Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Zürich.

Thesis (doctoral) - Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg im Breisgau. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 275-300).

Article 102 TFEU has been criticised in the past for being too formalistic and lacking in economic analysis. If these comments are true when considering traditional manufacturing industries, then these criticisms are of even more importance when dealing with the high technology markets for it is these markets the determine the future prosperity of Europe. High technology markets are characterised by rapid innovation, a reliance on intellectual property rights and are seen by many as being prone to market failure as a result off inefficient lock-in arising through the economic theory of network effects. As such it is questionable whether traditional means of applying European competition law are suitable in their application to the high technology markets. Tech giants such as Microsoft, Google, Apple and Intel have found themselves in the European Commission's crosshairs. More recently the European Parliament has voted in favour of breaking up Google in response to its alleged anticompetitive conduct. The case against Microsoft and more recently the Commission's investigation into Google provide an ideal starting point upon which to judge whether European competition law, as it is currently interpreted, is suited to deal with the high technology markets. Have the authorities' decisions made any real impact on the way the market operates? Have consumers benefited from their decisions? If the answers to these questions are no, it raises the further questions: what other tools are available when attempting to deal with competition issues within the high technology sectors? The technology sectors present competition law with a unique set of challenges and, with this in mind, the authorities may need to be careful when applying principles that were originally applied to markets that exhibited more 'traditional' economic characteristics.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Göttingen.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Breslau, (1928?). / Includes bibliographical references (p. [5-7]).

Habilitationsschrift--Heidelberg.

Habilitationsschrift--Heidelberg.

Thesis (M.B.A.)--Ohio State University, 1951. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 102-106). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center

This study flows from fundamentals by describing the raison d'etre of international competition policy: how competition law, interacts with trade policy and why that interaction has become a critical concern that should be addressed in an international cooperative framework. From this observation, this thesis concludes that policy initiatives to establish international substantive competition rules are both desirable and feasible. They are desirable because they would avoid international trade disputes deriving from conflicting implementations of trade and competition policies. They are feasible trough the application of a methodology which balances efficiency, fairness and social objectives. Such a methodology is proposed by the author for the determination of common substantive competition rules. / This set of proposals identifies changes that would be acceptable to most national participants in world trade and classifies trade practices into three categories: First, the trade practices prohibited per se, for which international standards can be reached in a short time; second, the trade practices examined under a rule-of-reason approach for which some common standards seem obtainable only in a mid-term frame given the existing divergent antitrust philosophies; third, international mergers and antidumping laws for which, given the strong industrial policy considerations, international substantive rules are not likely to emerge in the foreseeable future. / Finally, as practical illustration, this thesis explores the long-run potential for replacing anti-competitive aspects of current antidumping laws with more efficient and more equitable competition-policy safeguards. The substitution of the international price discrimination standard commonly applied in antidumping review by the predatory pricing standard favoured under antitrust investigations can be achieved through the introduction of two criteria: determination of the "impact on the domestic economy, as a whole" and calculation of the variable cost standard.

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