Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 1940. / Bibliography: p. [147]-168.

No description available.

No description available.

Thèse doctorat : Sciences de l'éducation : Lyon 2 : 1991. / Titre provenant de l'écran-titre. Bibliogr.

Thesis--Paris.

No description available.

Two firms with innovative technology are potential licensors in the industry. In addition, there is a potential licensee which only possesses aged technology. When the two potential licensors have exactly the same technology, they will cut the license fee to zero due to severe competition no matter whether the fee is in the format of fixed payments or royalties. When one potential licensor possesses the technology far advanced than the technology the other potential licensor has, those two firms with less advanced technology will ask for technology licensing and pay the license fee in the format of fixed payment.

This thesis is an extension of a recent study into the relationship between merger size and profitability. It studies a class of Cournot oligopoly with linear cost and quadratic demand. Its focus is to analyze how a mergers profitability is affected by its size and by the demand elasticity. Such results have not yet been reported in previous studies, perhaps due to the complexity of the equilibrium equation involved. It shows an increase in the demand elasticity also raises a mergers profitability. Consequently, an increase in the demand elasticity reduces merged members critical combined per-merger market share for the merger to be profit enhancing. Comparing with 80% minimum market share requirement for a profitable merger in Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983), a greater market share is needed when the demand function is concave (demand is relatively inelastic), while a smaller market share may still be profitable when the demand function is convex (demand is relatively elastic). In our model, mergers are generally detrimental to public interests by increasing market price and reducing output. However, the merger will be less harmful when the goods are very inelastic.

This dissertation consists of three chapters; each models competition in natural gas markets. These models provide insight into interactions between changes in market conditions/policies and market players’ strategic behavior. In all three chapters, we apply our models to a natural gas trade network formed by using BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy 2010 major trade flows. In the first chapter, we develop a model for the world natural gas market where buyers and sellers are connected by a trading network. Each natural gas producer is a Cournot player with a fixed supply capacity. Each of them is also connected to a unique set of importing markets. We show that this constrained noncooperative Cournot game is a potential game and its potential function has a unique maximizer. In the scenario analysis, we find that any exogenous change affecting Europe also has an effect in the Asia Pacific. The reason is that two big producers, Russia and the Middle East, are connected to both markets. We also find that a collusive agreement between Russia and the Middle East leads them to specialize in supply to markets based on their marginal costs of exporting natural gas. The second chapter is devoted to analyzing the impacts of North American shale gas on the world natural gas market. To better represent the North American natural gas market, this chapter also allows for perfect competition in that market. We find that North America exports natural gas when its supply curve is highly elastic and hence the domestic price impact of its exports is very small. Even so, the price impacts on the importing markets are substantial. We also find that shale gas development in North America decreases dominant producers’ market power elsewhere in the world and hence decreases the incentive of any parties to form a natural gas cartel. In the third chapter, we relax the assumption of fixed supply capacities and allow for natural gas producers to invest in their supply capacities. We assume a two period model with no uncertainty and show that there is a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium and the open-loop Cournot-Nash equilibrium and closed-loop Cournot-Nash equilibrium investments coincide.

This thesis is an extension of a recent study into the relationship between merger size and profitability. It studies a class of Cournot oligopoly with linear cost and quadratic demand. Its focus is to analyze how a mergers profitability is affected by its size and by the demand elasticity. Such results have not yet been reported in previous studies, perhaps due to the complexity of the equilibrium equation involved. It shows an increase in the demand elasticity also raises a mergers profitability. Consequently, an increase in the demand elasticity reduces merged members critical combined per-merger market share for the merger to be profit enhancing. Comparing with 80% minimum market share requirement for a profitable merger in Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983), a greater market share is needed when the demand function is concave (demand is relatively inelastic), while a smaller market share may still be profitable when the demand function is convex (demand is relatively elastic). In our model, mergers are generally detrimental to public interests by increasing market price and reducing output. However, the merger will be less harmful when the goods are very inelastic.