A new name for an old problem, the “hard problem of consciousness” is perhaps the most controversial issue in the contemporary philosophy of mind. The problem, posed by non-reductivists like Chalmers, is: how do the phenomenal qualities of our conscious experience stand in relation to a physical world that seems logically compatible with their absence? But there is no agreement over what precisely this question is asking about (viz., “phenomenal qualities”), or whether the apparently non-physical explanandum is a real one. At the root of the intractability is the particular way that we have come to think about the question, presupposing i) that the conscious explanandum is an ontological one and thus ii) that the sense in which it exists (as an inner entity) should be straightforward. These assumptions are overturned in the following account in which I argue that the qualitative contents of our experience are in the world, not the ontological mind. I argue that neither the non-reductivist nor the eliminitivist, on analysis, need disagree about this. In Chapter Two, I argue that what the non-reductivist really wants to preserve are the qualities of the world that are invisible to an ontological picture made in terms of scientific unobservables, or trans-experiential physical structures and processes. The eliminitivist, on the other hand, is merely interested in denying the ontologization of these qualities as properties of the ontological mind. On this interpretation, non-reductivists and eliminitivists can be seen to mutually support a solution to the traditional mind-body problem in the form of the non-reductive, non-ontological account of consciousness that I will offer in this thesis: non-reductive, because the properties of our experience are not illegitimately denied (or reduced), and non-ontological because they are not thereby hypostatized (or ontologized). Rather, they are left in the “neutral” public realm where—from a Wittgensteinian perspective—the meanings of the problematic terms of mind-body discourse are fixed. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2008-09-29 15:55:54.312

Despite the shift from dualism to materialism, philosophy of mind and cognitive science still face the challenge of explaining the interaction of the physical and the mental. The language of thought hypothesis, combined with advances in computing offers a promising explanation of the aforementioned interaction by capitalizing on the parallels between the syntax and semantics of language. Unfortunately, the language of thought hypothesis is vulnerable to arguments and objections that stem from syntactic ambiguity, semantic poverty, and semantic causation, all of which stand in the way of creating a working theory of mind. I will claim that these problems can be avoided by incorporating feedback to regulate the semantic content in chains of thoughts. The regulation of semantic content would allow the operations performed by the psychological machinery responsible for the process of thinking to be causally sensitive to the semantic content of thoughts. The causal influence of the feedback would be heuristic, rather than algorithmic, avoiding the explanatory pitfalls traditionally encountered in attempts to integrate semantic content into strict, syntax manipulating mechanisms. The inclusion of consciousness feedback also answers a solipsistic worry, the syntactic zombie, as well as fitting more closely with our experience of cognition.

The research explores the concept of human consciousness and its being experienced in a particular social context, focusing on consciousness’s ‘highest potential’ as described in both ancient Buddhist Philosophy and more recent spiritual teachings. The main attention is on the individual’s emotional and mental experience of ‘conventional’ and ‘ultimate’ reality as taught by these traditions and the possible transformation of consciousness they might initiate. Two years of fieldwork was carried out at the Barbara Brennan School of Healing, which is a spiritual educational institution, offering a four-year training to become a healer. The School emphasis is on the human individual and his or her inherent existential power to transform and transcend limitations or delusions, focusing on the process of self- transformation. Being human in the eyes of the School is seen as an endless potential for growth, creativity, the capacity to love, and about learning to become fully responsible for one’s own life and happiness. The thesis explores the effect that this particular understanding of human potential has in the quotidian existence of the trainee and her or his social relations. Methodologically the study is based in phenomenological anthropology. This approach here implies that life cannot be understood through the conceptual or systematic study of its outward forms. Therefore it places conscious experience at the centre of its investigation, rather than disengaged objectivity. By employing the first-person perspective and undertaking part of the training myself, I hope to do justice to the inherently subjective dimension of consciousness and to gain as deep an understanding as possible of the processes of its transformation. The thesis thus includes subjective personal experience as primary data, and understands being objective in the sense of being open and without bias to both internal and external experience, giving the ‘perennial wisdom’ of spiritual traditions the same status as approved scientific laws.

Are we conscious of more than what's in the “spotlight” of attention, or is consciousness limited to the content of attention? Recently several authors (DeBrigard & Prinz 2011; Prinz 2010; Dennett & Cohen 2012) have defended the view that attention to some object is necessary for conscious perception of that object. For each of these authors, attention acts like more than just a “spotlight on a stage.” But none of them provides a robust account of this new way of attending. My project offers a new theory of diffuse attention that explains the apparent richness of experience. Accepting that there is a diffuse way of attending requires us to abandon the notion of attention as a spotlight. On the view that I offer, attention has degrees. For example, when looking at a landscape, your attention is spread over a broad spatial area and details are more difficult to remember or describe than when you focus attention in greater depth on some object within that landscape. A broad and shallow diffusion of attention nonetheless makes its object available for guiding thought and action, and so should be considered a way of attending rather than merely being conscious. After defending a theory of diffuse attention, I offer a new argument for the view that attention is necessary for conscious perception. My argument is motivated by the phenomenological observation that ordinary perceptual experience has a structure: some objects are in the foreground of experience, while others are in the background. I motivate the claim that this foreground/background structure is necessary for perceptual experience, and argue that focal and diffuse attention provide the foreground/background structure. I conclude that attention is necessary for perceptual experience, since it provides a necessary structure of experience. In making this argument, I draw on phenomenological insight into the structure of consciousness from James (1890), Gurwitsch (1964; 1966) and C.O. Evans (1970). For each of these authors, attention structures the foreground – but not the background – of consciousness. My novel contribution is to provide an account of how attention structures the conscious background. By enriching the concept of attention to include diffuse attention, my account is poised to explain the structure of conscious experience from foreground to background.

Are we conscious of more than what's in the “spotlight” of attention, or is consciousness limited to the content of attention? Recently several authors (DeBrigard & Prinz 2011; Prinz 2010; Dennett & Cohen 2012) have defended the view that attention to some object is necessary for conscious perception of that object. For each of these authors, attention acts like more than just a “spotlight on a stage.” But none of them provides a robust account of this new way of attending. My project offers a new theory of diffuse attention that explains the apparent richness of experience. Accepting that there is a diffuse way of attending requires us to abandon the notion of attention as a spotlight. On the view that I offer, attention has degrees. For example, when looking at a landscape, your attention is spread over a broad spatial area and details are more difficult to remember or describe than when you focus attention in greater depth on some object within that landscape. A broad and shallow diffusion of attention nonetheless makes its object available for guiding thought and action, and so should be considered a way of attending rather than merely being conscious. After defending a theory of diffuse attention, I offer a new argument for the view that attention is necessary for conscious perception. My argument is motivated by the phenomenological observation that ordinary perceptual experience has a structure: some objects are in the foreground of experience, while others are in the background. I motivate the claim that this foreground/background structure is necessary for perceptual experience, and argue that focal and diffuse attention provide the foreground/background structure. I conclude that attention is necessary for perceptual experience, since it provides a necessary structure of experience. In making this argument, I draw on phenomenological insight into the structure of consciousness from James (1890), Gurwitsch (1964; 1966) and C.O. Evans (1970). For each of these authors, attention structures the foreground – but not the background – of consciousness. My novel contribution is to provide an account of how attention structures the conscious background. By enriching the concept of attention to include diffuse attention, my account is poised to explain the structure of conscious experience from foreground to background.

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Thesis (Ed. D.)--West Virginia University, 2008. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains xvi, 365 p. : ill. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 353-365).

Thesis (B.A. Hons. 1978) from the Department of Psychology, University of Adelaide.

Thesis (D.Litt.) from the Dept. of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, 1972.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Murdoch University, 2003. / Thesis submitted to the Division of Arts. Bibliography: leaves [286]-293.