Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, Dec. 2004. / Thesis Advisor(s): Peter J. Gustaitis. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): Anna Simons, Jeffrey Starr. Includes bibliographical references (p. 81-85). Also available online.

Thesis (M.S. in Operations Research)--Naval Postgraduate School, September 1973. / Thesis advisor(s): Glen F. Lindsay. Bibliography: p. 85-86. Also available online.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Far East, South East Asia, Pacific))--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2010. / Thesis Advisor(s): Porch, Douglas; Second Reader: Kline, Jeffrey F. "June 2010." Description based on title screen as viewed on July 14, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Sri Lanka, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, Maritime Interdiction, Irregular Warfare, Piracy, Counter-piracy, Maritime Terrorism, Arms Smuggling, Counter-arms Smuggling, Maritime Security Operations, Small Boat Tactics. Includes bibliographical references (p. 71-76). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Anna Simons. Includes bibliographical references (p. 57-63). Also available online.

Thesis (M.S.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2001. / Title from title screen (viewed Aug. 22, 2006). "June 2001." "ADA392863"--URL. Includes bibliographical references (p. 93-97). Also issued in paper format.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2006. / "June 2006." AD-A451 756. Includes bibliographical references (p. 57-59). Also available via the World Wide Web.

The Boko Haram conflict in northern Nigeria has generated immense scholarly interest since it began in 2010. Much of this interest has centred on advancing counterinsurgency policy prescriptions. There are two dominant approaches in the generic counterinsurgency literature: enemy-centric counterinsurgency, which involves the use of brute force to eliminate insurgents and population-centric counterinsurgency, which entails the use of persuasive means to end an insurgency. The counterinsurgency scholarship on Boko Haram is dominated by scholars that advance the latter approach. These scholars argue that the Boko Haram insurgency is a result of the socio-economic challenges that beset northern Nigeria, hence the government should adopt a policy of dialogue with the group and implement socio-economic reforms. However, there is a disjuncture between this policy prescription and Boko Haram’s Salafi-driven objective of establishing an Islamic Caliphate. Thus, this thesis answers the following question: given the Salafi ideology of BH, can population-centric counterinsurgency be an effective state response? I explored this question based on the theories of Weinstein (2007) and Ugarriza & Craig (2013): the notion that the factors that influence the emergence of an insurgent group continues to shape the group’s attitudes, emotions and dispositions. In answering my question, I explored the history of Islamic fundamentalism in northern Nigeria in order to ascertain the outcome of the government’s accommodation of Islamist demands in the past. Using textual analysis, I also examined the speeches of Boko Haram’s leader, Abubakar Shekau, in order to identify the group’s specific objectives and understand its disposition to dialogue. Based on the historical exploration and analysis of Shekau’s speeches, I argued that whereas the implementation of socio-economic reforms can win over potential Boko Haram recruits, neither dialogue nor socio-economic reforms can convince the existing Boko Haram members and leaders to stop fighting. / Graduate

Asymmetric prisoner release initiatives (APRI), such as Israel's trade of 1027 security prisoners for one soldier, differ in kind from diplomatic POW exchanges and remain both undertheorized and unexamined. Most explanations tend toward the psychological or sociological. My data-driven plausibility probe finds that regime (democratic) and conflict (counterinsurgency) type are likely background conditions for APRI. Cross-case comparison of four democracies (Israel, UK, US, Spain) uncovers specific commonalities. Prisoner Discourse (international law/norms; "terrorist" belligerents; "worthy" prisoner) dictates state negotiation posture; societal support for asymmetric exchange, and underlies counterinsurgency praxis. These practices, the "Democratic Counterinsurgency Complex", paradoxically lead to prolonged conflict; favor recourse to "counterinsurgency through capture", and consequently create a "prisoner marketplace" which makes kidnapping state personnel a viable insurgent tactic. But APRI is contingent; not all democracies executed an asymmetric exchange during counterinsurgency. An Historical Institutionalist, within-case study of Israel from 1978-2011, shows that Menachem Begin faced a critical juncture of energy insecurity, Egypt peace negotiations, and electoral pressures. Begin's APRI (76 prisoners/one soldier) was socially and politically contested in 1979. By 1988, Israeli APRI had hardened into path-dependent praxis, and "social fact" by 2011. Specific cross-case factors strongly linked to APRI are a "no negotiation with terrorists" stance; external safe haven for insurgents; and family access to leaders. Denying cross-border access to insurgents, and limiting family access to leaders is important. But without a diplomatic posture/negotiation structure which allows direct talks with belligerents, democratic regimes are unlikely to be successful in counterinsurgency, and also more likely to execute APRI. / Doctor of Philosophy / Asymmetric Prisoner Release Initiatives (APRI), such as Israel's trade of 1027 Palestinian prisoners for one soldier still mystify some observers. I have found that there are specific conditions which explain APRI: first, democracies engaged in counterinsurgency campaigns are most likely to execute APRI. Second, specific factors such as the Prisoner Discourse (international law/norms; "terrorist" belligerents; and state prisoners considered especially "worthy"); and democratic counterinsurgency practices lead states into a tactic where mass detention of prisoners becomes routine. This prisoner imbalance makes insurgent kidnapping of state personnel a viable tactic. The factors most strongly associated with APRI include third-country safe haven for insurgents; a "no negotiation with terrorists" policy; and family access to state leaders. An absence of these, results in a less likely recourse to asymmetric prisoner exchange. It appears that if a government controls for these factors it is more likely to conduct successful counterinsurgency and be less likely to require such uneven prisoner trades.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / The unwillingness to correct deficiencies in current COIN Doctrine or to follow the correct methods within current doctrine will lead to continued instability and possible failure of counterinsurgency operations and governments in states with large Islamic populations. The conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq is insurgent in nature, therefore requires a Counterinsurgent strategy. Current US Army Doctrine focuses entirely on the Counterguerilla aspect of an insurgency, rather than viewing the insurgency in its entirety. Therefore, not only is the COIN doctrine is inadequate, it also requires an overall governing strategy which must include the engagements of both the populace, and the infrastructure of the insurgency, as well as counterforce operations against the guerillas. The entire hierarchy of COIN Doctrine is skewed in favor of the conventional units who write it. Currently all COIN operations fall under Support and Stability Operations, as do Counterguerrilla Operations in doctrinal hierarchy that is written by the US Army Infantry Branch. However, US Army Special Forces Branch writes Insurgency and Foreign Internal Defense Doctrine (COIN falls under FID for all Internal Defense and Development [IDAD] Programs). The unique qualifications of Special Forces units make them ideal for creating, developing, instituting, and commanding these operations. Special Forces soldiers are language and culturally trained to operate within these nations, and normally have habitual associations previously developed with the people and militaries of these nations. / Major, United States Army