This dissertation explains how the Republic of China (ROC), overseas Chinese (huaqiao), and the Philippines, sometimes but not always working with each other, produced and opposed the threat of Chinese communism from the end of World War II to the mid-1970s. It is not a history of US-led anticommunist efforts with respect to the Chinese diaspora, but rather an intra-Asian social and cultural history of anticommunism and nation-building that liberates two close US allies from US-centric historiographies and juxtaposes them with each other and the huaqiao community that they claimed. Three principal arguments flow from this focus on intra-Asian anticommunism. First, I challenge narrowly territorialized understandings of Chinese nationalism by arguing that Taiwan engaged in diasporic nation-building in the Philippines. Whether by helping the Philippine military identify Chinese communists or by mobilizing Philippine huaqiao in support of Taiwan, the ROC carved out a semi-sovereign sphere of influence for itself within a foreign country. It did so through institutions such as schools, the Kuomintang (KMT), and the Philippine-Chinese Anti-Communist League, which functioned transnationally and locally to embed the ROC into Chinese society and connect huaqiao to Taiwan. Through these groups, the ROC shaped the experiences of a national community beyond its territorial boundaries and represented itself as the legitimate “China” in the world. Second, drawing upon political theory, I argue that the anticommunist relationship between the ROC, the Philippines, and the Philippine Chinese constituted a form of what I call shared, non-territorial sovereignty. Nationalist China did not secure influence over Chinese in the Philippines by exerting military or economic pressure, as a neocolonial regime might. Vast disparities in power did not obtain between Manila and Taipei, as they did between them and Washington. Rather, for reasons of law, culture, linguistic incapacity, and ideology, the Philippines selectively outsourced the management of its Chinese residents to the ROC. In turn, both depended on the Chinese being able to govern themselves with state support, coercive and otherwise. The Philippine Chinese, as in colonial times, were thus semi-autonomous actors who participated in the construction of shared sovereignty after World War II by forging ties with states to advance their anticommunist agenda. This three-way relationship provides a framework for thinking about postcolonial sovereignty in East Asia that focuses on relations of relative equality between states and the relative autonomy of the Chinese as a minority population, rather than between dominant and dominated or in terms of territory. Nationalist China and the Philippines’ nation-building projects had profound consequences for the Philippine Chinese. While these peoples were in many respects acted upon by the ROC and Philippine states through legal and coercive means, they by no means lacked agency. Rather, they performed their agency as consensual participants in making anticommunism. In focusing on them, the dissertation shifts from international and transnational history to social and cultural history and the history of civic life. Existing scholarship, whether in the social sciences or Sinophone Studies, largely depicts the postcolonial hua subject as a non-ideological businessman or cultural producer. I argue, by contrast, that the overseas Chinese could be eminently ideological and politically active. From informing on suspected Chinese communists to the ROC and Philippine states to proclaiming their loyalties to the ROC and Chiang Kai-shek, anticommunist social practices enabled Philippine huaqiao to come to terms with being legally disadvantaged and ideologically suspect minorities in their country of residence. Unlike racial and cultural Chineseness, which they could or would not give up, they could and did choose to behave ideologically; and in doing so, they legitimized their community to the Philippine state and Filipino society.

The Communist Party of China CCP) controls all political, economic, and military issues in China. In the absence of elections, the only route of recruitment at higher levels of the political hierarchy in the Party is an official promotion. The scholarship on promotions offers two main explanations for advancement inside the Communist Party of China: (i) informal connections between high officials and candidates, and (ii) merit of candidates. This scholarship disregards, however, the importance of achievement of political targets by the candidates, specifically, their ability to deliver social stability. Like every authoritarian regime, the CCP faces threats from the masses over which the elites rule. Reducing social mobilization is a key component of the CCP’s rule. In the past decade, labor strikes have become offensive in nature with workers demanding better conditions and espousing democratic values, thus challenging the Party’s dominant position in Chinese society. In order to minimize collective activities of Chinese citizens, provincial officials use censorship of the media, including posts on the social media websites, threats of job termination, as well as threats of deportation from urban areas. For that reason, those provincial officials who minimize the number of labor protests increase their chance of promotion to the Politburo. Furthermore, avoiding unrest should matter more for the promotion of party secretaries than governors, whose domain is economic growth. To evaluate my argument, I analyze promotions of provincial leaders to the Politburo in 2003-2017. The data yield that—consistent with my argument—provincial leaders’ ability to minimize labor strikes increases their chances of promotion. In addition, positive economic performance matters more for the promotion of governors than of party secretaries.

This article is a reply to a statement by Elke Schwinger in WeltTrends 31. <br>The author tries to strike the balance between "coming to terms with the past" and the role of criminal law in this process in Germany. The principle of prohibition of retroactive laws, fixed in the 1990 German Unification Treaty and in the Constitution, had been broken in the trials against the "Mauerschützen" (border guards) in German criminal courts since 1990. There is an artificially constructed past which does not correspond to the reality of the border regime before 1989. <br>The author underlines that today the criminal law is misused for political aims within the German unification process.

Citizens around the world are using the Internet to connect with an international community, speak out against governmental injustices, and dissolve informational barriers. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a regime known for its strict control and harsh repression, is faced with the challenge of balancing an appropriate amount of civilian freedom on the Internet while still maintaining its monopolistic power. How does a one-party system successfully maintain control over the flow of information and sustain its unchallenged control of citizens in an increasingly-liberalized world? The Party’s answer to this question is a finely-tuned Internet censorship strategy, which this paper seeks to investigate.

The research is mainly to discuss about the realization of enlistment recruits in Chinese Naval Recruit Training Center of psychological warfare from the Communist Party of China, morale of armed conflict between Strait, and support of affixing ECFA. To make use of their age, education, politic tendency, residence,yearly revenue, whether have visited mainland China and whether their families migrated to Taiwan with KMT government in 1949 as variable analysis which corresponding to previous description. Use the self-designed poll ¡§The cognition of enlistment recruits about the relationship between Strait¡¨ as an instruction to survey these enlistment recruits, and SPSS statistical software to analysis variable above-mentioned and the recognitions of these enlistment recruits. According to outcome of our analysis, we found that it has different influences among the conditions, including age, education, yearly revenue, whether have visited mainland China, culture awareness, identification or recognition? political education, intention to work or to study in mainland China, psychological warfare from the Communist Party of China, morale of armed conflict between Strait, and affixing ECFA.

This dissertation addresses generalized trust in Post-Communist Europe. I examine trust stressing two sets of factors: the impact of attitudes associated with cleavages coming out of transition to democracy, and the importance of informal interpersonal association over more formal, structured forms of association. I argue that the classic list of cleavages suggested by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) have less importance to trust since those cleavages developed under the communist one-party state and were therefore less connected to the party system. As a result, these classic cleavages did not have the same mobilization functions as they did in Western Europe. Instead, I argue that cleavages that have developed out of the transition to democracy and a free-market economic system bear greater importance to trust. I further argue that due to the experience of forced group association during the communist era, and lingering distaste for formal political participation, the familiar Western models of the benefits of social engagement underestimate the importance of informal association in the post-communist states. Informal association was a key component of survival during the communist era and continues to be a valuable means of conferring information and forming political judgments. The first contribution this dissertation makes is that it brings together theories of political cleavages with theories of trust and social capital development. The dissertation bridges the gap between societal divisions and the position of the individual within these divisions. A second contribution of the dissertation is the testing of established theories of formal social engagement in post-communist states. The secretive nature of association during the communist era differs greatly from the open nature of association in the West. Theories of trust and social capital development must take this fact into account when exploring post-communist states.

Thesis (M.A.)--York University, 2008. Graduate Programme in Interdisciplinary Studies. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 117-121). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:MR45941

Thesis (M.S.W.)--University of Hong Kong, 1986.

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China’s current crop of leaders has inherited a country full of promise. After the disastrous socialist transformation under Mao, Deng Xiaoping and his successors have implemented large scale, successful economic and social reforms and in less than two generations brought China to the forefront of the global economy. As a result they have gartered most of the praise, glory, and often, economic windfall, associated with China’s success. The goal of this thesis is to examine the complex, non-linear fashion in which China’s top leadership is chosen, and explore the best possible paths to ascend the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party. An investigation of China’s current governing leaders’ paths to power will be included to illuminate how various factors including merit, patronage, institutional role, and luck play a part in the ultimate makeup of China’s top leadership. Key findings show that family pedigree, faction loyalty, and exceptional performance in important roles, especially in provincial governments are the most influential variables when predicting Chinese leadership.