This study analyses the financing decisions of listed non-financial corporations in France, Germany and the UK over the period 1969 to 2000. These countries represent satisfactorily different financial structures of their classes, Le., Latinic, Germanic and Anglo-Saxon traditions, respectively. Thus, this thesis attempts to shed light on the impact of institutional differences (accounting and taxation systems, bankruptcy laws, corporate governance structure) on corporate financing mix policies. The empirical investigation comprises three main themes; capital structure (debt versus equity), debt maturity structure (short-term versus long-term debt), and debt ownership structure public versus private debt). It is obvious that factors influencing financial strategies of firms change overtime and firms are expected to adjust themselves to their target financing structure according to random events. For these reasons we use dynamic panel data and choose Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) as an appropriate estimation procedure for our autoregressive-distributed lag model GMM methodology overcomes the problems of endogeneity, heteroscedasticity, normality, simultaneity and measurement errors, which are common for studies using firm-level data. The empirical evidence shows that corporate financing decisions are determined by both firm-specific (profitability, tangibility and maturity of assets, growth, quality, size, liquidity, payout policy, corporate tax rates, and earnings volatility), and market-related factors (term structure of interest rates, market equity premium, interest rate volatility, stock return volatility, stock price performance). However, the strength and nature of the effect of these factors are dependent on the financial environment and tradition of the countries of interest. Therefore, our research argues that financing mix decisions of firms are not only the product of their own characteristics, but also the outcome of environment and traditions in which they operate.

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This article explores the corporate governance in the developed countries and China from a comparative perspective. Following the analysis of principal-agent model, this article examines the dispersion-to-concentration ownership span to explore its influence on the majority/minority ownership and the shareholder/manager conflicts. It compares the positive and negative edges of concentrated shareholding with empirical analysis of Canada, the U.S., and China, and finds the different roles of institutional shareholders in various countries. This article then turns to two-tier agency model which is another way to enhance corporate governance. Compared with the vertical construct with the vanguard of Germany, it illustrates that the supervisory board in china is situated parallel to the board of directors and loses the supervising purpose. This article finally explores the independent director system which has obtained credits in the developed countries. While in China, it lacks legal protection and is not effective as expected.

This article explores the corporate governance in the developed countries and China from a comparative perspective. Following the analysis of principal-agent model, this article examines the dispersion-to-concentration ownership span to explore its influence on the majority/minority ownership and the shareholder/manager conflicts. It compares the positive and negative edges of concentrated shareholding with empirical analysis of Canada, the U.S., and China, and finds the different roles of institutional shareholders in various countries. This article then turns to two-tier agency model which is another way to enhance corporate governance. Compared with the vertical construct with the vanguard of Germany, it illustrates that the supervisory board in china is situated parallel to the board of directors and loses the supervising purpose. This article finally explores the independent director system which has obtained credits in the developed countries. While in China, it lacks legal protection and is not effective as expected.

This research has considered the extent to which Australia's top 100 companies by capitalisation at 30 June 2003 have responded to this call for improved corporate governance reporting. It has considered what companies were reporting in 2002, prior to the 2003 ASX Corporate Governance Report, what they were able to report in 2003, and the extent to which they met the requirements in 2004, the first year in which most companies could report fully against the recommendations. The research questions being asked related to the extent of change to corporate governance reporting as a result of the ASX Corporate Governance Report, whether the recommendations were met in whole or in part, whether the reporting was also changing corporate governance practices, and whether this provided any insight into models of governance amongst Australia's top companies. / The Australian Stock Exchange should be well pleased with the action taken in response to its recommendations, showing high levels of goodwill towards the changes that have been proposed, which it now seems unlikely it will be necessary to mandate. Significant improvement in reporting is evident, particularly amongst companies which are listed on the stock exchange as responsible entities. / What this research tells us about models of governance is that there is no single model of governance that stands out as being pre-eminent. Some companies adopt traditional models but more often there is the sense that the governance model evolves for a company at a particular time based on the circumstances facing the company and the personalities involved. / Has this ASX reform process been a form of window dressing or does it reflect serious change? Evidence gathered form annual reports over three years of Australia's top companies would suggest that this is not window dressing because of the extent and detail of disclosure in corporate governance reporting and the willingness of so many companies to change their practices as a result of an enhanced disclosure regime. / Thesis (DBA(DoctorateofBusinessAdministration))--University of South Australia, 2007.

This study examines the relationship between ownership structures and the performance of listed Thai financial firms, using a sample of 39 companies which is accounted for 86% of the market capitalisation of all financial firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) in 1996. The study employs both univariate and multivariate regression analysis. The empirical results reveal that the presence of controlling shareholders is associated with higher performance, particularly when measured, for example, by return on equity (ROE). This evidence is consistent with the view that large shareholders mitigate the “free-rider” problem of monitoring a management team, and reduce agency costs, as contended by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Admati et al. (1994). In addition, the separation of voting and cash-flow rights through the use of pyramid and cross-shareholding is not detrimental to the value of a firm. The study does not find evidence to support the argument that a family's involvement in management has a negative effect on company performance. Rather, there is strong evidence to support the hypotheses that state-owned financial institutions display superior performance. Finally, the study does not find evidence to support the argument that there is a non-monotonic relationship between ownership concentration and company value. Nevertheless, there is strong evidence that, at higher levels of ownership (in this case 50-75%), the involvement in management by controlling shareholders has a positive effect on firm performance, in terms of accounting, ROE, and market measures, price-to-book ratio. The results add to the literature that evaluates an empirical the link between ownership structure and firm performance, and provide additional information to policy-makers engaged in the ongoing development of corporate governance in developing countries, particularly in Thailand. / Thesis (DBA(DoctorateofBusinessAdministration))--University of South Australia, 2005.

Thesis (PhDBusinessandManagement)--University of South Australia, 2003.

Since the late nineteen nineties, corporate governance has been recognised by the Chinese leadership as being an integral and vital part of economic reform. At the macro level the reform is to transition to a market economy and at the micro level, business enterprises are adopting sound standards of corporate governance. This thesis analyses the various models: the shareholder value, the stakeholder, the stewardship and the convergence models of corporate governance. It looks at the Chinese scenario - what model of governance has China adopted and is it appropriate? What problems of corporate governance are special to China and how are these problems being resolved? Many of the problems are due to the fact that China has adopted the shareholder value model ??? a model based on the UK / USA. However, unlike them, China does not posses the requisite institutions necessary to underpin the efficient functioning of the model. The Chinese capital markets are nascent and not well regulated, the rule of law is tentative and the regulatory bodies are lacking in enforcement powers. In an effort to encourage good corporate governance, the China Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated the QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor) scheme in December 2002 in the hope that by opening the domestic securities market to foreign financial institutions, this would result in the implementation of sound corporate governance in Chinese listed companies as they vied to attract foreign shareholders. A survey was carried out and the results have only been mildly encouraging. The QFII has not had the dramatic impact that was expected of it initially and the reason is that the quotas allocated have been small and the QFII have had many restrictions placed. Until these are loosened the impact of the QFII will continue to be modest.

Dissertation--Universität Hamburg, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references.

Zugl.: München, Univ., Diss., 2006