This thesis is an attempt to combine two opposing arguments which have appeared in the literature of labour economics for nearly 25 years. The analysis deals with the formulation of a collective bargaining model which yields some insight into the wage-determining process. The economic criteria for a wage settlement proposed by J. T. Dunlop in his book, Wage Determination Under Trade Unions, are combined with the 'political' or 'power' variables which A. M. Ross had advocated as the most important determinants of wages in his book, Trade Union Wage Policy. The result is an analysis very similar to that of recent bargaining theory studies. Six industries from the British Columbia economy are examined within the concept of the model developed. These industries produce a major part of the output of this region. The examination of these industries, therefore, provides a key to the comprehension of the general trends and forces at work in the British Columbia labour market. The model attempts to discover the variables most significant in explaining the movement of wages in each industry from 1948 to 1968. The variables examined represent a combination of the economic and political forces which are hypothesized to act upon the wage determination process. In addition, the thesis examines those industries in the-context of a general wage structure. It is hypothesized that the existence of such a structure plays a large role in the wage determining process and has a significant influence upon trends in the economic activity of the province. The end result will be an explanation of the single and collective wage movements of these six industries. The findings generally support the theoretical hypothesis that the wage determining process is subject to both political and economic forces. Economic variables are able to confine wage settlements within a range. The size of this range also depends upon economic forces. Within the range, however, bargaining may involve a multiplicity of criteria. Both the union and the firm will often choose some easily observable criteria upon which to base wage settlements. This study attempts to determine the main criteria chosen within each industry. The conclusions reached show that wage comparisons made among industries by both workers and employers are able to explain the largest part of wage movements. A bargaining theory model is supported and ample evidence of a wage structure which plays an important role in the wage determining process is found. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate

This thesis examines the behavior of bargaining parties under a statutory scheme of compulsory conciliation. The statutory scheme used in the study is the basic pattern of conciliation effective in British Columbia from 1947 to 1968. Its general function is explained in a summarization of published criticisms of the process. A particular bargaining relationship -- that of the coast forest industry negotiations -- is examined on a historical and institutional basis to discover specific characteristics which would influence behavior under a conciliation process. Using this predicted pattern of interaction, a model of party behavior is constructed for the parties involved in actual negotiations. This is tested against a summarized chronology of the actual bargaining that occurred from 1947 to 1968. The model reveals the important sections within a system of compulsory conciliation which influence the behavior of the parties during negotiations. It also emphasizes the importance of the apparent fairness of the recommendation stage of conciliation and its value to the union as a tactical "watershed" for continued bargaining. The development of the dynamic process of party interaction in the coast forest industry emphasizes the importance of union internal or intra-organizational difficulties. It suggests the existence of a limit to the effectiveness of any bargaining system which does not control the desires of the union rank and file. With the dynamic process in mind, the analysis examines some of the influences that changing the statutory process would have upon the behavior of the parties. On this basis the actual significance or effectiveness of some past changes is analyzed and new changes are proposed. Too, the basic limits inherent in the compulsory conciliation system as a control over party behavior are emphasized. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate

Decertification is a legal term implying the dissolution of a unit of unionized employees. Just as a certification legally establishes a unionized unit of employees, a decertification eradicates the legal collective rights of the unit. This thesis examines the issue of decertification and why decertification occurs. The data is based on 43 cases of decertification in the Province of British Columbia, Canada. All the research was done by personal interviews. For each case of decertification, employers, union officials and neutral parties were asked to comment. The data was used to reconstruct the events within each case and isolate the characteristics of those involved. Most decertifications involved unskilled workers employed by small companies. The companies experience average turnover and are mostly in the manufacturing and service industries of the B.C. economy. The unions which experienced decertification are very large for B.C. and represent many small units. The unions are mostly industrial or miscellaneous locals. The employers' desire to break the certification and the unions' response to the employers' influence are the key features of decertification. The employers used a large array of tactics to break the union. At times the tactics were very subtle, such as employer comments and in other cases, the employer dismissed employees for their union activity. Because the units were very small, the union local assigned them a low priority to union resources. In many cases the union did not resist the employers' influence and a decertification resulted. In some cases, the union spent a great deal of resources to preserve the unit but employer influence in conjunction with turnover of staff resulted in the decertification. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

The forest products industry is a major part of British Columbia's economy, employing directly or indirectly about twenty percent of the province's workforce; and accounting for a significant percentage of the province's exports and government revenues. Historically, the industry has been characterized by highly centralized bargaining structures and formal pattern bargaining between the two regions, the Interior and the Coast, and between the two main industry sectors, pulp and paper and solid wood. Recent environmental changes however, have put considerable pressure on the current system. Because of these changes employers now desire less centralized structures and more local control over terms of the collective agreement. Pressures for decentralization have resulted from a combination of world wide trends and industry specific changes. The globalization of markets, increased volatility of currency exchange rates, and the increasing rate of technological change are examples of the former. Industry specific changes include the diversification of products and markets between regions and firms, and two major labour disputes in the 1980s. These changes however, have had little effect upon bargaining in the forest products industry. Some changes have occurred, but to date they have not been significant. Employers in the province's pulp and paper sector deaccredited their employer bargaining association in March 1985. Despite this change, bargaining in the last two rounds has been done jointly, as it has been done for the past four decades. The second change noted is the severing of ties between the Pulp Bureau and FIR, the Coastal solid wood employer association. Previously overseen by a common Chairman, these two bodies are now run independently to encourage the separation of bargaining outcomes in the two sectors. The final change of note is the role reversal between the pulp unions and the IWA. For many years it was the IWA who negotiated what would become the industry wide settlement. In the last two rounds of negotiations, however, the pulp unions have settled first. Despite what appear to be significant environmental changes, there has been relatively little change in bargaining in this industry. Clearly there are forces in the industry's industrial relations system that are preserving the status quo. Several organizational forces and one environmental force are identified which are preventing change in industry bargaining structures. Organizational forces include third party pressures (specifically threats of government intervention), industry tradition and past practice, and the unions' ability to resist unilateral changes in bargaining. The environmental force preventing employers from forcing change in industry bargaining structure is the economic health of product markets in the two sectors. Not until the pressures for change are great enough to overcome these inertial organizational forces will significant change occur in the bargaining structure and patterns of the B.C. forest products industry. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate