Thesis--Universidad de Nariño. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 183-190).

This thesis examines the bases for the implication of terms, the relation between interpretation and implication as well as the relation between the bases for the implication of terms and the theories of contract formation. There is authoriative support in England and South Africa for the following bases for the implication of terms: (a) unexpressed subjective consensus; (b) the reasonable expectation principle; (c) logic and/or the rational construction of the contract; (d) legal rules or incidents governing particular kinds of contractual relationships; and (e) the <i>Moorcock</i> doctrine. It is submitted the the <i>Moorcock</i> doctrine should be discarded, because it involves an artificial approach to the resolution of cntractual disputes which obscures the true reasons for the implication of terms in individual cases and is conducive to much uncertainty. The law will be none the poorer if the doctrine is abandoned, because the courts' powers to interpret contracts and to recognise novel legal rules governing particular kinds of contractual relationships are adequate tools for the resolution of contractual disputes. It is shown that the courts frquently manipulate the principles of the <i>Moorcock</i> doctrine in the interest of justice. This practice has obscured the emergence of a principle to counter-balance the doctrine of sanctity of contract. It is argued that the appropriate counter-balancing principle is that the courts have the power to adopt and apply rules governing particular kinds of contractual relationships after an evaluation of the competing considerations of policy attending the kind of relationship in question. Examples of specific policy considerations which may be of assistance in this regard are supplied. The influence of English law on the South African law relating to implied terms is examined.

No description available.

No description available.

This thesis examines common-law and civil-law jurisdictions in order to find differences between them. These differences are then being qualified as either relevant or irrelevant for the categorisation of individual jurisdictions. This reflects the argument that only features occurring in only one of the legal families can be relevant when categorising jurisdictions. Only such features can be, from the author’s point of view, specific and typical for their legal family and inherent features of them.The first thing to be considered under this premise is the respective sources of law (Chapter 1). These are in civil-law jurisdictions traditionally statutes and in commonlaw jurisdictions predominantly courts’ decisions. There are, of course, statutes also in common-law jurisdictions and previous courts’ decisions play an important role also in civil-law systems. The differences are not inherent. Furthermore, there are fundamental legal concepts, that is important concepts underlying the respective rules. These concepts may explain differences between the rules. The examination of sources of law, altogether, does not reveal any distinguishing factors.Chapters 2–5 discuss the issue of attitudes of common-law and civil-law judges to statutory interpretation. Chapter 2 examines the respective methods of statutory interpretation. This does not reveal any differences as to common-law and civil-law judges’ attitudes; for instance, greater adherence of common-law judges to the literal meaning of rules arguably does not exist. As shown in Chapter 3, this is true also in the area of Criminal Law under the special safeguards this subject provides. Chapter 4 asserts terminology causes differences between the systems; this is true even in case of identical terminology which is sometimes being interpreted in a diametrically different way. Moreover, differences can also be compensated for elsewhere in the legal system. Altogether, Chapter 4 does not reveal any inherent differences between the systems. As Chapter 5 shows, there is an ongoing process of convergence between common-law and civil-law systems, which means the categorisation into legal families becomes even less plausible.Chapter 6 shows that the categorisation into legal families is not only incorrect but also highly misleading and that there are numerous scholarly statements relying incorrectly on the family concept. The proposition (Chapter 7) is that it may nevertheless be feasible to structure comparative-law texts according to the wellknown legal families, as these show a common historical background. However, for conducting research into particular foreign legal rules (micro-comparative research), the family concept becomes a misleading starting-point. Insofar the concept should be abandoned or, at least, used only together with an appropriate warning.

Univ., Diss.--Zugl.: Paris.

Lietuvos Respublikos civilinis kodeksas 1.2 straipsnyje įtvirtina civilinių teisinių santykių reglametavimo principus. Šiame straipsnyje pateikiami tik principų pavadinimai, o jų turinys atskleidžiamas per kitus Civilinio kodekso straipsnius ar teismų praktiką. Principų vaidmuo vis auga, nes jie yra tam tikros gairės, kuriomis turi sekti tiek įstatymų leidėjas, tiek teisėjas, spręsdamas bylą, tiek patys civilinių teisinių santykių subjektai. Todėl šiame darbe civilinės teisės principai atskleidžiami per teismų praktiką, tai yra kokį jų turinį ir supratimą savo priimamuose sprendimuose nustato teismai. Pirmoje darbo dalyje pateikiama bendra civilinės teisės principų interpretacija - kas yra teisės principas, kartu pateikiant civilinės teisės principo sąvoką. Taip pat analizuojamos civilinės teisės principų funkcijos, kurios yra svarbios aiškinant pačių principų turinį. Tame pačiame skyriuje aptariamas santykis tarp civilinės teisės santykių reglamentavimo ir įgyvendinimo principų, nuosekliai pereinant prie kelių Europos Sąjungos principų, kurie padarė didžiausią įtaką Lietuvos civilinei teisei, kadangi buvo perkelti harmonizuojant mūsų teisės normas. Antroje darbo dalyje kiekvienas civilinės teisės principas analizuojamas atskirai, jo analizė pateikiama remiantis mokslininkų nuomone bei teismų suformuluotomis taisyklėmis. Paskutinėje darbo dalyje nurodomos civilinės teisės principų ribojimo galimybės ir būdai, kaip tai galima padaryti. Pabrėžtina, kad negalima piktnaudžiauti... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / The 1.2 article of the Lithuanian Civil Code establishes the principles of the regulation of legal civil relations. Only the bare names of these principles are being presented in this article, while their content is revealed through the other articles of the Civil Code or through the judicial practice. The importance of the principles keeps growing, since these seem to constitute certain basis which is equally to be relied upon as by legislation, so by judges (that deal with the case) or by the subjects of legal civil relations themselves. It follows that in the present work the principles of civil law are revealed through the judicial practice (i.m. what content and interpretation of the mentioned principles the court establishes in its litigations and judgments). In the first part of the present work, general interpretation of the principles of civil law is presented, and, at the same time, in respect of that, the definition of a principle is clarified. There are analyzed as well the functions of the principles of civil law, these are essential in future while explaining the content of the principles themselves. The correlation between the regulation principles of civil law and enforcement principles of civil law is analyzed in the same part of the work; afterwards the author consequently passes on to some principles of European Union that caused enormous impact on the Lithuanian civil law, as they have been extrapolated within the harmonization of our provisions. Each of... [to full text]

It is held that the police officer is liable at criminal and civil law the same as the citizen; given constitutional expression in the common law office of constable. Yet, in the execution of their duty police officers are prone to committing a range of criminal offences - assault, false imprisonment, perverting the course of justice - defined in this thesis as police crimes. Statistical analysis reveals that police officers are rarely prosecuted for these offences, suggesting that criminal liability is an illusion, and civil proceedings have become an increasingly popular remedy for police wrongdoing. This thesis holds that ss.48 and 49 of the Police Act 1964 played a prominent part in undermining the police officer's accountability to the law. This was achieved under s.48 by removing the police officer's personal responsibility for his wrongdoing at civil law, and introduction of a vicarious liability rule. And, under s.49, by definition of reports of alleged criminal offences committed by police officers as complaints, and codification of a separate criminal procedure. Since the 1964 Act, statute and case law on police wrongdoing have caused further damage to the constitutional position by emphasising the internal police complaint and disciplinary processes and devaluing issues of liability. It is argued that there is a conflict between the ancient office of constable and the recently developed doctrine of constabulary independence, and it is proposed that a 'balance model' accurately reflects the constitutional position of the police. This thesis examines recent developments at common law alongside the statutory trend, including intended reform of the complaint and discipline processes, and concludes that the integrity of the constitutional position has been seriously damaged. It is proposed that the police officer is no longer accountable to the law for his wrongdoing in like manner as the citizen, and the office of constable survives as a constitutional fiction.

This thesis examines common-law and civil-law jurisdictions in order to find differences between them. These differences are then being qualified as either relevant or irrelevant for the categorisation of individual jurisdictions. This reflects the argument that only features occurring in only one of the legal families can be relevant when categorising jurisdictions. Only such features can be, from the author’s point of view, specific and typical for their legal family and inherent features of them.The first thing to be considered under this premise is the respective sources of law (Chapter 1). These are in civil-law jurisdictions traditionally statutes and in commonlaw jurisdictions predominantly courts’ decisions. There are, of course, statutes also in common-law jurisdictions and previous courts’ decisions play an important role also in civil-law systems. The differences are not inherent. Furthermore, there are fundamental legal concepts, that is important concepts underlying the respective rules. These concepts may explain differences between the rules. The examination of sources of law, altogether, does not reveal any distinguishing factors.Chapters 2–5 discuss the issue of attitudes of common-law and civil-law judges to statutory interpretation. Chapter 2 examines the respective methods of statutory interpretation. This does not reveal any differences as to common-law and civil-law judges’ attitudes; for instance, greater adherence of common-law judges to the literal meaning of rules arguably does not exist. As shown in Chapter 3, this is true also in the area of Criminal Law under the special safeguards this subject provides. Chapter 4 asserts terminology causes differences between the systems; this is true even in case of identical terminology which is sometimes being interpreted in a diametrically different way. Moreover, differences can also be compensated for elsewhere in the legal system. Altogether, Chapter 4 does not reveal any inherent differences between the systems. As Chapter 5 shows, there is an ongoing process of convergence between common-law and civil-law systems, which means the categorisation into legal families becomes even less plausible.Chapter 6 shows that the categorisation into legal families is not only incorrect but also highly misleading and that there are numerous scholarly statements relying incorrectly on the family concept. The proposition (Chapter 7) is that it may nevertheless be feasible to structure comparative-law texts according to the wellknown legal families, as these show a common historical background. However, for conducting research into particular foreign legal rules (micro-comparative research), the family concept becomes a misleading starting-point. Insofar the concept should be abandoned or, at least, used only together with an appropriate warning.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Köln, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 245-278).