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Diss. Univ. Zürich. / Im Buchh.: Zürich : Schulthess. Literaturverz.

<p>After several scandals in the US, the focus on corporate governance has increased rapidly and led to implementations of “codes of best practice” in many countries. In 2002, the Swedish government appointed a committee with the purpose to develop a Swedish Code of Corporate Governance. The purpose with the code is to help the Swedish industry to regain its confidence in order to attract capital after the scandals that have occurred. The code shall be implemented by Swedish com-panies listed on the A-list on the Stockholm stock exchange and companies on the O-list with a market value above 3 billion SEK and shall be implemented by the 1:st of July 2005.</p><p>The code is based on the principle “comply or explain” which means that companies do not have to comply with the requirements of the code as long as they explain their reasons why they deviate. The purpose of this thesis is thereby to examine to what extent Swedish companies prepare to comply or are already complying with the requirements of the code and the reasons for possible deviations regarding the level of compliance between the companies. In order to answer the purpose stated, the authors have chosen to use both a quantitative and a qualitative method. The authors have sent surveys to all companies obliged to implement the code in order to find out to what extent the Swedish companies prepare to comply or are already complying with the code today. In order to answer the second research question, why companies prepare to comply, or are complying to different degrees, hypotheses were stated and interviews with five companies listed on the Stockholm stock exchange were made.</p><p>The authors found a high compliance rate among Swedish companies, with a mean of 88,49%. The companies on the A-list are complying to a larger extent than the ones on the O-list. Based on the hypotheses, the authors found that companies with higher turnovers are more likely to comply with the code to a larger extent than companies with lower turnovers. Additional reasons to a high degree of compliance rate with the code, are: the need for resources, the impact of media, the culture and personal values within the organization and the fact that the code does not imply any major changes for the organization. Reasons why companies do not prepare to comply or are already complying to a large extent are: the increased devotion of resources that the implementation requires, the high level of details and the complicated requirements of the code. These last-mentioned factors lead to difficulties to interpret the requirements of the code and increased bureaucracy, which thereby lead to a lower level of compliance.</p>

No abstract on disk

Hao He. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 84-86). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract / Chapter Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter 2. --- Literature Review --- p.3 / Chapter 2.1 --- Recent Work on Synchronicity --- p.3 / Chapter 2.2 --- Recent Work on Corporate Governance --- p.5 / Chapter 2.3 --- Motivation´ؤWhy Stock Return Synchronicity Matters --- p.6 / Chapter Chapter 3. --- Theory and Hypotheses --- p.9 / Chapter 3.1 --- Derivation of Dependent Variables --- p.9 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- Corporate Governance Mechanisms --- p.9 / Chapter 3.1.1.1 --- Static Corporate Governance Mechanisms --- p.9 / Chapter 3.1.1.2 --- Dynamic Corporate Governance Mechanisms --- p.11 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- Regional Governance Mechanisms --- p.12 / Chapter 3.2 --- Quantification of Dependent Variables --- p.14 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Quantifying corporate Governance Mechanisms --- p.14 / Chapter 3.2.1.1 --- Quantifying Static Corporate Governance Mechanisms --- p.14 / Chapter 3.2.1.2 --- Quantifying Dynamic Corporate Governance Mechanisms --- p.15 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Quantifying Regional Governance Mechanisms --- p.19 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- Quantifying Control Variables --- p.22 / Chapter Chapter 4. --- Data --- p.23 / Chapter 4.1 --- Sample --- p.23 / Chapter 4.2 --- Definitions of Main Synchronicity Measures --- p.25 / Chapter 4.3 --- Methdology --- p.26 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- Empirical Results --- p.27 / Chapter 5.1 --- Results on Corporate Governance Mechanisms --- p.27 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- Results on Static Corporate Governance Mechanisms --- p.27 / Chapter 5.1.2 --- Results on Dynamic Corporate Governance Mechanisms --- p.29 / Chapter 5.1.2.1 --- Results on President-Changing Variables --- p.29 / Chapter 5.1.2.2 --- Results on General manager-change Variables --- p.31 / Chapter 5.2 --- Results on Regional Governance Mechanisms --- p.34 / Chapter Chapter 6. --- Conclusion --- p.36 / Reference --- p.38 / Tables and Figures --- p.41

I | P a g e Abstract This thesis primarily focuses on the construction of a firm-specific index measuring the quality of corporate governance in the most liquid Czech and Croatian companies. The index is made by following OECD recommendations on construction of composite indicators. It allows comparison of best practices implementation on the overall level, and it also provides with a comprehensive analogy in terms of various governance domains performance. These domains are represented by four sub-indices: Board, Conflict of Interest, Shareholders' Rights, and Transparency and Disclosure. Initial assumption, stating that the Czech companies should have higher overall Corporate Governance Index score than the Croatian companies, is approved. Moreover, the Czech companies have stronger performance in three sub-indices: Board, Conflict of Interest, and Transparency and Disclosure, whereas the Croatian companies have negligible advantage solely with regard to the Shareholders' Rights Sub-index.

In recent years, countries across the globe have come to realise the importance of an official corporate governance regime, which provides a platform for market integrity and efficiency, as well as facilitating economic growth. Formulating effective corporate governance measures is a complex task for legislators. The purpose of this paper is to provide an in depth analysis and comparison of the corporate governance legislative frameworks in Australia and Jordan. In 2004, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in conjunction with national and international governmental organisations, finalised a universal set of corporate governance principles. Although non-binding, the OECD Principles 2004 are a serious attempt to strengthen every aspect of corporate governance and, accordingly, have been utilised in this paper as an international benchmark.The ultimate objective of this paper is to formulate a number of detailed and specific recommendations to the Jordanian Government. Jordan’s legislative framework for corporations received a significant shake-up a decade ago when the Jordanian Government began the process of implementing a privatisation program under the guidance of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Despite a number of positive developments since this program was initiated, the Jordanian Government has continually failed to recognise the importance of promoting good corporate governance. There can be no doubt that the Jordanian companies’ legislation is in desperate need of reform. The vast majority of the provisions are ambiguous and lack the necessary detail to regulate the complex sphere of company law. In this writer’s opinion, the relevant authorities in Jordan must act immediately to bring the country’s legislative regime into line with internationally recognised standards and practices. Chapter 1 of the paper sets out an introductory explanation of corporate governance and corporate structure. Chapter 2 provides a brief account of the history of company law in Jordan and a description of the different types of company structures permitted under the relevant Jordanian legislation. Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion of the corporate governance principles formulated by the OECD. The process began in 1999 and was completed in 2004 after extensive revision and consultation. Chapter 4, the core part of the paper, presents a comparative analysis of the implementation of the OECD principles in Australia and Jordan. Chapter 5 provides an explanation and analysis of two important shareholders’ remedies in the Australian companies’ legislation that do not exist in Jordan. Finally, Chapter 6 provides a summary of analysis and sets out a list of recommendations to the Jordanian Government.

Zugleich: Diss. Nr. 1926 Wirtschaftswiss. St. Gallen, 1996 u.d.T.: Das Konzept des Economic Value Added (EVA) : Massstab für finanzielle Performance und Bewertungsinstrument im Zeichen des Shareholder value : Darstellung und Anwendung auf Schweizer Aktiengesellschaften. / Literaturverz.

After several scandals in the US, the focus on corporate governance has increased rapidly and led to implementations of “codes of best practice” in many countries. In 2002, the Swedish government appointed a committee with the purpose to develop a Swedish Code of Corporate Governance. The purpose with the code is to help the Swedish industry to regain its confidence in order to attract capital after the scandals that have occurred. The code shall be implemented by Swedish com-panies listed on the A-list on the Stockholm stock exchange and companies on the O-list with a market value above 3 billion SEK and shall be implemented by the 1:st of July 2005. The code is based on the principle “comply or explain” which means that companies do not have to comply with the requirements of the code as long as they explain their reasons why they deviate. The purpose of this thesis is thereby to examine to what extent Swedish companies prepare to comply or are already complying with the requirements of the code and the reasons for possible deviations regarding the level of compliance between the companies. In order to answer the purpose stated, the authors have chosen to use both a quantitative and a qualitative method. The authors have sent surveys to all companies obliged to implement the code in order to find out to what extent the Swedish companies prepare to comply or are already complying with the code today. In order to answer the second research question, why companies prepare to comply, or are complying to different degrees, hypotheses were stated and interviews with five companies listed on the Stockholm stock exchange were made. The authors found a high compliance rate among Swedish companies, with a mean of 88,49%. The companies on the A-list are complying to a larger extent than the ones on the O-list. Based on the hypotheses, the authors found that companies with higher turnovers are more likely to comply with the code to a larger extent than companies with lower turnovers. Additional reasons to a high degree of compliance rate with the code, are: the need for resources, the impact of media, the culture and personal values within the organization and the fact that the code does not imply any major changes for the organization. Reasons why companies do not prepare to comply or are already complying to a large extent are: the increased devotion of resources that the implementation requires, the high level of details and the complicated requirements of the code. These last-mentioned factors lead to difficulties to interpret the requirements of the code and increased bureaucracy, which thereby lead to a lower level of compliance.

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