In cooperatively breeding societies, where individuals (termed ‘helpers’) provide care to young which are not their own, group members can vary substantially in their contributions to cooperative activities. Individuals are expected to exhibit higher levels of cooperative investment if the benefit of performing that behaviour greatly outweighs the cost of performing that behaviour. This may be achieved by directing investment towards kin (thereby maximising indirect fitness benefits) and/or attaining large direct fitness benefits. In this thesis, I explore whether direct fitness benefits shape patterns of helping behaviour in the cooperatively breeding white-browed sparrow weaver (Plocepasser mahali). White-browed sparrow weavers live in year round territorial groups with high reproductive skew, comprising a dominant pair and subordinates of both sexes. Although all group members contribute to a wide range of highly conspicuous cooperative activities, there is large inter-individual variation in investment. In chapter 2, I use simulated territorial intrusions to show that sexually-selected direct benefits shape the expression of sentinel behaviour. In chapter 4, I provide evidence that the direct benefits associated with either the pay-to-stay or social prestige hypotheses are unlikely to modulate patterns of provisioning in male white-browed sparrow weavers. Evidence of marked individual differences in contributions to offspring care in cooperative societies is also generating increased interest in the proximate causes of such variation. In chapter 5, I use within-individual measurements to demonstrate that variation in provisioning effort is not directly regulated by variation in circulating levels of prolactin (a pituitary hormone). The evidence does suggest, however, that provisioning behaviour may be induced by exceeding a threshold hormone level. Individual contributions to parental behaviours (as opposed to alloparental) may be shaped by constraints associated with life-history traits. In chapter 3, I show that parents in white-browed sparrow weaver societies perform different provisioning rates yet employ similar food allocation tactics, and that these patterns are expected in tropical living bird species. Combined, these findings provide insights into the selection pressures that may shape individual contributions to cooperative activities.

Online services such as e-marketplaces, social networking sites, online gaming environments etc have grown in popularity in the recent years. These services represent situation where participants do not get to negotiate face to face before interaction and most of the time parties to transaction remain anonymous. It is thus necessary to have a system that rightly assesses trustworthiness of the other party in order to maintain quality assurance in such systems. Recent works on Trust and Reputation in online communities have focused on identifying probable defaulters, but less effort has been put to come up with system that make cooperation attractive over defection in order to achieve cooperation without enforcement. Our work in this regard concerns design and investigation of trust assessment systems that not only filter defaulters but also promote evolution of cooperativeness in player society. Based on the concept of game theory and prisoner's dilemma, we model business games and design incentive method, compensation method, acquaintance based assessment method and decision theoretic assessment method as mechanisms to assure trustworthiness in online business environments. Effectiveness of each of these methods in promoting the evolution of cooperation in player society has been investigated. Our results show that these methods contribute positively in promoting cooperative evolution. We have further extended our trust assessment model to suit the needs of a mobile ad-hoc network setting. The effectiveness of this model has been tested against its capability to reduce packet drop rate and energy conservation. In both of these the results show promise.

Online services such as e-marketplaces, social networking sites, online gaming environments etc have grown in popularity in the recent years. These services represent situation where participants do not get to negotiate face to face before interaction and most of the time parties to transaction remain anonymous. It is thus necessary to have a system that rightly assesses trustworthiness of the other party in order to maintain quality assurance in such systems. Recent works on Trust and Reputation in online communities have focused on identifying probable defaulters, but less effort has been put to come up with system that make cooperation attractive over defection in order to achieve cooperation without enforcement. Our work in this regard concerns design and investigation of trust assessment systems that not only filter defaulters but also promote evolution of cooperativeness in player society. Based on the concept of game theory and prisoner¿s dilemma, we model business games and design incentive method, compensation method, acquaintance based assessment method and decision theoretic assessment method as mechanisms to assure trustworthiness in online business environments. Effectiveness of each of these methods in promoting the evolution of cooperation in player society has been investigated. Our results show that these methods contribute positively in promoting cooperative evolution. We have further extended our trust assessment model to suit the needs of a mobile ad-hoc network setting. The effectiveness of this model has been tested against its capability to reduce packet drop rate and energy conservation. In both of these the results show promise. / EU Asia-link project TH/Asia Link/004(91712) East-West and its local host Kantipur Engineering College in Nepal, and Kathmandu University.