This dissertation’s aim is to evaluate the Hegelian and Catholic foundations of Carl Schmitt’s National Socialist theory of law. In 1934 Schmitt called his theory “concrete order thinking,” in contrast to both normative and decisionist theories of law. On the one hand, Schmitt positively described Hegel’s state as a “concrete order of orders” where corporations mediated between state and civil society. Despite the incompatibility of the National Socialist concepts of the Führer principle and racial identity with Hegel’s theory, Schmitt saw in the National Socialist triadic structure (State, Movement, People) a common Hegelian heritage that overcomes the dualistic principles of state vs. civil society found in liberalism. On the other hand, going beyond this Hegelian heritage, Schmitt affirmed that a defense of concrete orders requires maintaining the proper distinction between a pluralism of concrete orders and a universalist divine order. After examining the Hegelian National Socialist jurist Karl Larenz’ view that Schmitt’s concrete order theory is made more coherent by rejecting an eternal divine order, I entertain the alternative hypothesis that the Catholic perspective makes concrete order theory more coherent. Under this hypothesis, I explore the political theology in Schmitt’s earlier writings and those of his Catholic contemporaries, where appeal is made to an analogy of proportionality between church and state as “perfect societies” to uphold the distinction between divine order and plural human “concrete orders.” I argue that this appeal excessively separates divine and concrete orders and fails to see them as united through an analogy of image and archetype. At this juncture I turn to corrective supplements by Schmitt’s contemporaries who explicitly emphasized the need to conjoin church and state more intrinsically. The most promising such avenue emphasizes the paradigm of Christ as a model for the relation of church and state. Once this Christological framework is affirmed, the immanence of the Führer principle and Hegelian state personality, as well as the separation entailed in analogy of proportionality, must fall away as incompatible with concrete order thinking. To some extent Schmitt recognizes this framework himself, but it is, I argue, insufficiently articulated and leaves his thought incomplete.