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Paper analyse retail banking fees in Czech Republic. It depicts bank methods of pricing retail banking fees and selected fees are compared across the market. Competition at similar foreign markets is shortly analysed as comparison tool. Testing the demand side of this market surprisingly revealed that the lack of competition between retail banks is not the main reason of low pressure on retail banking fees decrease. The same testing shows the significant passivity of customers as main cause.

This study empirically investigates the validity of the competition and stability trade-off hypothesis for the Turkish banking system. To this end, we consider annual bank level accounting data for the 1990-2008 period and compute the most commonly used measures of banking stability and competition. The effects of macroeconomic factors and bank specific indicators including the ownership structure are also taken into account. The fixed effects panel estimation results suggest that the relation between competition and stability is not invariant to the use of alternative indicators. The results based on the Z-Index as a measure of bank stability support the competition-stability and competition-fragility views when concentration ratios and the H-Statistics are used as the alternative competition indicators, respectively. However, when nonperforming loan ratio, a proxy for loan portfolio risk, is used as a stability measure, exactly the opposite outcome is obtained. The results also change when the ownership structure of banks is considered. Consequently, in line with the literature stating that there is no clear-cut relation between competition and stability, the direction of this relation for the Turkish banking system changes with different model specifications.

nÃo hà / Esta pesquisa investiga o relacionamento entre o nÃvel de risco e o grau de competiÃÃo bancÃria. O trabalho define a estatÃstica-H do modelo de Panzar & Rosse e o Ãndice de BasilÃia como medidas de competiÃÃo e risco, e utiliza o modelo de Bolt & Tieman para esclarecer o relacionamento entre competiÃÃo e risco. Dada a relevÃncia do debate entre Allen & Gale, Grochulski & Kareken e Kahn, foi mensurada uma segunda medida de competiÃÃo que identifica os efeitos da concentraÃÃo (Ãndice de Herfindahl-Hirschman). Os resultados desta pesquisa sÃo: (a) a conclusÃo do modelo teÃrico de Bolt & Tieman no mercado brasileiro à vÃlida, a maior competiÃÃo implica em maior exposiÃÃo ao risco independente da medida de competiÃÃo utilizada, (b) nÃo mostrou significÃncia na relaÃÃo entre competitividade (estatÃstica H) e oferta de crÃdito e (c) os bancos brasileiros operam em concorrÃncia monopolista. / This paper investigates the relationship between risk and competition in banking. The competition is measure with statistic-H of Panzar & Rosse model. The risk is quantified in Brazilian Central Bank Index, Ãndice de BasilÃia. The discussion of Allen & Gale, Grochulski & Kareken and Kahn must measure a second competition index to identify concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index). The results are: (a) the conclusion of the Bolt & Tieman model is valid in Brazilian banking, biggest competition implies bigger risk, (b) competitiveness (statistics H) did not significance to credit supply and (c) Brazilian banks operate in monopolistic competition