published_or_final_version / Industrial Engineering / Master / Master of Philosophy

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1982. / Bibliography: leaves 242-245. / Microfiche. / xiii, 245 leaves, bound ill. 29 cm

Digitized by Kansas Correctional Industries

A Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) adopts a decentralized communication architecture which relies on cooperation among nodes at each layer of the protocol stack. Its reliance on cooperation for success and survival makes the ad hoc network particularly sensitive to variations in node behavior. Specifically, for functions such as routing, nodes which are limited in their resources may be unwilling to cooperate in forwarding for other nodes. Such selfish behavior leads to degradation in the performance of the network and possibly, in the extreme case, a complete cessation of operations. Consequently it is important to devise solutions to encourage resource-constrained nodes to cooperate. Incentive schemes have been proposed to induce selfish nodes to cooperate. Though many of the proposed schemes in the literature are payment-based, nodes can be incentivized to cooperate by adopting policies which are non-monetary in nature, but rather are based on the threat of retaliation for non-cooperating nodes. These policies, for which there is little formal analysis in the existing literature on node cooperation, are based on observed node behavior. We refer to them as behavior-based incentives. In this work, we analyze the effectiveness of behavior-based incentives in inducing nodes to cooperate. To determine whether an incentive scheme is effective in fostering cooperation we develop a game-theoretic model. Adopting a repeated game model, we show that nodes may agree to cooperate in sharing their resources and forward packets, even if they perceive a cost in doing so. This happens as the nodes recognize that refusing to cooperate will result in similar behavior by others, which ultimately would compromise the viability of the network as a whole. A major shortcoming in the analysis done in past works is the lack of consideration of practical constraints imposed by an ad hoc environment. One such example is the assumption that a node, when making decisions about whether to cooperate, has perfect knowledge of every other node's actions. In a distributed setting this is impractical. In our work, we analyze behavior-based incentives by incorporating such practical considerations as imperfect monitoring into our game-theoretic models. In modeling the problem as a game of imperfect public monitoring (nodes observe a common public signal that reflects the actions of other nodes in the network) we show that, under the assumption of first order stochastic dominance of the public signal, the grim trigger strategy leads to an equilibrium for nodes to cooperate. Even though a trigger-based strategy like grim-trigger is effective in deterring selfish behavior it is too harsh in its implementation. In addition, the availability of a common public signal in a distributed setting is rather limited. We, therefore, consider nodes that individually monitor the behavior of other nodes in the network and keep this information private. Note that this independent monitoring of behavior is error prone as a result of slow switching between transmit and promiscuous modes of operation, collisions and congestion due to the wireless medium, or incorrect feedback from peers. We propose a probability-based strategy that induces nodes to cooperate under such a setting. We analyze the strategy using repeated games with imperfect private monitoring and show it to be robust to errors in monitoring others" actions. Nodes achieve a near-optimal payoff at equilibrium when adopting this strategy. This work also characterizes the effects of a behavior-based incentive, applied to induce cooperation, on topology control in ad hoc networks. Our work is among the first to consider selfish behavior in the context of topology control. We create topologies based on a holistic view of energy consumption " energy consumed in forwarding packets as well as in maintaining links. Our main results from this work are to show that: (a) a simple forwarding policy induces nodes to cooperate and leads to reliable paths in the generated topology, (b) the resulting topologies are well-connected, energy-efficient and exhibit characteristics similar to those in small-world networks. / Ph. D.

Prepared for NASA-Ames Research Center. Grant NSG-2180. / Description based on: Sept. 1978/Mar. 1979. Subtitle varies slightly: Semi-annual status report. Principal investigators: 1978/79- Michael Athans, Mark E. Connelly.

Thesis (M.S.)--Brigham Young University. Dept. of Technology, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 79-81).

No description available.

<p> The general purpose of this work is to study the feasibility of using McMaster University's PACER and MACSIM Executive Computer Programmes to simulate the environmental control system in a large building by means of elementary modules. </p> <p> The operation of PACER is described together with some general instructions as to its use. </p> <p> A number of module subroutines are developed, covering a wide cross-section of the type of equipment used in the air conditioning, heating and ventilation of a building. They are used in various combinations within the main programme to demonstrate their use. The programmes developed are not sufficient to simulate a complex system; however, they would act as a guide to the user for developing the necessary programmes to enable him to represent almost any type of equipment. </p> / Thesis / Master of Engineering (ME)

A computer simulation model written in PL/I of the flowering phenology of C. thoermeri and the seasonal population dynamics of R. conicus was constructed based on a synthesis of the literature, and on laboratory experiments which determined developmental periods, mortality for immature stages and the ovipositional pattern of R. conicus. The model successfully simulated the ovipositional pattern of R. conicus and the flowering phenology of C. thoermeri. Larval population dynamics of R. conicus, in the model however, did not fit the validation data. Though the model was temporally synchronized with the field data, the model results were one degree of magnitude less. The poor fit was attributed to sampling errors in the validation data. Studies of the overwintering mortalities of both organisms were performed. R. conicus was found to overwinter with lowest mortality on musk thistle rosettes; mortality was 73.6% in 1981, higher than previously reported but possibly more representative of field conditions. No overwintering mortality was observed for established rosettes of C. thoermeri. Studies of seed dispersal of C. thoermeri were performed to determine the percentage of seeds removed from the vicinity of the plant where they originated. Seed dispersal observed for different wind velocities demonstrated that less than 1% of seeds are blown further than 100m and most seeds are deposited within 50m of the release site. A Gaussian model of seed dispersal based on experimentally determined parameters and literature values corroborated these results. / Master of Science

M.S.