Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Breslau.

University of Macau / Faculty of Science and Technology. / Department of Computer and Information Science

Thesis (MBus) -- Auckland University of Technology, 2004. / Also held in print (54 leaves, 30 cm.) in Wellesley Theses Collection. (T 658.4220993 YUE)

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Erlangen.

Thesis (D.Admin.)-University of Pretoria, 2005. / Abstract in English. Includes bibliographical references. Available on the Internet via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Utah State University, Dept. of Sociology, Social Work and Anthropology, 1976. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S.)--West Virginia University, 2008. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains iv, 67 p. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 33-37).

As the economy shifts from a heavy emphasis on defense science and technology to a focus on the application of innovation to commercial markets, decision makers are eager to learn how to shape successful university-industry partnerships. Given that the trend is toward greater numbers of relationships, this national survey project investigated whether scientists and administrators involved in university-industry cooperation share similar perspectives. It explored the benefits, conflicts and mechanisms related to collaborative activity, and sought to determine the implications for universities, industry, and policies directed towards this collaborative activity. Sponsored in part by the National Science Foundation, this study is one of the first to solicit responses from persons not involved in university-industry collaborative activity as well as from those who are. This research successfully captured three aspects of conflicts: conflict of interest, conflict of commitment and conflict over internal equity. The study found that conflict of interest turns on potential financial gain and revenue generating activities. Conflict of commitment is viewed in terms of responsibility and loyalty to the academic or industrial sector to which the individual belongs. Conflict over internal equity centers on traditional academic duties such as teaching and interaction with students. The primary benefits society will receive as a result of collaborative activity are new knowledge and know-how of new techniques and technologies. Regarding specific mechanisms preferred by survey respondents, collaborative universities and firms will rely heavily on conflict of interest policies guide appropriate activities. These should be specific enough to counsel an individual who has come to a decision point with regard to loyalties and at the same time be general enough to treat each collaborative endeavor on its unique merits. Regardless of the type of collaborative relationship in which academics become involved, the study found that decision makers should hold firm in their promotion of teaching and equitable treatment of students. In order to be true to their academic identity, university representatives should ensure the scale is tipped in favor of teaching, or delicately balanced so that teaching activities are equal to collaborative activities.

Magister Legum - LLM

Révélées au grand jour à partir de l’année 2007, par leur implication dans la crise des subprime puis parleur rôle procyclique dans celle des dettes souveraines, les agences de notation ont été l’objet d’uneattention toute particulière du législateur qui se devait d’assurer l’intégrité des marchés et de restaurer laconfiance des investisseurs au lendemain d’un véritable cataclysme financier. Conflits d’intérêts, opacité,méthodologies défaillantes, crédibilité équivoque, comportements anti-concurrentiels, les critiquesadressées à l’encontre de l’oligopole, dominant l’industrie de notation, étaient nombreuses. L’adoptionsuccessive de dispositifs règlementaires n’a pu permettre un affranchissement de l’influence de cepouvoir privé économique, dont l’enracinement règlementaire date du lendemain de la GrandeDépression de 1929 et le développement est étroitement lié à celui de la titrisation. Bien au contraire, lesnouvelles règlementations qui auraient dû encadrer «l’activité» plutôt que les «structures» n’ont eu, aucoté de certaines initiatives louables, eu pour effet principal que la consécration d’un régime spécial.Même les affronts à l’ordre public économique n’ont été que rarement lavés par une justice qui setrouvait, sauf rares exceptions, en manque d’armes adéquats et par un régulateur encore trop balbutiant.Rattrapés par des enjeux en constante mutation, les quelques acquis liés à la transparence et au contrôledes agences de notation tendent déjà à être remis en cause. Le législateur, quant à lui, semble déjà êtrepassé à autre chose, et ce, alors que point à l’horizon des nouveaux marchés de nouvelles bulles oùagissent encore les agences de notation. / As a result of their involvement in the subprime crisis and pro-cyclical role in the sovereign debt crisis,the credit rating agencies have been, since 2007, subject to the specific attention of the lawmaker whichhad to ensure integrity of the financial market and restore investors’ confidence in the aftermath of a realfinancial cataclysm. The criticisms against the oligopoly that dominates the rating industry were manyand include, inter alia, conflict of interest, opacity, deficient methodologies, lack of credibility and anticompetitivebehaviours. The successive adoption of regulatory and legislative measures was not enoughto achieve emancipation from the influence of this economic private power which maintains rootswithin the market regulatory framework since the aftermath of the Great Depression of 1929 and whosedevelopment is closely linked to securitization. Instead, the new regulations that should have governedan “activity” rather than “structures” have, alongside some commendable initiatives, resulted in theconsecration of a specific regime. Even the violations of the economic public order were rarely punishedby a justice which, except for anecdotic cases, was missing adequate legal weapons to address thosesituations or by a regulator still too immature. However, due to an environment constantly changing, thefew benefits obtained in terms of the rating agencies’ transparency and control, are already in the processof being jeopardised. The lawmaker seems to have moved on to other topics, while on the horizonappear new bubbles in new markets where rating agencies are very active.