Text in Afrikaans / In enige arbeidsverhouding bly dit wenslik dat partye hulle onderlinge verpligtinge vrywilliglik sal nakom. Soms is dit nie moontlik vanwee die onderlinge wantroue tussen partye nie en daarom is di t belangrik om te let op wyses van afdwinging van nywerheidsraadooreenkomste, versoeningsraadooreenkomste en vasstellings en bevele van die Nywerheidshof. Nywerheidsrade en versoeningsrade is die instrumente wat daar gestel is sodat partye onderling kan beding om geskille te voorkom en ooreenkomste van onderlinge belang te beding. Daar is sekere regsgevolge verbonde aan die publikasie van sodanige ooreenkomste en as sodanig word dit as h vorm van ondergeskikte wetgewing beskou. Wat die afdwinging van sodanige ooreenkomste betref speel die strafsanksie h belangrike rol. Ooreenkomste word egter nie noodwendig gepubliseer nie en soms is die strafsanksie ook nie altyd die aangewese een nie. In sodanige gevalle sal daar na siviele sanksies gekyk moet word vir die afdwinging van sodanige ooreenkomste. Daarbenewens maak die Wet ook voorsiening dat sodanige ooreenkomste as h onbillike arbeidspraktyk ~n die Nywerheidshof afgedwing kan word. Die strafsanksie en die siviele sanksie het egter hulle tekortkominge en dus moet dear gekyk word na alternatiewe wyses vir die afdwinging van ooreenkomste. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.M

LL.M. / Please refer to full text to view abstract

The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 brought a number of changes in the labour relations environment from its inception on 11 November 1996. The Act codified Industrial Court decisions that were already established under the strike-law jurisprudence from the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956. These general changes to the law also impact on the strike-law regime. The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of the contributions made by the Labour Courts1 in developing strike law from the inception of the Act. The Labour Courts have made a number of decisions that have helped in clarifying the provisions of the Act. One should hasten to say that this has never been a smooth process by the courts. It will further be shown in this paper that some of the court decisions were not well accepted in the light of other considerations, such as the Constitution and the previous Industrial Court decisions. On some occasions the Constitutional Court had to intervene in order to clarify the intention of the legislature. For the purpose of effectively dealing with this topic, I shall briefly give the historical context of strike law in the form of common-law position, and the strike-law position before the Bill of Rights and the Constitution. I shall then endeavour to identify the legislative provision of the Act when it comes to strike-law provisions, at the same time identifying the important court decisions that were made.

In South Africa, the Labour Courts have experienced an important and continuing controversy regarding the permissible scope of judicial review of arbitration awards of the Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration (“CCMA”) in terms of section 145 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (“LRA”). Section 145(1) of the LRA specifically provides that arbitration awards, generally considered final and binding, can be reviewed and set aside by the Labour Court on the basis of a defect as defined in section 145(2)(a) and (b). These defects are not prescribed in an open-ended manner but limited to decisions involving allegations of misconduct by the commissioner in relation to his or her duties, a gross irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings and/or allegations that the commissioner exceeded his or her powers or that the award was improperly obtained. Unreasonableness and/or irrationality are not included within the scope of a defect as per section 145(2)(a) and (b). Initially, Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & others 1998 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC) found that the interpretation of section 145 was influenced by rational justifiability in accordance with the right to just administrative action as provided for in section 33, read with item 23(2) of Schedule 6, of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘the 1996 Constitution’). Today, leading precedent in the form of Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2007 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) dictates that section 145 of the LRA is suffused by reasonableness in accordance with the right to just administrative action as provided for in section 33 of the 1996 Constitution. The ultimate enquiry is whether the arbitration award is one that a reasonable decision-maker could reach as articulated in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and others 2004 4 SA 490 (CC). However, the enquiry into the reasonableness of a decision is indistinct. As a result, the Labour Courts have struggled to apply the concept of reasonableness in a consistent manner. This thesis seeks to identify the proper role of reasonableness in the judicial review process, including identifying factors that would assist in recognising an unreasonable decision. Relevant principles of judicial review in South Africa in the general administrative law context are considered and distinguished from the process of appeal. An assessment of English case law and commentary in the field of both administrative and employment law is conducted. Finally an extensive examination of South African case law and commentary on the subject, both pre- and post Sidumo, is undertaken. The English law approach is found to provide greater clarity to the interpretation of reasonableness in South African labour law in several respects.

The primary purpose of this treatise is to revisit and reconsider the development of the review test set out in the Constitutional Court judgment of Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & Others (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC) and consequently ascertain the correct approach to be adopted by our Labour Courts in the application of such test. The secondary purpose, entail the determination of the extent to which Labour Court judges interfere with the merits of awards and the resulting impact on the distinction between appeal and review. In order to establish whether the test for review was correctly developed and to determine whether our review proceedings deter recurrent interference by our judges, an edifying consideration of judicial review in South Africa, an extensive analysis of various judgements pertaining to such development, followed by a comprehensive comparison with the United Kingdom`s application of review proceedings and judicial composition are made. The research methodology is based on a contour of Sidumo, commencing with the Sidumo judgment, followed by three contentious Labour Appeal Court judgments and concluding with a Supreme Court of Appeal judgement, which clarifies the operation of the review test. The contour is interlinked with the notion of reasonableness. The primary research findings are identified in the judgment of Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (2013) 34 ILJ 2795 (SCA). The judgment, concluding the Sidumo contour, underlines the current position in our law and consequent narrower approach. A comparison made with the United Kingdom, differentiate between such approach implemented by our courts and the strict gross unreasonableness approach applied by Employment Appeal Tribunals, recognising the finding, that our Labour Court judges ardently interfere with the merits of awards. In the conclusion it is submitted that our labour law jurisprudence will constantly evolve, dictated by our courts interpretation of lawfulness, reasonableness and fairness.

"A well functioning judiciary is a central element of civil society. It is the sole adjudicator over the political, social and economic spheres. Judiciaries in many African countries suffer from backlogs, delays and corruption. In countries such as Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda, speedy resolution of disputes is becoming increasingly elusive. Although many African countries have constitutional provisions against delay, and have identified congestion, excessive adjournments, local legal culture and corruption as some of the major causes of delay, nevertheless, the problem continues to be a feature in African Courts. In Nigeria, the average period to commence and complete litigation is six to ten years. In some instances, the litigation period is even longer. For example, in the case of Ariori v. Muraimo Elemo proceedings commenced in October 1960 and took 23 years to reach the Supreme Court of Nigeria. In South Africa, despite many programs and projects in place to solve the problem, delay in the administration of justice is still a problem. Appraising the extent of the problem, Penuell Maduna addressing the National Judges Symposium stated: “The public is perturbed by substantial backlogs in the criminal courts and in finalising prosecutions...” Mindful of the increase of this problem, especially in view of the consequences it poses, this study perceives a need to eradicate delay in the administration of justice. Thus, this study analyses the problem of delay in Nigerian and South African Courts with a view to ascertaining the nature, extent and causes of delay in the two countries, and suggests possible solutions to the problem. South Africa and Nigeria were chosen because they have similar judicial systems and experience delays in judicial proceedings." -- Chapter 1. / Prepared under the supervision of Mr. Abraham J. Hamman, Faculty of Law, University of Western Cape, South Africa / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2005. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis examines the contractual remedy of specific performance in South African law. It looks closely and critically at the discretionary power of the courts to refuse to order specific performance. The focus is on the considerations relevant to the exercise of the judicial discretion. First, it emphasises the tension between the right and the discretion. It is argued that it is problematical for our courts to refuse to order specific performance in the exercise of their discretion. The underlying difficulty is that the discretion of the court to refuse specific performance is fundamentally in conflict with the supposed right of the plaintiff to claim specific performance. The thesis investigates the tenability of this open-ended discretionary approach to the availability of specific performance as a remedy for breach of contract. To this end, the thesis examines less complex, more streamlined approaches embodied in different international instruments. Comparison between different legal systems is also used in order to highlight particular problems in the South African approach, and to see whether a better solution may be borrowed from elsewhere. An investigation of the availability of this remedy in other legal systems and international instruments reveals that the South African approach is incoherent and unduly complex. In order to illustrate this point, the thesis examines four of the grounds on which our courts have refused to order specific performance. In the first two instances, namely, when damages provide adequate relief, and when it will be difficult for the court to oversee the execution of the order, we see that the courts gradually attach less or even no weight to these factors when deciding whether or not to order specific performance. In the third instance, namely, personal service contracts, the courts have at times been willing to grant specific performance, but have also refused it in respect of highly personal obligations, which is understandable insofar as the law wishes to avoid forced labour and sub-standard performances. The analysis of the fourth example, namely, undue hardship, demonstrates that the courts continue to take account of the interests of defendants and third parties when deciding whether or not to order specific performance. This study found that there are certain circumstances in which the courts invariably refuse to order specific performance and where the discretionary power that courts have to refuse specific performance is actually illusory. It is argued that our law relating to specific performance could be discredited if this reality is not reflected in legal doctrine. Given this prospect, possible solutions to the problem are evaluated, and an argument is made in favour of a simpler concrete approach that recognises more clearly-defined rules with regard to when specific performance should be refused in order to provide coherency and certainty in the law. This study concludes that a limited right to be awarded specific performance may be preferable to a right which is subject to an open-ended discretion to refuse it, and that an exception-based approach could provide a basis for the simplification of our law governing specific performance of contracts. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis ondersoek die benadering tot die kontraktuele remedie van spesifieke nakoming in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg. Die diskresionêre bevoegdheid van howe om spesifieke nakoming te weier word van nader en krities aanskou. Die fokus is op die oorwegings wat ‘n rol speel by die uitoefening van die diskresie. Eerstens beklemtoon die tesis die spanning tussen die reg en die regterlike diskresie. Daar word aangevoer dat dit problematies is dat ons howe ‘n eis om spesifieke nakoming kan weier in die uitoefening van hul diskresie. Die onderliggende probleem is dat die hof se diskresie om spesifieke nakoming te weier, fundamenteel in stryd is met die sogenaamde reg van die eiser om spesifieke nakoming te eis. Die tesis ondersoek die houbaarheid van hierdie onbelemmerde diskresionêre benadering tot die beskikbaarheid van spesifieke nakoming as ‘n remedie vir kontrakbreuk. Vervolgens ondersoek die tesis die vereenvoudigde benaderings ten opsigte van spesifieke nakoming beliggaam in verskillende internasionale instrumente. Vergelyking tussen verskillende regstelsels word ook gebruik om spesifieke probleme in die Suid- Afrikaanse benadering uit te lig, en om vas te stel of daar ‘n beter oplossing van elders geleen kan word. ‘n Ondersoek van die aanwesigheid van hierdie remedie in ander regstelsels en internasionale instrumente onthul dat die Suid-Afrikaanse benadering onsamehangend en onnodig ingewikkeld is. Om hierdie punt te illustreer, ondersoek die tesis vier gronde waarop die remedie tipies geweier word. In die eerste twee gevalle, naamlik, wanneer skadevergoeding genoegsame regshulp sal verleen en wanneer dit vir die hof moeilik sal wees om toesig te hou oor die uitvoering van die bevel, sien ons dat die howe geleidelik minder of selfs geen gewig aan hierdie faktore heg wanneer hulle besluit of spesifieke nakoming toegestaan moet word nie. In die derde geval, naamlik, dienskontrakte, sien ons dat die howe bereid is om in sekere gevalle spesifieke nakoming toe te staan, maar egter nie spesifieke nakoming ten opsigte van hoogs persoonlike verpligtinge gelas nie, wat verstaanbaar is tot die mate wat ons reg dwangarbeid en swak prestasies wil vermy. Die analise van die vierde grond, naamlik, buitensporige benadeling, toon dat die howe voortgaan om die belange van die verweerder en derde partye in ag te neem wanneer hulle besluit om spesifieke nakoming te beveel. Die studie het bevind dat daar sekere omstandighede is waarin die howe nooit spesifieke nakoming toestaan nie en die diskresie eintlik afwesig is. Derhalwe word dit aangevoer dat die geldende reg wat betref spesifieke nakoming weerlê kan word indien hierdie werklikheid nie in die substantiewe reg weerspieël word nie. Gegewe die vooruitsig, word moontlike oplossings ondersoek, en ‘n argument word gemaak ten gunste van ‘n eenvoudiger konkrete benadering wat meer duidelik gedefinieerde reëls erken met betrekking tot wanneer spesifieke nakoming geweier moet word ten einde regsekerheid en eenvormigheid te bevorder. Die gevolgtrekking is dat ‘n beperkte aanspraak op spesifieke nakoming meer wenslik is as ‘n reg op spesifieke nakoming wat onderhewig is aan die hof se oorheersende diskresie om dit te weier, en dat ‘n uitsondering-gebaseerde benadering as ‘n basis kan dien vir die vereenvoudiging van ons reg rakende spesifieke nakoming.

Due to the party-orientation and professional nature of the adversary mode of criminal procedure, the principles of a fair trial are best observed where the accused is represented by a lawyer. Given the advantages to be gained from legal representation, the principle of equal justice requires that all accused should have access to legal assistance and thus that legal aid should be provided for indigent accused. The South African legal aid scheme cannot yet provide assistance to all indigent accused because of the large number of these accused, the shortage of manpower and the lack of funds. There are, however, few legislative provisions to safeguard the rights of the vast majority of accused, arraigned in the lower courts, who remain undefended. The Supreme Court, in order to ensure that these accused are fairly tried, has imposed the following types of duties on judicial officers: (a) a duty to facilitate the accused's participation in the proceedings by advising him of his rights and duties and assisting him in their exercise; (b) a duty to control the prosecutor in the exercise of his powers; and (c) a duty to conduct an enquiry before arriving at administrative-type decisions. These duties are, however, inadequate to achieve the Court's, objective because, firstly, not all, rights are made accessible to the accused, and secondly, the duties are inadequate to ensure that the accused's guilt is reliably established. The failure of the legislature and the Supreme Court to incorporate the principle of equal justice into the legal process, has resulted in court proceedings that are characterized by unjust practices and outcomes. To ensure the more equitable prosecution of undefended accused it is suggested that an activist judicial officer should be responsible for the enforcement of all the principles of a fair trial (which would be concretized in clear legal rules) in an impartial manner, with his decisionmaking routinely supervised by the Supreme Court. / Thesis (LL.D.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1986.

There exists a lacuna in our legal system, the role of the judiciary in the lawmaking process is not well defined. 'Historically, the judiciary has always claimed that its duty was merely to interpret and apply the law and that it was not within its province to legislate.' Custom and practice on the other hand has revealed that. to some extent, this is not entirely true. Because through precedents and pronouncements of statutes unconstitutional and therefore, null and void, the former in that sense makes laws and is practically involved in the law-making process. • Judicial discretion is another means at the disposal of the judiciary by which the latter legislates." Therefore, the notion that the province of the judiciary is only confined to the interpretation and application of the law is overwhelmingly misleading. The role of the judiciary in the law making process has to be clearly defined and not just to be inferred so that there is left no middle ground or grey area between its involvement and non-involvement. Once this is done, the problem of uncertainty and inconsistency in so far as the judicial process is concerned will be remedied. Since it is indeed the judiciary that decides the cases before them, from these cases it is respectfully submitted that the interpretative process they adopt in arriving at their decision itself amounts to law-making. It is trite law that when courts interpret the law. they also make the law in that process. This reasoning has long been accepted in our legal order and in foreign jurisdictions. The former President of the United States of America, Roosevelt. precisely pointed out in his message to the Congress of the United States on the 8th December 1908, thus: The Chief lawmakers in our country may be. and often are, the judges. because they are the final seat of authority. Every time they interpret contract. property, vested rights, due process of the law. liberty, they necessarily enact into law parts of a system of social philosophy; and as such interpretation is fundamental. they give direction to all lawmaking. The decisions of the courts on economic and social questions depend upon their economic and social philosophy; and for the peaceful progress of our people during the twentieth century we shall owe most to those judges who hold to a twentieth century economic and social philosophy and not to a long outgrown philosophy, which was itself the product of primitive economic conditions. 1 Even though the above quote was said in the last century, it is still applicable today because judges still do the job of interpreting and applying the law. In doing so they are involved in the law-making process. It has become manifest, as this study will reveal, that Ihe judiciary is involved in the law-making process even though this has proven somewhat irksome to 1 PresidenlTheodore Roosevelt, Message to the Congress of the United States, 8th December 1908, 43rd Congressional Record ,Part 1, p.21 . accept and appreciate, bearing in mind the overriding democratic principles such as seoaration of DOwers and the independence of the judiciary .. Therefore this study endeavours to interrogate the manner by which the South African judiciary has been involved in the law-making process both during the previous apartheid regime and in the present democratic dispensation. Futhermore, this study also attempts to answer the question as to how the judiciary will continue to legislate in the present judicial transformation process without upsetting the imperatives of the doctrine of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. / Thesis (LLM)--North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, 2006.

There exists a lacuna in our legal system, the role of the judiciary in the law-making process is not well defined. 'Historically, the judiciary has always claimed that its duty was merely to interpret and apply the law and that it was not within its province to legislate.' Custom and practice on the other hand has revealed that to some extent, this is not entirely true. Because through precedents and pronouncements of statutes unconstitutional and therefore, null and void, the former in that sense makes laws and is practically involved in the law-making process. "Judicial discretion is another means at the disposal of the judiciary by which the latter legislates." Therefore, the notion that the province of the judiciary is only confined to the interpretation and application of the law is overwhelmingly misleading. The role of the judiciary in the law making process has to be clearly defined and not just to be inferred so that there is left no middle ground or grey area between its involvement and non-involvement. Once this is done, the problem of uncertainty and inconsistency in so far as the judicial process is concerned will be remedied. Since it is indeed the judiciary that decides the cases before them, from these cases it is respectfully submitted that the interpretative process they adopt in arriving at their decision itself amounts to law-making. It is trite law that when courts interpret the law, they also make the law in that process. This reasoning has long been accepted in our legal order and in foreign jurisdictions. The former President of the United States of America, Roosevelt, precisely pointed out in his message to the Congress of the United States on the 8th December 1908, thus: The Chief lawmakers in our country may be, and often are, the judges, because they are the final seat of authority. Every time they interpret contract, property, vested rights, due process of the law, liberty, they necessarily enact into law parts of a system of social philosophy; and as such interpretation is fundamental, they give direction to all law-making. The decisions of the courts on economic and social questions depend upon their economic and social philosophy; and for the peaceful progress of our people during the twentieth century we shall owe most to those judges who hold to a twentieth century economic and social philosophy and not to a long outgrown philosophy, which was itself the product of primitive economic conditions. Even though the above quote was said in the last century, it is still applicable today because judges still do the job of interpreting and applying the law. In doing so they are involved in the law-making process. It has become manifest, as this study will reveal, that the judiciary is involved in the law-making process even though this has proven somewhat irksome to "President Theodore Roosevelt, Message to the Congress of the United States, 8th December 1908, 43rd Congressional Record ,Part 1, p.21" accept and appreciate, bearing in mind the overriding democratic principles such as separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary .. Therefore this study endeavours to interrogate the manner by which the South African judiciary has been involved in the law-making process both during the previous apartheid regime and in the present democratic dispensation. Furthermore, this study also attempts to answer the question as to how the judiciary will continue to legislate in the present judicial transformation process without upsetting the imperatives of the doctrine of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. / (LLM) North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, 2006