Thesis advisor: Dominic Doyle / Moral, aesthetic, and religious pluralism has become a source of disagreement and friction in the modern world. Within the context of modernity and precipitated by the American and French revolutions, liberal democracy has aimed to organize the social and political life of societies in which their inhabitants sustain different, distant, and sometimes contradictory conceptions of the good life. Liberal secular principles have been the framework used to protect fundamental values such us freedom, equality, and mutual respect. In order to preserve the stability of a plural society, liberalism insists that moral and religious convictions must remain a private matter. Democracy and tolerance, it was argued, would be best preserved if religious convictions were removed from the public/political conversation. Yet the debate about the appropriate relationship between religion and politics regularly resurfaces among political and moral philosophers, social theorists, and theologians. / Thesis (STL) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. School of Theology and Ministry. / Discipline: Sacred Theology.

In recent years, political legitimacy as a concept distinct from full justice has received much attention. Yet in addition to querying the specific conditions legitimacy requires, there is a more general question: What is legitimacy even about? How ought we identify and conceptualize these conditions? According to the regnant justificatory liberal (JL) approach, legitimate legal coercion is based on reasons all reasonable persons can accept and JL is explicated in terms of a hypothetical procedure. Alas, Part I explains why JL is inadequate. First, I argue that it de-legitimizes all coercion. Second, it undercuts the proposition that there are certain basic rights which must be protected for legitimacy. Third, I suggest that JL structurally involves paternalism. Where should theorists turn? My perhaps surprising proposal is that they turn to the Christian Reformed (CR) tradition of social thought. As I take it, this tradition is composed of such figures as Augustine and Calvin, Abraham Kuyper and Herman Dooyeweerd, and, more recently, Francis Schaeffer. It has long theorized such issues as church-state separation and permissible coercion, and is replete with conceptual resources. Thus, Part II reconstructs an alternative legitimacy framework out of these resources. The central CR insight is this: legitimacy is a function of preventing basic wrongs. Legal coercion is only necessary "by reason of sin". I develop this insight in terms of three ideas. First, those wrongs which must prevented as conditions of legitimacy are objective wrongs, obtaining universally regardless of consent. Second, they presuppose some view of basic teleology. A teleological view is needed to elaborate contentful basic rights non-arbitrarily, but only a basic teleological view insofar as legitimacy is distinct from full justice. Third, I suggest these wrongs are fruitfully understood as constituting an exogenous standard, one that is neither the product of actual nor hypothetical self-legislation. Part III brings JL and CR legitimacy into dialogue. Understanding legitimacy in terms of objective, teleological, and exogenous wrongs, respectively, helps us avoid each of the unacceptable consequences of JL covered in Part I. Legitimacy is better conceptualized in CR terms; preventing such wrongs is what legitimacy is about. / Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2013-11-13 04:18:01.642

La produzione di carne è disciplinata dai diritti ebraico ed islamico attraverso normative che, a prescindere dalle loro rispettive specificità, sono accomunate dallo scopo fondamentale di rammentare ai fedeli la gravità dell’atto di privare un animale della vita. La produzione di carni kashèr (idonee ad essere consumate, in base al diritto ebraico) e halal (lecite, ai sensi di quello islamico) trova generalmente spazio nelle democrazie pluraliste in virtù del diritto alla libertà religiosa. Questo, ad ogni modo, non esime lo Stato dalla responsabilità di disciplinare la macellazione e l’uso commerciale delle indicazioni di qualità kashèr e halal, in ragione ed entro i limiti dei propri compiti di tutela della salute umana ed animale, della concorrenza e dei consumatori. Assolvere questa responsabilità nel rispetto della reciproca autonomia tra Stato e confessioni religiose implica la ricerca di un equilibrio complesso, soprattutto quando si tratta di individuare e delimitare le competenze dei poteri pubblici, degli enti confessionali e del settore privato in materia di macellazione rituale e di certificazione religiosa delle carni. La tesi analizza e mette a confronto le soluzioni normative adottate in due ordinamenti (quello francese e quello statunitense) ispirati al principio di separazione dello Stato dalle religioni, seppur con declinazioni molto differenti. / Meat production is regulated by both Jewish and Islamic Laws through sets of rules that, aside from their respective specificities, share the aim of teaching reverence for life to the believers. Generally speaking, in pluralist democracies the production of kosher (“fit/proper”, according to Jewish Law) and halal (“permissible”, under Islamic Law) meat is protected under the right to freedom of religion. However, the State retains the authority to regulate the use of religious slaughter and that of kosher and halal claims in the meat market, on the basis and within the limits of its mandate to protect and promote public health, humane treatment of animals, fair market competition and consumer rights. Fulfilling such responsibility without overstepping the bounds of State-religion mutual autonomy is a complex task, especially when it comes to determining the roles of public authorities, religious bodies and the private sector in the fields of ritual slaughter and religious certification; it requires, indeed, to strike a fair balance between several - sometimes competing - rights and interests. The dissertation analyses and compares the legal approaches through which these matters are addressed in France and in the US, where the general principle of separation between Church and State is construed and implemented in profoundly different ways.