This dissertation is an empirical study of the political benefits of decentralization. It examines the effects of decentralization on citizens’ evaluations of the political system. Despite the large number of empirical studies on the costs and benefits of decentralization, most studies focus on economic benefits (typically in terms of fiscal efficiency) and pay little attention to potential political benefits. This dissertation seeks to fill these gaps by explicitly modeling the role decentralization plays in shaping citizens’ attitudes toward a political system. Drawing on work in political behavior and decentralization, a theoretical framework is developed to explain the manner in which citizens’ attitudes are shaped by election outcomes and their post-electoral win-loss status in multi-tier government. This dissertation not only offers a general argument with which to understand how a decentralized political structure may lead to greater stability in a democratic regime, but also offers guidance to policymakers on whether decentralization should be pursued as an option for institutional reform.