Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1968. / Typescript. Vita. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin, 1966. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1966. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1973. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

No description available.

The 1993 Collective Bargaining Agreement changed the way that the National Football League operated with its player contracts. With the introduction of the salary cap and free agency players were given more freedom in where they took their talents while keeping the competitive balance of the league intact. There have been revisions and changes since the 1993 landmark CBA, specifically the 2011 CBA created changes mostly in the way that rookie salary and contract regulations function. This paper looks at whether the policy changes affected the competitive balance of the National Football League. Looking at point differential, competitive fairness, and winning percentage we found that the newest CBA did not create any significant changes in the competitive fairness of the league.

Magister Philosophiae - MPhil / The main objective of this research is to asses the effectiveness of the channels (collective bargaining and workplace forums) created by the LRA for employee‟s participation in decision making in the mining sector. Problems related to employee participation will be examined to determine whether they are structural or due to shortcomings in the LRA. If it is found that there are shortcomings of the labour legislation in this regard, recommendations on how the shortcoming can be addressed will be made. The significance of this research paper is that it attempts to determine the efficacy of the current statutorily protected channels for employee participation in the mining sector against the backdrop of prevalent theories on employee participation. Although many labour law authors have commented on the role of workplace forums in South Africa, the relative advantages of workplace forums have not been analysed through the lens of the theories on employee participation.

This study examines collective bargaining in 14 unionized community colleges in British Columbia. It provides a broad overview of bargaining in the colleges and insights into the tensions commonly associated with collective bargaining. The study combines qualitative data and quantitative data through the use of interviews, contractual analysis and two questionnaires. One survey examined the opinions of board members, senior administrators and faculty leaders on various aspects of collective bargaining. The latter included the competitive characteristics of distributive bargaining, governance, the scope of the collective agreements and a number of proposed modifications aimed at improving bargaining in the colleges. The study is significant as it fills a void in the research related to the above issues in British Columbia's colleges. The literature review encompassed a wide range of research. This included material related to the evolution of collective bargaining in higher education; factors that influence opinions of bargaining; constructive conflict, destructive conflict and dysfunctional competition; conflict resolution techniques associated with bargaining; and integrative bargaining. The study revealed a competitive collective bargaining climate in the colleges, characterized by such factors as a lack of trust and respect, inexperienced faculty negotiators, contractual constraints and a lack of bargaining priorities. The competitive climate was aggravated by a number of external factors (government policies); internal factors (the management style of a president); the composition of the faculty associations (combined vocational and academic faculty associations); and personal factors (age and political preferences). In terms of governance issues, the scope of the collective agreements and their political orientation, the board members and the senior administrators are essentially from the same population. The faculty leaders come from a different population. The respondents favour modifications that would enhance communications, training, and equal access to information, as well as the resolution of labour matters at the local level rather than at the provincial level. Distributive bargaining will likely remain the cornerstone of negotiations in British Columbia's colleges. Although it does not have to be as competitive as it is, the distributive model appears to be best suited to the resolution of Level I issues, e.g. salaries, benefits. Given the collegial traditions of higher education, the varying professional needs of the faculty, the issue of management rights and the intrinsic values of the parties involved, a more collaborative model of bargaining is necessary to accommodate Level II issues. The latter include faculty participation in college governance, peer evaluation, and the selection of other faculty. The study contributed to the research literature and produced a number of recommendations for practice. / Education, Faculty of / Graduate

This thesis is an attempt to combine two opposing arguments which have appeared in the literature of labour economics for nearly 25 years. The analysis deals with the formulation of a collective bargaining model which yields some insight into the wage-determining process. The economic criteria for a wage settlement proposed by J. T. Dunlop in his book, Wage Determination Under Trade Unions, are combined with the 'political' or 'power' variables which A. M. Ross had advocated as the most important determinants of wages in his book, Trade Union Wage Policy. The result is an analysis very similar to that of recent bargaining theory studies. Six industries from the British Columbia economy are examined within the concept of the model developed. These industries produce a major part of the output of this region. The examination of these industries, therefore, provides a key to the comprehension of the general trends and forces at work in the British Columbia labour market. The model attempts to discover the variables most significant in explaining the movement of wages in each industry from 1948 to 1968. The variables examined represent a combination of the economic and political forces which are hypothesized to act upon the wage determination process. In addition, the thesis examines those industries in the-context of a general wage structure. It is hypothesized that the existence of such a structure plays a large role in the wage determining process and has a significant influence upon trends in the economic activity of the province. The end result will be an explanation of the single and collective wage movements of these six industries. The findings generally support the theoretical hypothesis that the wage determining process is subject to both political and economic forces. Economic variables are able to confine wage settlements within a range. The size of this range also depends upon economic forces. Within the range, however, bargaining may involve a multiplicity of criteria. Both the union and the firm will often choose some easily observable criteria upon which to base wage settlements. This study attempts to determine the main criteria chosen within each industry. The conclusions reached show that wage comparisons made among industries by both workers and employers are able to explain the largest part of wage movements. A bargaining theory model is supported and ample evidence of a wage structure which plays an important role in the wage determining process is found. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate

The object of this research is to study how unions and firms divide the surplus or rents available to them. Many instruments are used in practice to make this division, but standard micro data only includes two: wages and employment. I use a new approach to study wage and employment contracts as I consider them equilibrium points in a noncooperative bargaining game. This work is an extension of wage-employment determination models, the extension being the incorporation of a bargaining model, specifically, a Rubinstein bargaining game. Given the objective functions of the two players, the wage and employment equations are specified by the equilibrium conditions for the game. Also, additional determinants of the contracts are identified. One of the characteristics of the model is that the wage and employment contracts are affected by the relative strike costs of the two negotiating parties even in the absence of strikes. The data involve the B.C. wood products industry and the IWA, a powerful union believed to have been successful at capturing rents. The data include input and output quantities and prices and equations representing input demands and output supply are estimated simultaneously with the negotiated wage and employment equations. Four estimation models are derived corresponding to two bargaining frameworks and two sets of assumptions on the firms' technology. The two bargaining frameworks correspond to two polar cases that have been assumed in the wage-employment determination literature: in one case, the wage is set through bargaining while the employment level is chosen by the firm, in the second case, both the wage and employment level are negotiated. In one pair of models, output is treated as exogenous to the bargaining while in the second set of models, output is endogenous and capital is exogenous. The bargaining game is successfully implemented in the sense that technology and union utility parameters are generally reasonable and comparable to previous estimates. Also, the determinants of relative strike costs enter significantly in the estimation. The union is seen to care about employment as well as the wage with slightly more weight being placed on the employment level. Rent maximization is always rejected. Bargaining powers are calculated at each data point and results indicate that the 1980's recession increased the relative power of the union. The hypotheses of equal bargaining powers and complete union bargaining power are tested and rejected. Also, the proportion of rents captured by the firm is found to be a poor indicator of its bargaining power. Although the qualitative results mentioned above are robust across the four models, parameter values are generally sensitive to both the technology assumptions and the bargaining framework. Ignoring the simultaneity of wages, employment and other variables chosen by the firm can be very misleading. Finally, the model in which both wages and employment are negotiated consistently performs better than the framework in which employment is unilaterally set by the firm. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate