Submitted by Felipe Flores Golfín (felipefloresgolfin@gmail.com) on 2016-04-26T04:09:40Z No. of bitstreams: 1 MT_Biblioteca.pdf: 1041302 bytes, checksum: 149d489f7f6ef3ee90b9d412b209615f (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by GILSON ROCHA MIRANDA (gilson.miranda@fgv.br) on 2016-05-02T13:23:56Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 MT_Biblioteca.pdf: 1041302 bytes, checksum: 149d489f7f6ef3ee90b9d412b209615f (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2016-05-02T13:55:45Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 MT_Biblioteca.pdf: 1041302 bytes, checksum: 149d489f7f6ef3ee90b9d412b209615f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-05-09T13:39:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 MT_Biblioteca.pdf: 1041302 bytes, checksum: 149d489f7f6ef3ee90b9d412b209615f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-23 / Exclusivity contracts can help stations by providing brand-value that allows them to obtain higher profits, relative to unbranded retailers. However, branded retailers may have a stronger negative effect over its competitors’ profits. It is not clear which one of these two effects dominates (brand-value vs competition effect). Therefore, the impact of exclusivity over the number of participants in the downstream market is not determined. In this paper, I empirically study the effects of exclusivity agreements on competition in the Brazilian gasoline sector. In order to do so, I estimate an entry model of endogenous product-type choices using data of retailers’ locations and contract choices along with data from the 2010 Brazilian Census. I use my estimates to simulate entry decisions under two counterfactual scenarios: i) mandatory exclusivity and ii) no exclusivity.