The General Laws of Agency do not supply a full answer in circumstances where the principal is a company. These laws have undergone certain changes and extentions to suit the company which, as principal, cannot perform any act, by reason of the fact that it is a fictious entity. These changes were brought about by the English Doctrine of Constructive Notice and the Turquand Rule, as well as Section 36 of the Companies Act (Changes); and the Doctrine of Estoppel (Extention). Abolition of the Doctrine of Constructive Notice and the Ultra Vires Doctrine is pleaded on the one hand and the retention of the Turquand Rule, which must be kept distinct from Estoppel, on the other. Contracting with companies will hereby be simplified and become more practical. This will bring our company law on par with modern company law developments, especially those of England.

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Laws by Coursework and research report at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2018 / This research report seeks to interrogate whether some of the notable limitations which led to the dismal failure of the Judicial Management as a corporate rescue mechanism effectively remain subversive to the business rescue procedure which is intended to prevent the same experiences of the past. The research will thus be limited to the consideration of only those limitations which were problematic under Judicial Management and yet appear not to have been sufficiently addressed by Chapter six of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. It will be acknowledged that the business rescue procedure stands to be largely progressive. However, the bulk of this research is intended to show that the complicated nature of the business rescue provisions coupled with some drafting oversights on the part of the Legislature leaves the procedure vulnerable to the same issues which affected its predecessor. Specifically, the imprecise and complicated nature of sections 131(4) and 133(1) of the 2008 Companies Act makes the procedure vulnerable to judicial conservatism, the same challenge which was most contributory to the failure of Judicial Management. This has in turn resulted in several inconsistent decisions in the interpretation of these provisions which causes unnecessary uncertainties deleterious to the intended purpose for which the business rescue mechanism was enacted. / XL2019

Text in Afrikaans / The Companies Act, 1973 ("the Act") contains no specific provision dealing with the relationship between a nominee shareholder and its principal, the beneficial shareholder. The Act merely contains a variety of references to this unique relationship without specifying the content thereof or elaborating on the rights of the beneficial shareholder. It is clear from the Act that no legal connection exists between the company and the beneficial shareholder and a company is only obliged to recognise its registered members. It has become apparent that beneficial shareholders need more protection than is currently afforded to them in terms of our common law. Currently beneficial shareholders have a common law right to claim return of their shares from any person (even bona fide third parties) in the event of the misappropriation of such shares by their nominee shareholders. Beneficial shareholders are unprotected if their nominee shareholders were to act contrary to their instructions, for example by not voting at the general meeting in accordance with the instructions of the beneficial shareholders. Having regard to the fact that the relationship between the beneficial shareholder and the nominee shareholder is based on agency or trusteeship, the beneficial shareholder will be entitle to compel its nominee to transfer the shares to another person. This may, however, have stamp duty implications and if the nominee refuses to give its cooperation in respect of such transfer, costly legal action may be the only solution for the beneficial shareholder. In deciding which section of the Act should be adapted to include the rights of beneficial shareholders, the following sections have been considered: Section 266 (statutory derivative action), section 252 (statutory remedy in the event of prejudice), section 440K (compulsory acquisition of securities of minorities) and section 344(h) (liquidation on grounds of equity). The only one of these sections which provides the court with a wide enough discretion to afford the required protection is section 252. An important point in this regard is that section 252 cannot effectively be extended to beneficial shareholders unless they also acquire the right to have access to the same company information as the members of the company would receive. In an attempt to create a balance between the needs to greater protection of beneficial shareholders and the avoidance of unnecessary cumbersome administrative obligations on companies, it is suggested that a register of beneficial shareholders be created and that companies be obliged to inform all beneficial shareholders appearing on such register of the same company information as is provided to registered members. The Act must make it clear that : • a beneficial shareholder can only be recorded in the register with the assistance of its nominee shareholder; • the relevant nominee shareholder must satisfy the company secretary that the person which is recorded in the register is in fact its principal; • the only two instances where the company secretary will be entitled to remove the beneficial shareholder is in the first instance where the beneficia] shareholder consents to such removal and secondly where the shares held by the registered member is transferred. The latter ground will avoid continued provision of company information to persons not involved with the company. No duty will be placed on companies to ensure that the names and addresses of beneficial shareholders are correct. This will be the responsibility of beneficial shareholders. The improved flow of company information will facilitate the improved awareness by beneficial shareholders of relevant events and together with the appropriate extension of section 252, will go a long way in improving the much needed protection of beneficial shareholders. / Mercantile Law / LL.M. (Handelsreg)

Text in Afrikaans / The Companies Act, 1973 ("the Act") contains no specific provision dealing with the relationship between a nominee shareholder and its principal, the beneficial shareholder. The Act merely contains a variety of references to this unique relationship without specifying the content thereof or elaborating on the rights of the beneficial shareholder. It is clear from the Act that no legal connection exists between the company and the beneficial shareholder and a company is only obliged to recognise its registered members. It has become apparent that beneficial shareholders need more protection than is currently afforded to them in terms of our common law. Currently beneficial shareholders have a common law right to claim return of their shares from any person (even bona fide third parties) in the event of the misappropriation of such shares by their nominee shareholders. Beneficial shareholders are unprotected if their nominee shareholders were to act contrary to their instructions, for example by not voting at the general meeting in accordance with the instructions of the beneficial shareholders. Having regard to the fact that the relationship between the beneficial shareholder and the nominee shareholder is based on agency or trusteeship, the beneficial shareholder will be entitle to compel its nominee to transfer the shares to another person. This may, however, have stamp duty implications and if the nominee refuses to give its cooperation in respect of such transfer, costly legal action may be the only solution for the beneficial shareholder. In deciding which section of the Act should be adapted to include the rights of beneficial shareholders, the following sections have been considered: Section 266 (statutory derivative action), section 252 (statutory remedy in the event of prejudice), section 440K (compulsory acquisition of securities of minorities) and section 344(h) (liquidation on grounds of equity). The only one of these sections which provides the court with a wide enough discretion to afford the required protection is section 252. An important point in this regard is that section 252 cannot effectively be extended to beneficial shareholders unless they also acquire the right to have access to the same company information as the members of the company would receive. In an attempt to create a balance between the needs to greater protection of beneficial shareholders and the avoidance of unnecessary cumbersome administrative obligations on companies, it is suggested that a register of beneficial shareholders be created and that companies be obliged to inform all beneficial shareholders appearing on such register of the same company information as is provided to registered members. The Act must make it clear that : • a beneficial shareholder can only be recorded in the register with the assistance of its nominee shareholder; • the relevant nominee shareholder must satisfy the company secretary that the person which is recorded in the register is in fact its principal; • the only two instances where the company secretary will be entitled to remove the beneficial shareholder is in the first instance where the beneficia] shareholder consents to such removal and secondly where the shares held by the registered member is transferred. The latter ground will avoid continued provision of company information to persons not involved with the company. No duty will be placed on companies to ensure that the names and addresses of beneficial shareholders are correct. This will be the responsibility of beneficial shareholders. The improved flow of company information will facilitate the improved awareness by beneficial shareholders of relevant events and together with the appropriate extension of section 252, will go a long way in improving the much needed protection of beneficial shareholders. / Mercantile Law / LL.M. (Handelsreg)

No abstract available. / Dissertation (LLM (Mercantile Law))--University of Pretoria, 2006. / Mercantile Law / unrestricted

The shareholders in general meeting and board of directors are the main governing organs of a company. Control of the general meeting theoretically ensures control of the composition of the board of directors who are usually empowered by the articles to manage the day-to-day administration of the company. The company acts by shareholders and directors voting and passing resolutions in general meeting and board meetings respectively. Controlling sufficient votes to pass resolutions in general and board meetings is therefore the essence of corporate control. A shareholder's right to vote in general meeting is a proprietary legal right, severable from the other incidents of share ownership. By aggregating voting rights, or limiting the scope of the voting rights of some shareholders, or restricting ownership of voting rights to certain specified persons, voting control in the general meeting may be acquired. / LL.M / Private Law

Thesis (LLM. (Development and management law)) -- University of Limpopo, 2012 / This mini-dissertation highlights corporate governance initiatives in South Africa, focusing on the proposed governance reforms. An analysis of the major corporate governance reform is done including, statutory reforms, development of codes of conduct and practice and institutional reforms. The evolution of South Africa’s corporate structure and forces driving corporate governance is examined. It is noted that corporation in South Africa cannot shield themselves from the global movement shaping the standard principle governing corporations. Therefore the global principle corporate governance are examined concerning how they can serve as models for enhancing corporate governance standard in South Africa. The analysis is based on the need to bring South Africa’s corporate governance in line with international accepted standard but considering the best interest of South Africa and its citizen.

The shareholders in general meeting and board of directors are the main governing organs of a company. Control of the general meeting theoretically ensures control of the composition of the board of directors who are usually empowered by the articles to manage the day-to-day administration of the company. The company acts by shareholders and directors voting and passing resolutions in general meeting and board meetings respectively. Controlling sufficient votes to pass resolutions in general and board meetings is therefore the essence of corporate control. A shareholder's right to vote in general meeting is a proprietary legal right, severable from the other incidents of share ownership. By aggregating voting rights, or limiting the scope of the voting rights of some shareholders, or restricting ownership of voting rights to certain specified persons, voting control in the general meeting may be acquired. / LL.M / Private Law

Market abuse practices may directly or indirectly give rise to diverse problems such as inaccurate stock market prices, low public investor confidence, reduced market integrity and poor efficiency in the affected financial markets. This thesis reveals that three major forms of market abuse, namely insider trading, prohibited trading practices (trade-based market manipulation) and the making or publication of false, misleading or deceptive statements, promises and forecasts relating to listed securities (disclosure-based market manipulation) are prohibited in South Africa. However, although South Africa has had market abuse legislation for about 30 years, and must be commended for its great effort to enhance market integrity by combating market abuse practices, the enforcement of such legislation is still problematic. Moreover, in spite of the fact that there is no empirical data or accurate figures quantifying the occurrence and extent of market abuse activities in the South African financial markets, this thesis submits that market abuse practices are still to be completely eradicated. Accordingly, this thesis suggests that the aforementioned problem might have been aggravated by inter alia, various gaps, flaws and/or inconsistent implementation and enforcement of the market abuse legislation in South Africa. To this end, the anti-market abuse enforcement framework under the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 is analysed to investigate its adequacy. The co-operation and role of the Financial Services Board, the courts, the Directorate of Market Abuse and other relevant stakeholders is also examined and discussed. Moreover, the co-operation between the Financial Services Board and similar international agencies is discussed to gauge its effectiveness in relation to the combating of cross-border market abuse practices. The adequacy of the awareness and preventative measures in place to curb market abuse practices is also investigated to determine whether such measures are robust enough to combat other new challenges that were posed by the 2007 to 2009 global financial crisis. Furthermore, a comparative analysis is undertaken of the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in other jurisdictions, namely the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the European Union and Australia. This was done to investigate the relevant lessons that can be learnt or adopted from these jurisdictions. The thesis further discusses the adequacy of the recently introduced provisions of the Financial Markets Bill as well as the subsequent market abuse provisions of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. The thesis highlights that the aforementioned Bills are positive attempts by the policy makers to improve the enforcement of the market abuse provisions in South Africa. Nonetheless, the thesis reveals that most of the shortcomings contained in the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 were duplicated in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012. In light of this, it remains to be seen whether the market abuse provisions contained in the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 will improve the combating of market abuse practices in South Africa. Consequently, it is hoped that the relevant market abuse provisions of the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 will be comprehensively reviewed in regard to the recommendations made in this thesis. To this end, the thesis proposes a viable anti-market abuse model and policy framework and sets out both policy objectives and provisions which policy makers could use to strengthen some of the market abuse provisions in South Africa.

LL.M. (Commercial Law) / The Companies Act 71 of 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was passed by Parliament on 19 November 2008 and assented to by the President on 8 April 2009. The Act came into force on 1 May 2011 and contains the provisions regulating the new business rescue proceedings that replace judicial management under the Companies Act 61 of 1973. However, since the introduction of Chapter 6 of the Act, the courts South Africa still appear to be finding their feet with regard to many of the Act’s provisions. In spite of this, the new business rescue practice has become an important part of the South African corporate framework. The outbreak of recent case law has started to shape the direction, which business rescue, as interpreted by the Courts, is taking. An important debate among the courts is whether the courts should rescue a business entity or liquidating the businesses assets in order to settle claims against it. While a liquidation aims to divide the profit from the sale of assets amongst creditors and to dissolve the company, business rescue legislation provides for a restructuring of the financial structure of a distressed debtor to save the business as a going concern and to assist the settlement of claims against the business in full. The business rescue proceedings have been provided for by legislation in the Act, however, the result of the vast recent court decisions show that the Act may not be relied upon unconditionally without proper regard to the circumstances of each case. This research analyses the appropriateness of business rescue as opposed to liquidation by specifically looking at the requirements for a successful business rescue order. This research further analyses whether the decisions of the courts in present case law are on the correct path when interpreting the business recuse provisions in terms of the Act.