Corporate cash holdings is a topic constantly under review, companies hoarding cash are criticized by shareholders who rather have companies using their cash for new investments or dividend payouts. Recent academic research has discovered that levels of cash holding are high in times when risk is deemed to be high and found that levels of corporate cash holdings are substantially higher than they used to, making more coverage and a better understanding of the phenomenon crucial. This thesis is investigating an aspect of the interconnection between corporate cash holdings and shareholders by examining if there is a relationship between the level of corporate cash holdings and the risk of the company stock. This research is conducted on the Stockholm Stock Exchange during the four year period of 2009-2012 and investigates for a relationship not only on the entire stock exchange but also for each size and sector individually. In order to investigate this relationship a cash to assets ratio has been employed to represent the level of corporate cash holdings and the measures of stock beta and volatility are used to represent the risk of the stock. The cash holding ratio is tested for a relationship with both beta and volatility separately using the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient. This thesis have adopted a quantitative research and implemented an archival research strategy by using official records and numbers. Through these statistical tests this thesis establishes significant relationships between both the cash holding ratio and stock beta and stock volatility separately for the entire stock exchange and some differences arises between different sizes and sectors. For cash holding and stock beta a negative correlation relationship has been discovered for the entire sample, the medium cap size and the health care and industrial sectors. For cash holdings and stock volatility positive correlation findings have been made for the entire sample as well as the small cap size and the sectors of basic materials, health care and technology. This finding implicates that cash holdings to some extent relates stock risk and several potential explanations to this relationship are given and connected to well-established financial theories.

This thesis presents three essays, with the first two focusing on the insider role of M&A advisors and the effectiveness of insider trading rule, while the third essay looks into the effects of product market competition on corporate cash holdings. The main hypothesis of the first and second essay is that the advisory banks that are privy to non-public deal information might have high motivation to exploit this privileged information by taking a position in a takeover target ahead of a deal and realise an excess return upon deal announcement. This motivation for and act of “insider trading” might be attenuated by the insider trading rules Rule10b5-1 and Rule10b5-2, which were released in 2000.The first essay examines the presence of acquiror advisors’ holdings in targets and their trading strategy on such holdings before deal announcement. Using an aggregate level of stake-holding in the target firm by a financial conglomerate/brands with which the advisor to the acquiror is affiliated, we find that advisory brands start to take and accumulate holdings in targets at least seven quarters before deal announcement through to announcement quarter. The stake-holding is significantly larger than that of a non-advisory brand group that is defined. We argue that these results imply the direct link between advisory holdings, advisor identity and the strong intentions of trading on private deal information. However, this tendency is markedly attenuated in the post-rule period after 2000. This change in advisory brand trading strategy on target stocks ahead of a deal with the passage of rules suggests a positive deterrence effect of the insider trading rule. In the second essay, we investigate the profitability of this trading strategy by advisory brands to acquirors taking stake in targets ahead of a deal. Results suggest that both the level and the build-up (increase) of an advisory stake between the last two quarters immediately preceding deal announcement are positively related to the target return. These results are consistent with the view that advisory brands trade on their privileged deal information by taking and increasing holdings in targets ahead of deals to profit from the increase in target share price. In our sub-period analysis, results suggest that all the coefficients become much smaller and insignificant for the post-rule period after 2000. This again indicates a strongly positive deterrent effect of regulation, which further confirms the conclusion of the first essay. The third essay is related to both the static and dynamic effect of product market competition on firm cash holdings. We find that the intensity of product market competition measured by product similarity from Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2011) has a significant positive effect on firm cash holdings, after controlling for other measures including the Industry Herfindahl Index and industry fluidity. This suggests that firms in a more competitive industry reserve more cash as their war chest or preemptive tool against competitors. Further, Vector Autoregression (VAR) and analyses of shock show that when there is a sudden increase in product similarity/competition level (shock), firms use cash to fight off competition, leading to a decrease in cash holdings.

This thesis consists of three chapters and investigates the issues related to liquidity risk, credit market contagion, and corporate cash holdings. The first chapter is coauthored work with Professor Jay Sa-Aadu and Associate Professor Ashish Tiwari and is titled ‘Market Liquidity, Funding Liquidity, and Hedge Fund Performance.’ The second chapter is sole-authored and is titled ‘Credit Market Contagion and Liquidity Shocks.’ The third chapter is coauthored with Steven Savoy and titled ‘Ambiguity Aversion and Corporate Cash Holdings.’ The first chapter examines the interaction between hedge funds’ performance and their market liquidity risk and funding liquidity risk. Using a 2-state Markov regime switching model we identify regimes with low and high market-wide liquidity. While funds with high market liquidity risk exposures earn a premium in the high liquidity regime, this premium vanishes in the low liquidity states. Moreover, funding liquidity risk, measured by the sensitivity of a hedge fund’s return to the Treasury-Eurodollar (TED) spread, is an important determinant of fund performance. Hedge funds with high loadings on the TED spread underperform low-loading funds by about 0.49% (10.98%) annually in the high (low) liquidity regime, during 1994-2012. The second chapter provides evidence on credit market contagion using CDS index data and identifies the channels through which contagion propagates in credit markets. The results show that funding liquidity and market liquidity are significant channels of contagion during periods with widening credit spreads and adverse liquidity shocks. These results provide support for the theoretical model proposed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) according to which negative liquidity spirals can lead to contagion across various asset classes. Furthermore, during periods with tightening credit spreads and positive liquidity shocks, the results indicate that a prime broker index and a bank index are important channels contributing to co-movement in credit spreads. This suggests that financial intermediaries play an important role in spreading market rallies across credit markets. The third chapter investigates the link between investors’ ambiguity aversion and precautionary corporate cash holdings. Investors’ ambiguity aversion is measured by the proportion of individual investors in a firm’s investor base who are hypothesized to be more ambiguity averse compared to institutional investors. We show that the value of cash holdings is negatively associated with the extent of ambiguity aversion in a firm’s shareholder base for firms that are financially constrained. Our results also show that financially constrained firms with a higher proportion of ambiguity averse investors hold less cash. These results provide support for models in which ambiguity averse investors dislike the cash holdings of firms, that are held for precautionary reasons to fund long term projects, given that the returns on long term projects are ambiguous.