This thesis seeks to analyse the development and determinants of the corporate governance framework in China. With a focus on the emerging corporate governance framework, the relation between regulation, firms and the single-party state is examined. Corporate governance failures have not been a significant area of study in the governance literature. The analysis of recent high-level corruption cases in the oil industry provides evidence for the persisting influence of the Party-state on governance through personal networks and family ties at the nexus of state and economy. The findings suggest that there are significant underlying constraints which limit the effectiveness of the current regulatory framework. State shareholding, agency chains and a subservient legal system with a parallel legal sphere all impair the new corporate governance system. While a basic system is in place, improving governance remains difficult. An overhaul of the current constellation and second wave of SOE reforms is deemed necessary. / published_or_final_version / China Development Studies / Master / Master of Arts in China Development Studies

Since the late nineteen nineties, corporate governance has been recognised by the Chinese leadership as being an integral and vital part of economic reform. At the macro level the reform is to transition to a market economy and at the micro level, business enterprises are adopting sound standards of corporate governance. This thesis analyses the various models: the shareholder value, the stakeholder, the stewardship and the convergence models of corporate governance. It looks at the Chinese scenario - what model of governance has China adopted and is it appropriate? What problems of corporate governance are special to China and how are these problems being resolved? Many of the problems are due to the fact that China has adopted the shareholder value model ??? a model based on the UK / USA. However, unlike them, China does not posses the requisite institutions necessary to underpin the efficient functioning of the model. The Chinese capital markets are nascent and not well regulated, the rule of law is tentative and the regulatory bodies are lacking in enforcement powers. In an effort to encourage good corporate governance, the China Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated the QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor) scheme in December 2002 in the hope that by opening the domestic securities market to foreign financial institutions, this would result in the implementation of sound corporate governance in Chinese listed companies as they vied to attract foreign shareholders. A survey was carried out and the results have only been mildly encouraging. The QFII has not had the dramatic impact that was expected of it initially and the reason is that the quotas allocated have been small and the QFII have had many restrictions placed. Until these are loosened the impact of the QFII will continue to be modest.

published_or_final_version / Economics and Finance / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

published_or_final_version / Law / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

Since the late nineteen nineties, corporate governance has been recognised by the Chinese leadership as being an integral and vital part of economic reform. At the macro level the reform is to transition to a market economy and at the micro level, business enterprises are adopting sound standards of corporate governance. This thesis analyses the various models: the shareholder value, the stakeholder, the stewardship and the convergence models of corporate governance. It looks at the Chinese scenario - what model of governance has China adopted and is it appropriate? What problems of corporate governance are special to China and how are these problems being resolved? Many of the problems are due to the fact that China has adopted the shareholder value model ??? a model based on the UK / USA. However, unlike them, China does not posses the requisite institutions necessary to underpin the efficient functioning of the model. The Chinese capital markets are nascent and not well regulated, the rule of law is tentative and the regulatory bodies are lacking in enforcement powers. In an effort to encourage good corporate governance, the China Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated the QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor) scheme in December 2002 in the hope that by opening the domestic securities market to foreign financial institutions, this would result in the implementation of sound corporate governance in Chinese listed companies as they vied to attract foreign shareholders. A survey was carried out and the results have only been mildly encouraging. The QFII has not had the dramatic impact that was expected of it initially and the reason is that the quotas allocated have been small and the QFII have had many restrictions placed. Until these are loosened the impact of the QFII will continue to be modest.

published_or_final_version / Business Administration / Master / Master of Business Administration

published_or_final_version / Law / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

published_or_final_version / Economics and Finance / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

The primary objective of this dissertation is to examine the role of corporate governance in the performance of publicly listed corporations. The normative research suggests that stronger corporate governance should lead to better market performance and a firm’s governance practice should have a positive effect on its market value. This research focuses on Chinese capital markets because of their unique characteristics with respect to elements of corporate governance.

This research is in the field of corporate governance and focuses on corporate accountability and transparency of China’s commercial banks, in particular SOCBs. Since 1979, the banking system of China has been undertaken reforms to transform from a mono banking system to a banking system in which banks should be profit-driven. The focus of the reforms has been changed from off-loading of NPLs to the improvement of corporate governance of commercial banks. However, China’s SOCBs still appear to be inefficient and poor in disclosure of information, though they are now more profitable. They are also required to make certain loans in line with the policies of the Chinese government. This research aims at finding out issues related to the governance and disclosure systems of China’s commercial banks from a legal perspective and suggesting possible direction to solve the issues. For the governance system, directors who are accountable to their stakeholders, not only the majority shareholders, play an important role in enhancing the operations of banks. For the disclosure system, auditors and CRAs, the gatekeepers of the financial sector, could help to reduce information asymmetry and enhance the transparency of banks, leading to a more effective use of market discipline in monitoring the operations of banks. To improve the operations of banks, this research highlights the need to improve various institutions in addition to the reforms of banks, with the focus of reforms on the legal and regulatory systems relating to the governance mechanism, disclosure system, audit industry and credit rating industry. Though legal rules on the above areas are mostly stipulated in line with international standards or in line with regulations of other developed countries, they are usually scattered in various administrative regulations, departmental rules and normative documents and some of the provisions are still principles based in lack of implementation details. In lawmaking, there should be more revision, harmonization and consolidation of existing regulations and rules. In particular, the provisions associated with the liability risks of directors/ banks/ auditors/ audit firms/ CRAs/ responsible personnel of CRAs should be revisited and revised to enhance the enforceability of regulations and rules by regulators. Regulators of banks, auditors and CRAs should also take up more proactive roles in preventing possible risks in the financial sector rather than passively conducting box-ticking compliance. They should also increase supervisory intensity and effectiveness, with sufficient resources and clear mandate. Though the Chinese government holds controlling shares of SOCBs and certain bank loans made are still policy-led, this research argues that a well-established and effective legal and regulatory system on governance mechanism and disclosure system, via the help of auditors and CRAs, could help withstand political influence and enhance a healthy and sustainable development of the financial sector. Without an effective legal and regulatory system, China’s banking system may still be subject to external and internal influence which will affect the progress of gradual transformation to a real market economy. / published_or_final_version / Real Estate and Construction / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy