The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme was born out of international security concerns triggered by rebel groups that were using the proceeds of rough diamonds to fund conflict. Rebel groups used rough diamonds, acquired through gross human rights abuses, to fund conflicts aimed at overthrowing legitimate governments. The situation was particularly calamitous and ruinous in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In response to this situation a unique coalition of governments, civil society groups and stakeholders in the diamond industry, came together with the support of the United Nations and established a scheme to separate illicitly acquired diamonds from legally traded diamonds. The historical situation at the time allowed the KPCS to define conflict diamonds as "rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments". However, the exploitation of Marange diamonds in Zimbabwe shows that the use of the proceeds of so-called conflict in diamonds is not limited to rebel movements aiming to wield power but such conflict can be political, economic and military in nature. In Zimbabwe, there was a link between human rights abuses and the ZANU PF led government. ZANU PF financed terror using Marange diamonds. There was international dissatisfaction with the way the KPCS scheme certified Marange diamonds. The USA maintained sanctions on Zimbabwe and Global Witness withdrew from the scheme in protest over the refusal of the scheme to evolve. On the other hand, some participant countries applauded the scheme for its work in certifying Marange diamonds. This study evaluates the efficacy of the scheme in curbing conflict diamonds brought into legal trade by legitimate governments. The study concludes that there is need for reform in the KPCS to successfully separate conflict diamonds from clean diamonds in the face of changing forms of conflict. In meeting its objective, the KPCS applies an exclusion mechanism where participants of the scheme do not trade with non-participants. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules prohibit discrimination amongst participants and the KPCS clearly violated this rule. Scholars have debated human rights exceptions in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). There is strong legal support for the idea that the KPCS is justified under GATT article XX and XI. The KPCS is presently operating under a waiver granted from by the WTO under article IX (3) and (4). Another challenge the scheme faces is the legal nature of the scheme. Scholars do not agree on whether to classify the scheme as hard law or soft law. There is a need for clarity on the legal nature of the scheme. / LLM (Import and Export Law), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme was born out of international security concerns triggered by rebel groups that were using the proceeds of rough diamonds to fund conflict. Rebel groups used rough diamonds, acquired through gross human rights abuses, to fund conflicts aimed at overthrowing legitimate governments. The situation was particularly calamitous and ruinous in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In response to this situation a unique coalition of governments, civil society groups and stakeholders in the diamond industry, came together with the support of the United Nations and established a scheme to separate illicitly acquired diamonds from legally traded diamonds. The historical situation at the time allowed the KPCS to define conflict diamonds as "rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments". However, the exploitation of Marange diamonds in Zimbabwe shows that the use of the proceeds of so-called conflict in diamonds is not limited to rebel movements aiming to wield power but such conflict can be political, economic and military in nature. In Zimbabwe, there was a link between human rights abuses and the ZANU PF led government. ZANU PF financed terror using Marange diamonds. There was international dissatisfaction with the way the KPCS scheme certified Marange diamonds. The USA maintained sanctions on Zimbabwe and Global Witness withdrew from the scheme in protest over the refusal of the scheme to evolve. On the other hand, some participant countries applauded the scheme for its work in certifying Marange diamonds. This study evaluates the efficacy of the scheme in curbing conflict diamonds brought into legal trade by legitimate governments. The study concludes that there is need for reform in the KPCS to successfully separate conflict diamonds from clean diamonds in the face of changing forms of conflict. In meeting its objective, the KPCS applies an exclusion mechanism where participants of the scheme do not trade with non-participants. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules prohibit discrimination amongst participants and the KPCS clearly violated this rule. Scholars have debated human rights exceptions in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). There is strong legal support for the idea that the KPCS is justified under GATT article XX and XI. The KPCS is presently operating under a waiver granted from by the WTO under article IX (3) and (4). Another challenge the scheme faces is the legal nature of the scheme. Scholars do not agree on whether to classify the scheme as hard law or soft law. There is a need for clarity on the legal nature of the scheme. / LLM (Import and Export Law), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014