Thesis (M. A.)--University of Canterbury, 2009. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 212-239). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Title from title screen (viewed July 24, 2003). Includes bibliographical references. Also available in paper format.

The Arab Spring catalyzed dramatic transformations in the Middle East and initiated a long process that will eventually lead to new governing structures throughout the region. The prominence and growing influence of Turkey in the international arena has spurred some Western pundits, academics, and diplomats to advocate the “Turkish model” as a template for creating stable institutions in the Middle East states of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. Civil-military relations factor prominently into this model. Before recommending the Turkish model to any state, it behooves the international community to thoroughly vet every component. Previous to 1997, the military occupied a central role in determining the political, economic, and social trajectory of the Republic of Turkey. This guardian role conflicted with Western notions of healthy civil-military relations emanating from Europe and the United States. Since initiating the EU accession process in 1997, however, Turkey has implemented drastic reforms bringing the Turkish model of civil-military relations into alignment with European standards. Political leadership, incarnated in the Justice and Development Party, has encountered significant resistance from civilian and military opposition in the process of bringing the military under democratic control. Nonetheless, under the political leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, this resistance has been overcome. The Turkish model, as it exists today, evolved in response to unique historical and cultural contexts, continuing through great barriers. As such, facsimile transfer of the model to other states is bound to fail. However, lessons gleaned from Turkey’s difficult transition to more democratic controls over the military might inform similar transitions in Arab states. Careful analysis of the great obstacles political leadership has overcome in bringing the military under democratic civilian control may prove more valuable to Arab states than the Turkish model itself. / text

This dissertation constructs a structural theory of civil-military relations that identifies security threats as the primary independent variable that influences the military organization and its political role. My structural theory comprises two-stage causal connections. In the first stage, security threats as an independent variable shape the relative power of major domestic political actors: civilian leadership, military organization, and civil society. In the next, interactions among these actors are responsible for specific manifestations of the military's political role, from domination to total subordination. My thesis is that high threats provide the military with favorable conditions to be politically influential, while low threats work against army officers' involvement in politics. At the same time, domestic political dynamics are responsible for more nuanced aspects of the military's political role. This dissertation conducts a structured-focused comparative analysis of four Asian countries: South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The four cases are divided into four historical stages: (1) the state-building period (1940s-1950s), (2) armed forces' assumption of power (1960s-1970s), (3) the army's withdrawal from politics (1980s- 1990s), and (4) civil-military relations in the post-democratization era. The empirical analysis generates four major theoretical conclusions. First, high security threats bring about the expansion of the military organization and its political influence, while low threats weaken its political presence. Second, strong civilian leadership leads to stable civilian control over the armed forces, while weak civilian leadership invites them into politics. Third, a unified and professionalized army is conducive to stable civilian control, while a factionalized military leads to the politicization of army officers. Finally, a strong civil society with moderate ideology works against the armed forces' intervention in politics, while weak or ideologically radical civil society groups deteriorate security conditions, thereby bringing the military into politics. In addition to giving deeper insights into the military's political role, my structural theory provides a good starting point for integrating international relations and comparative politics in one theoretical model. As this study shows, security threats affect the military's domestic political position; at the same time, the military organization and its political position may account for certain international security outcomes. / text

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2007. / Bibliography. Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (M.S.)--School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2008. / "June 2008." Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-88). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 1998. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 593-610).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2007. / Thesis directed by Thomas Kselman for the Department of History. "April 2007." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 253-259).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Wollongong, 2008. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references: leaf 299-323.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Oklahoma, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 76-80). Also available via the Internet.