Thesis (M.S. in Construction Management)--University of Washington, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [64]-66). Also available online.

Göttingen, R.- u. staatswiss. Diss. v. 15. Jan. 1931. / Includes bibliographical references.

The object of this research is to study how unions and firms divide the surplus or rents available to them. Many instruments are used in practice to make this division, but standard micro data only includes two: wages and employment. I use a new approach to study wage and employment contracts as I consider them equilibrium points in a noncooperative bargaining game. This work is an extension of wage-employment determination models, the extension being the incorporation of a bargaining model, specifically, a Rubinstein bargaining game. Given the objective functions of the two players, the wage and employment equations are specified by the equilibrium conditions for the game. Also, additional determinants of the contracts are identified. One of the characteristics of the model is that the wage and employment contracts are affected by the relative strike costs of the two negotiating parties even in the absence of strikes. The data involve the B.C. wood products industry and the IWA, a powerful union believed to have been successful at capturing rents. The data include input and output quantities and prices and equations representing input demands and output supply are estimated simultaneously with the negotiated wage and employment equations. Four estimation models are derived corresponding to two bargaining frameworks and two sets of assumptions on the firms' technology. The two bargaining frameworks correspond to two polar cases that have been assumed in the wage-employment determination literature: in one case, the wage is set through bargaining while the employment level is chosen by the firm, in the second case, both the wage and employment level are negotiated. In one pair of models, output is treated as exogenous to the bargaining while in the second set of models, output is endogenous and capital is exogenous. The bargaining game is successfully implemented in the sense that technology and union utility parameters are generally reasonable and comparable to previous estimates. Also, the determinants of relative strike costs enter significantly in the estimation. The union is seen to care about employment as well as the wage with slightly more weight being placed on the employment level. Rent maximization is always rejected. Bargaining powers are calculated at each data point and results indicate that the 1980's recession increased the relative power of the union. The hypotheses of equal bargaining powers and complete union bargaining power are tested and rejected. Also, the proportion of rents captured by the firm is found to be a poor indicator of its bargaining power. Although the qualitative results mentioned above are robust across the four models, parameter values are generally sensitive to both the technology assumptions and the bargaining framework. Ignoring the simultaneity of wages, employment and other variables chosen by the firm can be very misleading. Finally, the model in which both wages and employment are negotiated consistently performs better than the framework in which employment is unilaterally set by the firm. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate

Univ., Diss--Zürich, 2008.

This study establishes a complete scientific selective model of "the most advantageous tender" to provide the tender inviting entity with selectors in handling "the most advantageous tender". the tendering invitation entity is happy and urgently needs the selective model developed. / Thesis (PhD)--University of South Australia, 2008.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universidad Javeriana.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Delaware, 2006. / Principal faculty advisor: Charles Link, Dept. of Economics. Includes bibliographical references.

The purpose of having labour laws in South Africa is to regulate employment contracts and the relationship between the employer and the employee. Once a legally binding contract comes into being the Labour Relations Act of 1995 automatically applies alongside the Basic Conditions of Employment Act and various other labour legislations. Common law rules play a vital role in the formation of an employment contract. For an ordinary contract to have legal effect, four basic requirements need to be met. Briefly, parties to the contract must have reached consensus, parties’ performance of their obligations must be possible, the conclusion and objectives of the contract must be lawful and that both parties to the contract must have the necessary capacity to conclude the contract. Once these requirements have been met one is said to have concluded a valid contract. Nevertheless for the purposes of this study, we focus specifically on the employment contract. Aside from the general common law requirements for a valid contract, for an employment contract to be recognised and protected by labour legislations, it is important to distinguish an employee from an independent contractor since only the former enjoys legal remedies afforded by labour law. Common law contractual rights and duties automatically apply once an employment relationship is established in addition to the rights and duties specified in the contract itself. Common law rules regarding morality plays a major role in our modern day societies, as shall be discussed the workforce has not been left untouched by this important principle. Morality greatly influences a society’s view concerning acceptable and unacceptable behaviour or practices. It goes without saying that a contract should not be contrary to the moral views of the society in which the parties find themselves in. A contract can be complying with all the statutory requirements for a valid employment contract; however it may at the same time be tainted with illegality as the object of performance is considered immoral in the society such as an employment contract to perform prostitution. Conversely, another scenario may involve a party to an employment contract who is a child below the age of 15 years old; the contract is invalid as it contravenes section 43 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. Despite clear statutory prohibitions this practice may be perfectly acceptable in the eyes and minds of the society. The purpose of this study is to evaluate prohibited and unlawful contracts of employments, how the law (both common law and statutory law) treats such contracts in the sense that; whether they are protected or not and to what extent these laws have been developed to influence modern attitudes concerning such contracts. One stark example is illustrated through case law where the court had to determine the validity of an employment contract concluded between an employer and an illegal immigrant.