This thesis reports theory development and explorative field observation of potential effects of conflict occurring within a collective bargaining team. From the theoretical bases of Walton and McKersie's (1965) intraorganizational conflict (IOC) concept and Pondy's (1967) process model of conflict, a model of bargaining team IOC is developed. The model partitions bargaining team IOC into functional and dysfunctional subsets. Seven propositions related to the effects of dysfunctional IOC are developed from conflict and decision making literature. These propositions are concerned with the effects of dysfunctional IOC on participation of team members, rule breaking behavior, time delays, and decision styles. Operational definitions and tests for dysfunctional IOC are developed using Filley's (1975) five item definition of conflict and seven item win-lose, lose-lose, conflict responses. A participant/observer quasi-case analysis of an actual collective bargaining team experience is the basis for data generation. Many of the propositions are supported iii the observed bargaining team environment. While the single case methodology prevents generalized conclusions regarding the effects of dysfunctional IOC, the findings tentatively suggest there may be considerable practical payoffs for extending this research area. The field experience provides some additional research insights regarding the dynamic variable of dysfunctional IOC. In this study, dysfunctional bargaining team IOC is observed as a few recurring issue-related problems flowing throughout the bargaining team interactions. Implications of this study regarding future research on IOC in a bargaining team are suggested. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

Doctorat en sciences sociales, politiques et économiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished