Perspective taking is typically defined as the ability to reason about others’ mental states (e.g. their beliefs, thoughts, desires, and intentions) and to understand the role of those mental states in everyday situations (I. A. Apperly, 2012). Traditional accounts of perspective taking typically analyze the ability based on three different domains: visual, affective or emotional, and cognitive perspective taking (Flavell, 2004). From a behavioral viewpoint, perspective taking skills are built upon the ability to recognize our own behavior in relation to the context. Relational Frame Theory (RFT) is a contemporary behavioral account of human language and cognition (Hayes et al., 2007). From an RFT viewpoint, perspective-taking skills involve deictic relations between individuals, spaces, and time. Instead of using the three dimensions analyzed in the other fields, RFT studies the development of complex perspective-taking skills through three types of deictic frames: interpersonal (I-YOU-OTHER), spatial (HERE-THERE), and temporal (NOW-THEN-LATER). The purpose of this dissertation was to develop a set of behavioral assessments to measure visual, emotional, and cognitive perspective-taking skills from an RFT viewpoint. This dissertation made methodological and empirical contributions to the field by proposing three behavioral computer-based protocols for evaluating the role of deictic frames on visual, emotional, and cognitive perspective taking tasks. Experiment 1 results revealed significant differences in response latency and correct response levels on interpersonal and spatial deictic frames at simple and reverse levels of complexity on a visual perspective-taking task. These findings suggested that transforming stimulus functions following a mutually entailed relationship between interpersonal and spatial frames is not equivalent to performing conditional discriminations involving both interpersonal and spatial stimuli. Experiment 2 results revealed significant differences in response latency and correct response levels on interpersonal frames with simple, reverse, and double reverse levels of complexity on an emotional perspective-taking task. The finding showed that as the complexity of the deictic relations in emotional perspective taking increased, so did the number of errors and latency to respond. Furthermore, the findings of the study indicate that the valence of emotions has an effect on the levels of deictic relational responding. On a cognitive perspective-taking task, the results of Experiment 3 revealed significant differences in response latency and correct response levels on interpersonal frames with simple and reverse levels of complexity. False beliefs and false desires increased the number of errors and latency to respond to interpersonal deictic frames, according to the findings. Overall, these protocols improved the ecological validity of RFT-based protocols of deictic frames, extended previous research on perspective taking, and opened up new research avenues.

Perspective taking (PT) is the ability to imagine perspectives that differ from our own. Understanding what others believe (cognitive PT) and feel (affective PT) allows us to better navigate social situations, and understanding what others see (spatial PT) allows us to better navigate spatial environments. Deficits in spatial, cognitive, and affective PT are apparent in several DSM–5 categorized clinical populations including autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and major depressive disorder (MDD). Further, differences in the severity of PT impairments may be related to general mechanisms that support this ability rather than diagnostic categories. However, the general cognitive mechanisms that support PT and whether spatial, cognitive, and affective PT share behavioral co-variance and rely on common neural mechanisms is not yet understood. There are at least two theoretical accounts regarding the association of spatial, cognitive, and affective PT. Common mechanisms accounts propose that the three types of PT are associated because all rely on manipulation of frame-of-reference representations coordinated by dorsal and ventral attentional networks. Alternative proposals suggest that attentional mechanisms support spatial PT, but cognitive and affective PT are supported by a distinct module for mental state reasoning. In this dissertation, I begin by summarizing prior evidence from studies which examined the developmental emergence of PT abilities, behavioral co-variance of PT in neurotypical and clinically diagnosed adults, and neuroimaging studies of PT. Review of the literature indicates mixed findings with support for both common and distinct mechanisms accounts. Thus, the present work probes the association of spatial, cognitive, and affective PT across two experiments. In Experiment 1, a systematic activation likelihood estimation meta-analysis of spatial, cognitive, and affective PT and attention switching was conducted. Results indicated no single neural region that was commonly associated with all three types of PT, but several overlapping regions among cognitive and affective PT, and separately among spatial PT and attention switching. In Experiment 2, two behavioral tasks and one self-report measure each of spatial, cognitive, and affective PT, a behavioral measure of attention and general reasoning ability were administered to large sample of young adults. Performance on spatial PT tasks did not significantly covary with cognitive PT, attention, nor two of the three affective PT measures in neurotypical adults. In sum, neural and behavioral experiments provided substantial support for distinct mechanisms accounts and only limited support for common mechanisms accounts of PT in neurotypical adults. / Psychology