Feng, Guosen. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 56-60). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Background for Network Content Providers' Peering --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Literature Review --- p.5 / Chapter 2 --- A Static Baseline Model --- p.12 / Chapter 2.1 --- Content Qualities and Subscribing Fees --- p.12 / Chapter 2.2 --- Users' Utilities --- p.13 / Chapter 2.3 --- Providers' Coverages and Revenues --- p.14 / Chapter 2.4 --- Content Procurement Strategies --- p.16 / Chapter 2.5 --- The Peering and Bargaining of Providers --- p.16 / Chapter 2.5.1 --- Peering Agreement --- p.16 / Chapter 2.5.2 --- Change of Coverage --- p.17 / Chapter 2.5.3 --- Providers' Revenues --- p.18 / Chapter 2.5.4 --- Nash Bargaining Problem --- p.18 / Chapter 3 --- Impact of Dynamic Content --- p.23 / Chapter 3.1 --- Additional Investment for Dynamic Content --- p.24 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- Content Change --- p.24 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- Change of Coverage --- p.24 / Chapter 3.1.3 --- Providers' Revenue --- p.30 / Chapter 3.2 --- Finite Budget for Dynamic Content --- p.30 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Content Change --- p.30 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Change of Coverage --- p.30 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- Providers' Revenue --- p.35 / Chapter 4 --- Peeing in Dynamic Model --- p.36 / Chapter 4.1 --- Peering over T Time Slots --- p.37 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- "Content Change, Advertisement Sharing, and Payment ." --- p.37 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- Change of Coverage --- p.37 / Chapter 4.1.3 --- Providers' Revenue --- p.38 / Chapter 4.1.4 --- Nash Bargaining Problem --- p.38 / Chapter 4.2 --- Peering over One Time Slot --- p.45 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- "Content Change, Advertisement Sharing, and Payment ." --- p.45 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Change of Coverage --- p.46 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Providers' Revenue --- p.48 / Chapter 4.2.4 --- Nash Bargaining Problem --- p.49 / Chapter 5 --- Summary and Future Work --- p.53 / Bibliography --- p.56 / Chapter A --- Proof of Optimal Peering Strategy --- p.61 / Chapter A.1 --- Proof of Static Optimal Peering Strategy --- p.61 / Chapter A.2 --- Proof of Strategy for Peering over T Time Slot --- p.65 / Chapter A.3 --- Proof of Strategy for Peering over One Time Slot --- p.66