This dissertation examines the identity of new controlling shareholders in partial corporate control transactions and its influence on firm performance and corporate policies in an international context. In a transfer of partial corporate control, the identity of controlling shareholder changs, thereby facilitating an event study of corporate changes resulted from controlling shareholder turnover. The dissertation comprises of three empirical research projects to address two questions: Firstly, does the identity of a new controlling shareholder in a partial control transfer matter to firm value? Secondly, how does new controlling shareholder identity explain the differences of firm performance and corporate policies in the long run? The equity block transactions in listed firms from around the world announced between 1996 and 2005 are filtered to arrive at the final sample of 215 corporate control transfers through private negotiation. This hand-collected dataset allows the dissertation to contribute to the existing literature on ownership concentration by introducing the identity of controlling shareholder into the theoretical framework and investigating its significance in an international context. It is argued that firm value, long-term performance and corporate policies can be influenced by the identity of new controlling shareholders because different controlling shareholders have distinct incentives, skills and styles. This dissertation finds that individual investor controlled firms outperform those controlled by corporate investors in both short-term abnormal returns and long-term performance after a control transfer; and that the sample firms controlled by individual and corporate investors adopt different policies of investment and financial leverage. The evidence presented here shows that individual controlling shareholders are better motivated to monitor managers and improve operational efficiency. Partial corporate control activities have important governance effects and controlling shareholder heterogeneity is a significant contributing factor to firm performance and decision making.

This dissertation examines the identity of new controlling shareholders in partial corporate control transactions and its influence on firm performance and corporate policies in an international context. In a transfer of partial corporate control, the identity of controlling shareholder changs, thereby facilitating an event study of corporate changes resulted from controlling shareholder turnover. The dissertation comprises of three empirical research projects to address two questions: Firstly, does the identity of a new controlling shareholder in a partial control transfer matter to firm value? Secondly, how does new controlling shareholder identity explain the differences of firm performance and corporate policies in the long run? The equity block transactions in listed firms from around the world announced between 1996 and 2005 are filtered to arrive at the final sample of 215 corporate control transfers through private negotiation. This hand-collected dataset allows the dissertation to contribute to the existing literature on ownership concentration by introducing the identity of controlling shareholder into the theoretical framework and investigating its significance in an international context. It is argued that firm value, long-term performance and corporate policies can be influenced by the identity of new controlling shareholders because different controlling shareholders have distinct incentives, skills and styles. This dissertation finds that individual investor controlled firms outperform those controlled by corporate investors in both short-term abnormal returns and long-term performance after a control transfer; and that the sample firms controlled by individual and corporate investors adopt different policies of investment and financial leverage. The evidence presented here shows that individual controlling shareholders are better motivated to monitor managers and improve operational efficiency. Partial corporate control activities have important governance effects and controlling shareholder heterogeneity is a significant contributing factor to firm performance and decision making.