This thesis comprises three empirical studies. These studies can be read as though they are independent. However, all three of them revolve around investigating whether and how characteristics of directors can affect firm-level outcomes. The first study – “Does gender diversity affect firm equity risk?” – systematically investigates whether gender diversity in the boardroom influences firm equity risk. To identify the causal effect of gender on risk, I employ a dynamic model which allows for the possibilities that risk can influence the gender of appointed directors and that both director gender and risk can be influenced by other unobserved firm-level factors. The overall results in this study do not support the view that female boardroom representation influences equity risk. I also show that findings of a negative relationship between the two variables are spurious and driven by unobserved between-firm heterogeneous factors. The second study – “Spillover effects of women on boards” – introduces an alternative way of looking at boardroom gender diversity. The definition of boardroom gender diversity is broadened to include female directors who do not sit on the board but are connected to the board through male directors or “external” female influence. This is in addition to the “internal” influence of female directors inside the board. I find that when both external and internal influences of female directors are considered, there is evidence supporting a link between gender diversity and firm risk and that a plausible channel by which gender affects risk is through more effective monitoring. Male directors are less likely to exhibit absenteeism when they are exposed to both external and internal female influence. CEO turnover sensitivity increases with the proportion of male directors who are externally connected to women, when there is at least one female director inside the board. Risk also increases with the proportion of these connected men when they work on a board with at least one woman. The findings suggests that female directors can exert influence on firm-level outcomes despite their minority status in the boardroom. The third study – “Independent director reputation incentives and stock price informativeness” – examines whether the reputation incentives of independent directors increase the incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices. I find that the proportion of directors who deem their directorships to be more important based on firm market capitalization is associated with higher firm-specific information content in stock prices. This is consistent with the argument that boards that are incentivized to protect their reputation can deter managers from withholding information. I find this relation to be stronger when other external monitoring mechanisms are weak and when there is uncertainty regarding the future prospects of the firm. I also find evidence that a channel by which directors can influence stock price informativeness is through voluntary disclosure. Additionally, the presence of directors with high reputation incentives is negatively associated with stock price crash.

Master-Arbeit Univ. St. Gallen, 2006.

Master-Arbeit Univ. St. Gallen, 2007.

<p>Background: The issue about corporate governance became more prominent in recent years as a result of corporate scandals and misconduct of executives. Firms, board members, and executives have been subject to criminal and civil actions over hidden debt, inflated earnings, insider trading, tax evasion, misuse of funds, and breaches of fiduciary duties. Firms such as Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco became well-known because of huge failures in governance. In addition to the scandals, nowadays, we can see that the financial crises have brought attention for today’s debate of corporate governance issue as well.</p><p>Board is the major component of corporate governance like chief executive office (CEO), shareholders, stakeholders or community in general. This board is authorized to decide on the operations, management, and strategy of the company on behalf of the shareholders. Since the board members suppose to represent their interests.</p><p>Problem: What is the relationship between main board composition factors and firm’s accounting profitability?</p><p>Purpose: This thesis strives to analyze the level of correlation between selected board composition factors and accounting profitability of the Swedish Large Companies; by using appropriate statistical tools of correlation we aim to identify the association of selected variables.</p><p>Method: This research is conducted with sample of 63 large caps from the OMX Nordic Exchange-Stockholm and includes data from 2005 to 2009. We adopt the perspective of a shareholder and the philosophical stance of a positivist. The study uses quantitative method since our sample size is large enough to use the method.</p><p>Conclusion: The findings highlight that there is no significant relationship between some of the board composition factors namely- number of board directors, percentage of independent directors and experience of board member and the accounting profitability measure (Av. ROE) of Swedish large firms.</p><p>Where as, in case of the proportion of female directors, we do find a significant correlation between the accounting profitability measure (Av. ROE) and percentage of female directors of Swedish large firms. The correlation results show a positive relationship between the variables</p>

Background: The issue about corporate governance became more prominent in recent years as a result of corporate scandals and misconduct of executives. Firms, board members, and executives have been subject to criminal and civil actions over hidden debt, inflated earnings, insider trading, tax evasion, misuse of funds, and breaches of fiduciary duties. Firms such as Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco became well-known because of huge failures in governance. In addition to the scandals, nowadays, we can see that the financial crises have brought attention for today’s debate of corporate governance issue as well. Board is the major component of corporate governance like chief executive office (CEO), shareholders, stakeholders or community in general. This board is authorized to decide on the operations, management, and strategy of the company on behalf of the shareholders. Since the board members suppose to represent their interests. Problem: What is the relationship between main board composition factors and firm’s accounting profitability? Purpose: This thesis strives to analyze the level of correlation between selected board composition factors and accounting profitability of the Swedish Large Companies; by using appropriate statistical tools of correlation we aim to identify the association of selected variables. Method: This research is conducted with sample of 63 large caps from the OMX Nordic Exchange-Stockholm and includes data from 2005 to 2009. We adopt the perspective of a shareholder and the philosophical stance of a positivist. The study uses quantitative method since our sample size is large enough to use the method. Conclusion: The findings highlight that there is no significant relationship between some of the board composition factors namely- number of board directors, percentage of independent directors and experience of board member and the accounting profitability measure (Av. ROE) of Swedish large firms. Where as, in case of the proportion of female directors, we do find a significant correlation between the accounting profitability measure (Av. ROE) and percentage of female directors of Swedish large firms. The correlation results show a positive relationship between the variables

Bachelor-Arbeit Univ. St. Gallen, 2005.

Definition and basic theoretic information about Corporate Governance of big industry company Description and Analyse of corporate Management, the functions of Top Management Members, their role in relationship to owners / shareholders (describtion of used tools for internal control of government, investment and tools for financial analyses)

La recente crisi internazionale ha acceso un intenso dibattito sulla composizione degli organi di governo societario delle istituzioni finanziarie. Questo studio si pone l’obiettivo di indagare le determinanti della struttura del consiglio di amministrazione nel settore bancario europeo. Il primo capitolo è dedicato all’analisi dei fattori capaci di condizionare la dimensione del consiglio e la presenza di componenti non esecutivi e di componenti indipendenti. I risultati ottenuti dimostrano l’esistenza di un equilibrio complessivo tra i fattori idiosincratici propri delle singole banche e le caratteristiche dei Paesi in cui esse operano nell’influenzare la dimensione dell’organo amministrativo. Di contro, le peculiarità del contesto di riferimento spiegano la maggior parte della variabilità nelle percentuali di amministratori non esecutivi e di amministratori indipendenti. Con riferimento alle caratteristiche specifiche degli intermediari, vengono identificate relazioni sistematiche tra la struttura del consiglio di amministrazione e l’operatività aziendale o la struttura proprietaria, in funzione del trade-off tra i costi e i benefici associati a configurazioni alternative dell’organo di gestione. Nel secondo capitolo, viene sviluppata l’analisi delle determinanti della presenza di amministratori di genere femminile. Il modello empirico integra le variabili esplicative relative alle caratteristiche delle singole banche con un ampio numero di indicatori della condizione della donna in ciascun Paese, attinenti all’istruzione, alla famiglia, al bilanciamento tra vita privata e lavoro, all’occupazione e al coinvolgimento nella politica e nelle istituzioni pubbliche. Le evidenze dell’analisi fanno emergere con chiarezza che la partecipazione femminile al consiglio delle banche è uno specchio dell’immagine della donna nell’ambiente esterno. In questo senso, i Paesi con costumi più emancipativi e un più efficace sistema di welfare a supporto della parità tra i generi presentano la più elevata partecipazione femminile al consiglio di amministrazione degli intermediari nazionali. / The recent financial crisis has brought board of directors of financial institutions into the spotlight. This study investigates the determinants of board structure in the European banking industry. In the first chapter, we analyze factors that can affect the number of board members, the percentage of non executive directors and the percentage of independent directors. We prove the existence of an overall equilibrium between bank-specific and country-specific characteristics in explaining variation in board size. In contrast, country-specific characteristics explain most of the variation in the percentages of non executive directors and independent directors. As regards bank-specific characteristics, we find systematic relationships between board composition and bank’s operating variables or ownership structure variables, according to benefits and costs embedded in different board structures. In the second chapter, we examine the determinants of female participation in the boardroom. In this case, bank-specific characteristics are complemented by country-specific explanatory variables of women’s status covering the areas of education, family life, economic activity and employment, work-life balance, participation in public life and decision making. The results provide evidence that female representation on bank boards is a mirror of the general status of women in the country in which the banks operate. In this sense countries that exhibit more emancipative values, as well as more advanced welfare systems to promote effective equality between women and men, are the ones that present higher percentages of female board directors in their banks.