This study is an analysis of how military issues can contribute to a sustainable ending of civil wars particularly in Africa. The continuous warfare in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) between 1996 and 2004 is used to understand the nature of civil wars and how they relate to classical strategic theory of war in general and their termination in particular. According to classical strategic military theory, war must always be guided by clear political objectives. Without this, war becomes an irrational act and spins out of control. Tactical victory gained in the battlefield over an opponent must be translated into strategic victory for war to end sustainably. This can only be done if the political objective of the war has been attained. But also crucial are the terms and conditions of peace that the victor offers the defeated opponent. Not all wars end with a tactical victory in the battlefield. In many instances of modern wars, and in particular with the current civil wars in Africa, there is a stalemate. This forces the belligerent parties to negotiate. Within the context of the DRC, the first war (1996-1997) ended in a tactical victory for the Rwandan alliance (composed of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi) over the regime of President Mobutu. However, this victory was not translated into strategic victory (long term peace). The alliance, despite having installed a new leader (Laurent Kabila) in the DRC, remained an occupying force, with the Rwandan military commander taking over the role of the DRC’s military chief of staff. This was in part because the political objectives of the Rwandan alliance had changed from revenge on Mobutu for sheltering and supporting the perpetrators of the genocide in Rwanda, to economic exploitation of the abundant natural resources of the DRC. The outcome was that the proxy (Kabila) turned against his backers as he sought to gain legitimacy and support from his fellow Congolese citizens. President Kabila ordered the Rwandan alliance out of the country. The alliance then started a second war (1998-2002) aimed at deposing the former proxy and establishing new proxies. The situation had however changed as the old proxy (Kabila) had acquired new partners (Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe). This, apart from transforming the DRC war into Africa’s first continental war (in terms of the number of countries that were eventually involved), turned into a stalemate. This resulted in negotiations that took a long time to complete. The first round of negotiations produced the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (LCA) in 1999 with two independent tracks that led to two levels of agreements: inter-state agreements and intra-state agreements. None of these were implementable until 2002 when the DRC negotiated with Rwanda and with Uganda separately on military issues of the conflict. These negotiations produced the Pretoria Accords between the DRC and Rwanda, and the Luanda Accords between the DRC and Uganda. The withdrawal of the militaries of Rwanda and Uganda from the DRC paved way for their proxies, The Rally for Congolese Democracy - Goma (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie - RCD-Goma) and the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (Mouvement de Libération du Congo – MLC) to join the Inter-Congolese National Dialogue (ICND) which ended in 2004 without a conclusive agreement on military issues. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2015. / tm2015 / Political Sciences / PhD / Unrestricted