This Q study revealed the beliefs about professional practices by investor relations professionals at publicly traded corporations in Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio. Participants completed a fifty-four statement Q sort that included five areas of investor relations: tactics, shareholder relations, analyst/media relations, laws and regulations, and internal relations.The data from the completed Q sorts was then entered into the PQMethod software and two factors of investor relations professionals were identified: The Investor Relationship Professionals and the Technical Investor Professionals.The Investor Relationship Professionals believed that communication and good relationships were the most important aspects of their profession. The Technical Investor Professionals believed that the technical aspect of their position, including the laws and regulations surrounding their profession, should be the focus of their professional practice.The characteristics of the two factors that emerged can be directly attributed to the scandals at Enron and WorldCom. The focus on open communications and credibility are associated with the push to rebuild investors' trust and confidence in publicly traded corporations. The focuson laws and regulations are associated with the strict enforcement of the new SEC regulations that have emerged in the last three years. Thus, illustrating that the recent events have impacted the practices of investor relations professionals. / Department of Journalism

This dissertation consists of two essays in the area of corporate voluntary disclosure of predecision information. The first essay entitled, "Disclosure Choice in a Duopoly", focusses on the phenomenon of partial disclosure, where the manager of the firm discloses selected signals and withholds the rest. The manager may or may not receive private information which is related to both firm-specific and industry-wide common factors. The motivation for disclosure (non-disclosure) is derived from the proprietary nature of the manager's private information. The cost (benefit) of disclosure is modelled in an imperfectly competitive product market, where an uninformed opponent’s reaction to a disclosure affects the manager's expected profit. Our results indicate that the nature of the manager's optimal disclosure policy is crucially dependent on whether the signal is more informative about firm-specific or industry-wide common factors. Unfavourable news is disclosed and favourable news withheld if the signal is more informative about common factors. On the other hand, favourable news is disclosed and unfavourable news is withheld if the signal is more informative about firm-specific factors. Comparative statics show that the sensitivity of the optimal disclosure policy and the probability of disclosure to some key parameters are also dependent on this characteristic of a signal. The empirical implications of our results suggest that when testing hypotheses involving voluntary disclosures, failure to take the above characteristic into account may confound the results. The second essay entitled, "Disclosure and Reputation in Credit Markets", deals with a different aspect of voluntary disclosures. A reputation game is modelled in the absence of credible disclosure. The manager's ability with respect to obtaining predecision information is of interest to the firm's creditors. The manager's future nominal interest charges depend on the creditors' belief about the manager's ability, i.e., on his reputation. Hence, the manager attempts to communicate this ability through sub-optimal production choice and creditors learn about the manager by observing the end of period revenue realization. If credible disclosures are possible the manager may make direct disclosures to communicate his information gathering ability to the creditors. This alternative mechanism avoids the cost of reputation building incurred by selecting a suboptimal project. However, it is shown that if these two mechanisms for reputation acquisition are not "independent", then the possibility of disclosure increases the manager's incentive to select a sub-optimal action.

This dissertation consists of two essays in the area of corporate voluntary disclosure of predecision information. The first essay entitled, "Disclosure Choice in a Duopoly", focusses on the phenomenon of partial disclosure, where the manager of the firm discloses selected signals and withholds the rest. The manager may or may not receive private information which is related to both firm-specific and industry-wide common factors. The motivation for disclosure (non-disclosure) is derived from the proprietary nature of the manager's private information. The cost (benefit) of disclosure is modelled in an imperfectly competitive product market, where an uninformed opponent’s reaction to a disclosure affects the manager's expected profit. Our results indicate that the nature of the manager's optimal disclosure policy is crucially dependent on whether the signal is more informative about firm-specific or industry-wide common factors. Unfavourable news is disclosed and favourable news withheld if the signal is more informative about common factors. On the other hand, favourable news is disclosed and unfavourable news is withheld if the signal is more informative about firm-specific factors. Comparative statics show that the sensitivity of the optimal disclosure policy and the probability of disclosure to some key parameters are also dependent on this characteristic of a signal. The empirical implications of our results suggest that when testing hypotheses involving voluntary disclosures, failure to take the above characteristic into account may confound the results. The second essay entitled, "Disclosure and Reputation in Credit Markets", deals with a different aspect of voluntary disclosures. A reputation game is modelled in the absence of credible disclosure. The manager's ability with respect to obtaining predecision information is of interest to the firm's creditors. The manager's future nominal interest charges depend on the creditors' belief about the manager's ability, i.e., on his reputation. Hence, the manager attempts to communicate this ability through sub-optimal production choice and creditors learn about the manager by observing the end of period revenue realization. If credible disclosures are possible the manager may make direct disclosures to communicate his information gathering ability to the creditors. This alternative mechanism avoids the cost of reputation building incurred by selecting a suboptimal project. However, it is shown that if these two mechanisms for reputation acquisition are not "independent", then the possibility of disclosure increases the manager's incentive to select a sub-optimal action. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

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Extant literature has struggled to identify definitive purpose for shareholder proposals, finding them to depend on their context. Progressively, climate change has gathered interest at annual meetings where shareholders present proposals related to the subject. The literature builds expectations for the role of obsolescence, regulation and other forms of activism to motivate innovation with respect to these proposals. The literature also establishes how diversification can serve as a defense. I test the impact that shareholder proposals have on the information environment and on the corporate behaviors of innovation and diversification. I find that capital markets are responsive to proposal pressures and that there are improvements in the information environment. I find that firms in receipt of shareholder proposals related to climate change innovate and diversify more. I find wealth enhancements for these corporate behaviors spurred by climate-related proposals. While definitive statements on causality may elude, my results suggest that shareholder proposals have real effects. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2020. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

違規給企業帶來的主要後果是企業名譽的損失。然而，我們對以下問題卻知之甚少：企業在違規事件中是怎樣損失名譽的？為什麼同樣程度的違規給不同企業帶來的名譽損失卻不同？等等。本文綜合了來自犯罪學、財務學和社會心理學方面的文獻，把企業名譽定義為利益相關者對企業的情感，同時把違規事件看成是導致這種情感變化的誘因。 / 本文構建了一個綜合的理論模型，研究企業股東和企業自身的情感和情感變化。首先，本文提出，企業違規違反了股東對企業的道德期望和基本情感，使股東的情感發生偏移，並最終導致企業名譽的損失。在情感偏移的形成過程中，股東傾向于根據違規線索的診斷性特徵，把他們的基本情感用作透視鏡或者參照點來評價違規企業。第二，本文認為，違規企業通過在致歉公告中列出恢復性行動或語言，可以恢復股東對企業的基本情感並且減少企業名譽的損失。然而在情感恢復過程中，股東傾向于將恢復性行動或語言的心理距離與違規線索的心理距離進行比較，並據此調整他們對企業的評價和情感。第三，與其他違規企業相比，那些表達了愧疚感的違規企業在未來會約束自己的行為，降低了反復違規的傾向。但是隨著本次懲罰強度的不同，以及企業直接或間接地被懲罰經歷的不同，違規企業對本次懲罰的目的和道德意義的評價也會不同，並由此影響企業表達愧疚感的傾向。 / 本文的貢獻主要集中在以下四個方面。首先，通過強調情感在企業和股東關係中的重要性，豐富了關於公司治理的研究。第二，本文從情感視角去探討存在于股東和企業在資訊評價中各種的偏見，而這些偏見會影響他們對違規事件的情感和行為反應，以此拓展了集中於經濟視角的企業違規研究。第三，本文通過借鑒解釋層次理論中的觀點來研究企業恢復性行動和語言的特徵以及他們在股東情感恢復和企業榮譽恢復過程中的作用，這豐富了關於企業層的影像管理和危機管理研究。第四，本文通過強調企業內化懲罰在約束企業違規行為方面的作用，這對補充了關於懲罰的研究，並具有現實意義。 / A consequence of corporate fraud studied in the literature is reputational penalty on the fraud firm. However, little is known about how a fraud firm loses its reputation after the fraud incident and why firms receive different levels of reputational penalty given the same level of fraud severity. Integrating literatures from criminology, finance, and social psychology, this dissertation conceptualizes firm reputation as stakeholders’ (mainly shareholders here) sentiment toward the firm and a fraud incident as a trigger of shareholders’ sentiment changes. / In this dissertation, I develop an integrated model that examines the sentiment changes of shareholders and sentiment restoration efforts made by the fraud firms. In the first study, I propose that corporate fraud violates shareholders’ normative expectations and fundamental sentiments toward the fraud firm, which leads to shareholders’ sentiment deflection and subsequently propels them to implement behavioral penalty on the fraud firm, that is, reputational penalty. During the process of sentiment deflection, shareholders tend to use the fundamental sentiment that they have adapted to as reference points to evaluate the fraud firm, depending on the salience of the fraud incident and the salience of the fraud firm. In the second study, I argue that the fraud firm can restore shareholders’ sentiment and minimize its reputation loss by expressing restorative actions in public apology announcement. However, during the process of sentiment restoration, shareholders tend to adjust their evaluation of the firm based on the relative psychological distance of the restorative actions compared with that of the fraud cues and sentiment cues. The third study focuses on guilt sentiments of the fraud firm, which have been found to have long-term impact on the fraud firm by transforming their future behaviors. I propose that fraud firms that express guilt sentiments after fraud punishment are more likely to restrain from repeated fraudulent behaviors in the future. However, variations in punishment intensity, together with the fraud firms’ direct and indirect punishment experiences, will influence their tendency to express guilt sentiments. / This dissertation aims to offer several contributions. First, by underscoring the importance of sentiment in the firm-shareholder relationship, it contributes to the corporate governance literature that mainly uses cognitive frameworks in the analysis. Second, it takes a sentiment approach to explore various biases embedded in shareholders’ and the firm’s evaluation of the informational cues that could influence their sentimental and behavioral reactions to the fraud incident, thus extending the corporate fraud literature that predominantly focuses on economics perspectives. Third, by examining the characteristics of firms’ restorative actions and languages and their effects on shareholders’ sentiment restoration and firm reputational repair, this dissertation contributes to the literatures of corporate turnaround and organizational-level impression management. Finally, it also contributes to the punishment literature by highlighting the internal transformation of the fraud firms, thus providing implications to stock exchange regulator and policy-makers in emerging economies. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Xu, Yuehua. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 117-137). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese. / ABSTRACT --- p.I / CHINESE ABSTRACT --- p.III / ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS --- p.V / LIST OF TABLES --- p.IX / LIST OF FIGURES --- p.X / Chapter CHAPTER 1 --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Motivation and Research Questions --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Theoretical Framework and Premise --- p.4 / Chapter 1.3 --- Contributions --- p.9 / Chapter 1.4 --- Organization of the Dissertation --- p.11 / Chapter CHAPTER 2 --- STUDY ONE: A SENTIMENT MODEL OF FIRM REPUTATIONAL PENALTY FOLLOWING CORPORATE FRAUD --- p.13 / Chapter 2.1 --- Introduction --- p.13 / Chapter 2.2 --- Theoretical Background --- p.15 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Corporate Fraud and Reputational Penalty --- p.15 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Sentiment --- p.19 / Chapter 2.3 --- Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses --- p.21 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Re-conceptualization of Firm Reputation and Theoretical Framework --- p.21 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- Stimuli - Sentimental Reaction - Behavior: The Process from Fraud Detection to Reputational Penalty --- p.26 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- Adaptive Levels of Moral Sentiment and Sentiment Rigidity --- p.28 / Chapter 2.3.4 --- The Moderating Effects of Cue Diagnosticity and Firm Visibility --- p.30 / Chapter 2.4 --- Methods --- p.34 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- Empirical Setting --- p.34 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- Sample and Data Collection --- p.35 / Chapter 2.4.3 --- Measurement --- p.37 / Chapter 2.5 --- Results --- p.45 / Chapter 2.6 --- Discussion --- p.56 / Chapter CHAPTER 3 --- STUDY TWO: FIRM RESTORATIVE EFFORTS AND REPUTATIONAL REPAIR AFTER CORPORATE FRAUD --- p.59 / Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.59 / Chapter 3.2 --- Theoretical Background --- p.61 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Firm Efforts to Turn Around from Fraud Incidents --- p.61 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Apology --- p.63 / Chapter 3.3 --- Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses --- p.65 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- Sentiment Restoration and Pragmatic Attitudes toward Restorative Efforts --- p.65 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- The Construal Level of Restorative Cues --- p.68 / Chapter 3.3.3 --- The Distance of Problem Cues: The Delay of Punishment --- p.70 / Chapter 3.3.4 --- Shareholders’ Negative Sentimental Reaction: Media Negative Comments --- p.72 / Chapter 3.4 --- Methods --- p.74 / Chapter 3.4.1 --- Sample and Data Collection --- p.74 / Chapter 3.4.2 --- Measurement --- p.75 / Chapter 3.5 --- Results --- p.79 / Chapter 3.6 --- Discussion --- p.84 / Chapter CHAPTER 4 --- STUDY THREE: THE EFFECTS OF PUNISHMENT ON FRAUD FIRMS’ GUILT SENTIMENT EXPRESSION --- p.86 / Chapter 4.1 --- Introduction --- p.86 / Chapter 4.2 --- Theoretical Background: Punishment --- p.88 / Chapter 4.3 --- Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses --- p.90 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- The Expression of Guilt Sentiment and Repeated Fraud --- p.91 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Punishment Intensity and Guilt Sentiment --- p.93 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- Normalization: The Moderating Effects of Direct and Indirect Punishment Experience --- p.95 / Chapter 4.4 --- Methods --- p.98 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- Sample and Data Collection --- p.98 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- Measurement --- p.99 / Chapter 4.5 --- Results --- p.102 / Chapter 4.6 --- Discussion --- p.110 / Chapter CHAPTER 5 --- DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION --- p.111 / Chapter 5.1 --- Conclusion --- p.111 / Chapter 5.2 --- Contributions to Theory and Practice --- p.112 / Chapter 5.3 --- Limitations and Implications for Future Research --- p.115 / REFERENCES --- p.117

Some commentators attribute the success of certain hedge fund activism events to “wolf pack” activism, the support offered by other investors, many of whom are thought to accumulate stakes in the target firms before the activists’ campaigns are publicly disclosed. This paper investigates wolf-pack activism by considering the following questions: Is there any evidence of wolf-pack formation? Is the wolf pack formed intentionally (by the lead activist) or does it result from independent activity by other investors? Does the presence of a wolf pack improve the activist’s ability to achieve its stated objectives? First, I find that investors other than the lead activist do in fact accumulate significant share-holdings before public disclosure of activists’ campaigns, a result consistent with wolf-pack formation. Second, these share accumulations are more likely to be mustered by the lead activist rather than occurring spontaneously. Notably, for example, the other investors are more likely to be those who had a prior trading relationship with the lead activist. Third, the presence of a wolf pack is associated with a greater likelihood that the activist will achieve its stated objectives (e.g., will obtain board seats) and higher future stock returns over the duration of the campaign.

[Truncated abstract] Investor relations (IR) management encompasses a broad range of activities including voluntary disclosure, attracting analyst coverage, targeting investors, and providing feedback to corporate managers (Byrd, Goulet, Johnson and Johnson 1993; Brennan and Tamarowski 2000; Bushee and Miller 2005). In recent years, a number of high profile corporate collapses and concerns about selective disclosure have contributed to an increased awareness of the importance of effective IR practices in promoting investor confidence. To this end, Australian market regulators and industry bodies have developed a number of best practice guidelines relating to disclosure and corporate governance. The current study undertakes a comprehensive investigation of corporate approaches to IR in the Australian context, and seeks to explain cross-sectional variation in these. The sample utilised in this study comprises 129 All Ordinaries Index (AOI) constituent companies that responded to a mail survey conducted in 2006 regarding their IR practices. The survey of all AOI companies constitutes the first Australian academic survey of IR practices, and the views of the individuals responsible for the function. Self-reported data are combined with data collected from the sample entities' websites to provide a detailed overview of corporate IR programs. The results of the survey suggest that there is widespread recognition, within the sample, of the importance of devoting organisational resources to IR. ... Several proxies for the extent of investment in IR are developed in this study. Two proxies capture organisational arrangements for managing IR, one proxy captures the frequency of one-to-one meetings with analysts and investors, and one proxy captures the quality of IR websites. Multivariate analyses relate cross-sectional variation in these to a number of firm-specific variables. Consistent with findings presented in the empirical voluntary disclosure literature, this study shows that the extent of investment in IR is positively associated with firm size, a finding that is common across all IR proxies. Ownership characteristics play an important role in explaining different types of investment in IR, as captured by the four proxies. Ownership concentration is negatively associated with the likelihood of employing an external IR consultant and positively associated with the frequency with which one-to-one meetings are held with analysts and investors. Firms with a foreign stock exchange listing, a proxy for the importance of foreign investors, achieve higher scores for the quality of their IR websites. Adverse selection models of voluntary disclosure predict that firms with good news are likely to disclose more. In contrast, the results of this study show that less profitable firms and firms with lower price-to-book ratios are more likely to have an IR department/officer, and they achieve higher scores for the quality of their IR websites. Finally, the nature of the investment in IR appears to differ with sector membership. Firms in the Materials and Energy sectors held more one-to-one meetings than firms in other sectors, while firms in the Information Technology sector are more likely to have an IR department or IR officer, and have higher quality IR websites than firms in other sectors.

Thesis (MTech (Public Relations Management))--Cape Peninsula University of Technology, 2017. / Investor Relations (IR) has become a key area of focus in academic and professional debates over the last few decades. Although the identity of the field is contested, with both finance and communication disciplines claiming the fledgling field, there is consensus across disciplines that communication is paramount in IR success. However, a number of scholars (see Schutzmann, 2013; Laskin, 2011; Watson, 2008) argue that IR is not being fully utilised to maximise fair valuation and obtain favourable return on company investments due to lack of strategic communication expertise among IR practitioners who usually have a purely financial background. It is against this background that this study evaluated communication strategies employed by IR practitioners in South Africa to build and maintain relationships with investor stakeholders. The purpose is to contribute towards theoretical debates on strategic communication practice in IR, an area that remains under theorised and understudied, especially within a developing country context. The theoretical frame of the study was derived from public relations Excellence theory and the two-way symmetrical communication (Grunig and Hunt, 1984). The research methodology of the study was qualitative and employed an explorative design to gather data through a combination of document analysis, indepth interviews and content analysis. The findings show that financial and non-financial information is disseminated to investor stakeholders. However, the communication of financial information by IR professionals to investor stakeholders remains dominant in South Africa. Importantly, two-way symmetrical communication and two-way asymmetrical communication strategies are used in different ways to build and maintain relationships and to disclose mandatory key corporate information to investor stakeholders. One-on-one meetings in different formats and online dialogue with closed feedback emerged as the dominant key two-way symmetrical communication strategies of nurturing and sustaining relationships with investor stakeholders. This includes two-way asymmetrical communication strategies such as the corporate publications and IR websites. IR policies that promote two-way symmetrical communication, trust, honest, transparency and credibility emerged in the study as being implemented by IR professionals of South Africa. In addition, the findings show that such characterised IR policies advances the rules of investor stakeholder relationship building and engagement. However, it remains unclear from a South African standpoint whether IR professionals are ready to engage in an open dialogue with investor stakeholders using social media. The findings show that IR in South Africa has trascended into a synergy era where two-way symmetrical communication is emphasised. It further shows that the theoretical frame of the study as derived from public relations Excellence theory and the two-way symmetrical communication (Grunig and Hunt, 1984) has positive implications in the investor relations efforts of building relationships and information disclosure. However, investor stakeholder preferences of engaging with IR professionals require further exploration. This will assist in theorising communication strategies ideal for IR practice.

M.Com. (Financial Management) / The idea that strategies should be judged by the economic value which is created in terms of them is well accepted in the business community. Based on surveys of practice there is, however, great uncertainty regarding the way in which strategies and subsequent company performance should be evaluated. The best measure of corporate success is therefore a vexed issue. Accounting numbers and ratios are generally perceived to be poor measures of changes in economic value. The problem can be said not to lie with accounting, but in its inappropriate use. Accounting measures are constrained by accrual accounting conventions and financial reporting objectives; they are not designed to measure changes in a finn's economic value. Some of the limitations are the fact that earnings can be computed in different ways (depending on management's choice of accounting policy), earnings do not reflect differences in risk and it ignores working capital and fixed capital investments. These shortcomings imply that traditional accounting measures (like earnings and earnings per share) are not reliably linked to increasing the value of the company's stock price. When a business wants to determine the economic value of an investment, it discounts the investment's forecast cash flow by the company's cost of capital. This technique, known as discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis, is widely used in capital budgeting and lease versus buy decisions. Until recently, managers have generally been reluctant to extend the approach beyond piecemeal applications to an entire business plan. The shareholder value approach applies the DCF analysis to the business as a whole - treating it as a portfolio of cash-generating strategies...