This study provides the model that first synthesizes strategic group theory with the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) approach in the international trade analysis, and uses the annual group data (1953-1988) from the U.S. brewing industry with two strategic groups (national producers and regional producers) in the presence of growing import competition. The main goal of study is to examine the impact of import and strategic group competition on strategic group behavior and market power in the U.S. brewing industry. Using the conjectural variation technique under the profit maximization assumption, the model estimates directly conjectural elasticities and the Lerner indexes incorporating firm behavior in competing with rivals from imports, and inside and outside each strategic group. The thesis shows the main following conclusions. Inside the group, national and regional brewers behave like Bertrand-type competitors and regional firms are more competitive than national firms. In the cross-group rivalry, national firms expect a cooperative response from regional brewers and regional firms expect an aggressive response from national producers. Holding possibly a sufficient niche market, import competition does not affect the behavior and market power of national and regional producers. As for over-all behavior, neither national nor regional firms behave like price-takers. National firms exert a significantly higher degree of market power than do regional firms, the market power of which appears to be harmed by national brewers. However, an average brewer exercises no market power in the industry as a whole. / Graduation date: 1997

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1996. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 204-209). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1996. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 204-209). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2006. / Advisor: Thomas M. Carsey, Florida State University, College of Social Sciences, Dept. of Political Science. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed June 14, 2006). Document formatted into pages; contains vi, 167 pages. Includes bibliographical references.

A firm provides voluntary disclosures to the financial market in order to guide the valuation of its shares by mitigating adverse selection. However, voluntary disclosures could cause detriment to the disclosing firm's prospects, as the firm's competitors in the product market observe the disclosures. Prior analytical research has conflicting positions about the role of product market competition in voluntary disclosure. One view (Verrecchia 1983) is that competitive disadvantage resulting from the existence of proprietary costs discourages firms in high competition industries from providing voluntary disclosures. Another view (Darrough and Stoughton 1990) is that firms provide voluntary disclosures to deter potential rivals from entering the industry. This paper examines the association between voluntary disclosure and product market competition after controlling for firm size, analyst following, firm performance, and access to external financing. It looks at disclosures in press releases, an issue that is relatively unexplored, even though press releases have become one of the most important channels of communication in the United States. A total of 5,587 press releases by 156 U.S. firms in 1998 are studied. Product market competition is measured by the Herfindahl- Hirschman Index. It is found that the firms in high competition industries provide, on average, greater voluntary disclosures than the firms in low competition industries. The results are found to be robust to revisions in the specification of the model and modifications in the sample.

This thesis is concerned with the relationships between profit, profit persistence, risk and competition within the US commercial bank sector. In particular, the thesis asks three questions: how profit and profit persistence are affected by changes in regulation designed to enhance competition; how profit persistence varies over time according to changes in market and economic conditions; how different aspects of banks' risk is affected by competition and market structure. Understanding the nature of these relationships is important given the prominent role banks play in the allocation of resources, the provision of capital to the economy and the stability of the financial system. Moreover, these roles in turn, have an effect on bank performance and wider economic growth and stability. Such issues have especially come to prominence following the financial crisis and thus there is a need for empirical evidence on which to base policy. To examine these relationships the thesis implements panel estimation techniques and obtains data on all commercial banks, primarily over the period 1984-2009, thus including births and deaths. The key findings show, first, that profit persistence is relatively low compared to previous US banking studies and compared to manufacturing firms. Moreover, persistence varies with regulatory changes, although not always in the expected direction, notably the increase in persistence following the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Second, additional time-variation in persistence is linked to bank specific, market structure and economic factors. Notably, persistence varies with bank size and market share, market concentration and output growth, but the precise nature of these relationships varies across the sample and by bank size. Third, that there is a difference in the nature of the relationship between competition and loan risk on the one hand and competition and total risk and leverage on the other. We also find that the relationship between risk and market structure varies according to bank size and that the economic cycle influences banks' risk. The implications and contribution of this thesis lie in establishing empirical evidence for understanding the nature of the relationships between competition, profits and risk. This is particularly prescient given the move towards new regulation following the financial crisis. Key results here show that no simple relationship exists between bank size or market concentration and competition and risk, therefore policy should account for such differences, whether according to bank size or type of risk.

Electricity prices in competitive markets are extremely volatile with salient features such as mean-reversion and jumps and spikes. Modeling electricity spot prices is essential for asset and project valuation as well as risk management. I introduce the mean-reversion feature into a classical variance gamma model to model the electricity price dynamics as a mean-reverting variance gamma (MRVG) process. Derivative pricing formulae are derived through transform analysis and model parameters are estimated by the generalized method of moments and the Markov Chain Monte Carlo method. A real option approach is proposed to value a tolling contract incorporating operational characteristics of the generation asset and contractual constraints. Two simulation-based methods are proposed to solve the valuation problem. The effects of different electricity price assumptions on the valuation of tolling contracts are examined. Based on the valuation model, I also propose a heuristic scheme for hedging tolling contracts and demonstrate the validity of the hedging scheme through numerical examples. Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) and Generalized ARCH (GARCH) models are widely used to model price volatility in financial markets. Considering a GARCH model with heavy-tailed innovations for electricity price, I characterize the limiting distribution of a Value-at-Risk (VaR) estimator of the conditional electricity price distribution, which corresponds to the extremal quantile of the conditional distribution of the GARCH price process. I propose two methods, the normal approximation method and the data tilting method, for constructing confidence intervals for the conditional VaR estimator and assess their accuracies by simulation studies. The proposed approach is applied to electricity spot price data taken from the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland market to obtain confidence intervals of the empirically estimated Value-at-Risk of electricity prices. Several directions that deserve further investigation are pointed out for future research.

The overriding theme of this thesis concerns the level of antitrust enforcement within the U.S. airline industry by the agencies entrusted with this task. / After a brief Introduction, Chapter I will examine whether concentration within the U.S. airline industry is a natural phenomenon or an ordinary monopoly/oligopoly resulting from the behaviour of competitors. In concluding that a natural monopoly/oligopoly does not exist, Chapter II will analyse the policy being antitrust enforcement in the industry. / Chapter III will then use the implementation of S 408 of the Federal Aviation Act (FAA) by the Department of Transportation (DOT) as an example of such a policy. Finally, the remaining chapters are dedicated to an analysis of the CRS industry. By using this industry as an example, the writer will suggest that, by removing barriers to entry through aggressive use of S 411 of the FAA, the future may see new entrants enter the market. Emphasis will be placed on the attitude of the DOT in this regard.

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