The thesis argues that the colonial state in Fiji was founded upon ethno-cultural divisions, which continued in the post-colonial period with the establishment of indigenous chiefly political hegemony. By using a neo-Gramscian analytical framework based on the centrality of the role of ethnicity and culture in the study of colonial and post-colonial societies, the thesis develops three inter-related themes for the analysis of Fiji’s political history: the role of colonial culture, the importance of ethno-cultural divisions, and the changing role of the military in hegemony, antihegemony and counter-hegemony. The thesis proposes a dynamic model of decolonisation that conceptualises Fiji’s post-colonial political history in terms of hegemonic cycles that sees indigenous chiefly hegemony subside into factionalisation of the indigenous polity, inter-ethnic alliances and coercive indigenous assertion. These cycles operate as a product of conflict between hegemonic, anti-hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces. The study finds that the hegemonic cycles were interrupted by a failed indigenous coercive phase in 2000 which led to military counter-hegemony and the ouster of the indigenous political order in 2006. The thesis notes that the re-alignment of indigenous political forces, following the latest military intervention, had the potential to re-instate the hegemonic cycles. The neo-Gramscian model developed in the thesis has a projective element and can be used to analyse the role of ethnicity and culture in colonial and postcolonial hegemonies such as in the South Pacific region.

The thesis argues that the colonial state in Fiji was founded upon ethno-cultural divisions, which continued in the post-colonial period with the establishment of indigenous chiefly political hegemony. By using a neo-Gramscian analytical framework based on the centrality of the role of ethnicity and culture in the study of colonial and post-colonial societies, the thesis develops three inter-related themes for the analysis of Fiji’s political history: the role of colonial culture, the importance of ethno-cultural divisions, and the changing role of the military in hegemony, antihegemony and counter-hegemony. The thesis proposes a dynamic model of decolonisation that conceptualises Fiji’s post-colonial political history in terms of hegemonic cycles that sees indigenous chiefly hegemony subside into factionalisation of the indigenous polity, inter-ethnic alliances and coercive indigenous assertion. These cycles operate as a product of conflict between hegemonic, anti-hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces. The study finds that the hegemonic cycles were interrupted by a failed indigenous coercive phase in 2000 which led to military counter-hegemony and the ouster of the indigenous political order in 2006. The thesis notes that the re-alignment of indigenous political forces, following the latest military intervention, had the potential to re-instate the hegemonic cycles. The neo-Gramscian model developed in the thesis has a projective element and can be used to analyse the role of ethnicity and culture in colonial and postcolonial hegemonies such as in the South Pacific region.

This thesis deals with constitutional law and other legal subjects such as Jurisprudence and Judicial Review. One constitution is distinguishable from another by its own provisions. These provisions are usually referred to as either the basic characteristics or features of the particular constitution and these are invariably derived from the basic political philosophy and constitutional arrangements of the particular country. A coup affects these characteristics in different ways. Some automatically disappear as being incompatible with the revolution; some are modified, others are strengthened. The usurpers may choose to set aside the constitution completely and replace it with another, or amend it to suit the new situation, or rule without any constitution. This often happens amidst the rattle of weapons and the whirr of military engines in and around the capital of a given country on that awesome occasion. This thesis sets out to examine the legal aspects of a coup d’ etat. The thesis is divided into six broad sections. Part one will deal with the theoretical background. I shall discuss an overview of Kelsen’s pure theory of law. The second part deals with the scope of its application in revolutionary situations and will also touch upon the reason behind the Kelsen’s theory as shown by decided cases from country to country. The third part deals with the essence as well as the significance of the doctrine of necessity to validate unconstitutional acts in the case of a coup d’ etat. This discussion is to pave the way for the fourth part which is to explore the position of judges who took oath of office under the old constitution. I am to explain their position after a coup d’ etat. The fifth part forms the gist of my research. I shall examine the effect of a coup d’ etat on traditional constitutional concepts such as fundamental rights, separation of powers, rule of law and judicial review in the military regime. The sixth part will deal with African experience. I shall include recommendations and conclusions drawn from the Lesotho and Uganda experiences.

This study surveys the issue of military coups in Nigerian politics. An attempt is made to explain the causes of coups d'etat. To this end, Thompson's thesis of military grievances has been rigorously employed to explain the occurrences of military coups in Nigeria. The Thompson thesis asserts that coups occur because the military is aggrieved. A study of the opinions of expert observers familiar with Nigerian politics confirmed that four out of the six military coups occurred due to problems emanating from the Nigerian military establishment. Although military grievances such as its political positions, resource bases, ethnicity, and factions within the military caused most coups, there is sufficient evidence that societal factors like economic crises, election decisions, and the need for reforms also encouraged the military to overthrow governments in Nigeria.

This study analyzed the causes of military coups and the consequences of military rule in the Third World during the 1960-1985 period. Using a coup d" etat score, including both successful and unsuccessful coups, as a dependent variable and collecting data for 109 developing nations from the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, The New York Times Index, and public documents, sixteen hypotheses derived from the literature on the causes of military coups were tested by both simple and multiple regression models for the Third World as a whole, as well as for four regions (Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East and North Africa) and in two time periods (1960-1970 and 1971-1985). Similarly, three models of military rule (progressive, Huntington's, and revisionist models) were analyzed to assess the consequences of military rule. The results of the study concerning the causes of military coups suggest four conclusions. First, three independent variables (social mobilization, cultural homogeneity, and dominant ethnic groups in the society) have stabilizing consequences. Second, six independent variables (previous coup experience, social mobilization divided by political institutionalization, length of national independence, economic deterioration, internal war, and military dominance) have destabilizing consequences. Third, multiple regression models for each region are very useful; most models explain more than 50% of the variance in military coups. Fourth, the time period covered is an important factor affecting explanations of the causes of military coups. In the analysis of the consequences of military rule, this study found that military governments did not differ significally from civilian governments in terms of economic, education, health, and social performances. However, the study found that military rule decreased political and civil rights. Its findings are thus very consistent with the best of the literature.

Does banning opposition candidates from ballots increase the risk that they will turn to bullets instead? Globally, since the end of the Cold War, blatant election rigging tactics (such as ballot box stuffing) are being replaced by 'strategic rigging': subtler procedural manipulations aimed at winning while maintaining the guise of legitimacy in the eyes of international observers. In particular, incumbents (in regimes stuck between democracy and authoritarianism) are turning to 'electoral exclusion', neutralizing key rivals by illegitimately banning certain candidates, in turn reducing the need for cruder forms of election day rigging. I used mixed methods - combining insights from an original global dataset with extensive elite interviews conducted in five countries (Madagascar, Thailand, Tunisia, Zambia, and Côte d'Ivoire) - to establish that electoral exclusion is an attractive short-term election strategy for vulnerable incumbents that produces a much higher chance of victory but comes with high costs in the longer-term. Global probit modeling (using electoral exclusion as an independent variable and coups d'état and civil wars as separate dependent variables) suggests that, since the end of the Cold War, excluding opposition candidates from the ballot roughly doubles the risk of a coup d'état or quadruples the risk of civil war onset. In spite of these risks, incumbents fall into this 'exclusion trap' because of the shortened time horizon that frequently accompanies competitive multi-party elections. Vulnerable incumbents worry more about the short-term risk of losing an election than the long-term but ultimately unknown risk that political violence will ensue after the election. Finally, the inverse corollary of these findings is that inclusion of opposition candidates during multi-party elections can be a stabilizing factor. Though it may seem counterintuitive, fragile 'counterfeit democracies' - and so-called 'transitional' regimes - may be able to stave off existential threats to regime survival by extending an olive branch to their fiercest opponents. These findings combine to form the overarching argument of this dissertation: when opposition candidates are excluded from the ballot, they become more likely to turn to bullets by launching coups d'état and civil wars.