Richard Feetham was Judge President of the Natal Provincial Division from 1 May 1930 to 18 July 1939. He succeeded Dove Wilson who was an able but not a very learned or dynamic Judge President. Thus, at the time of his appointment the Natal Court and its judgments were treated with little respect by the other provincial divisions. Feetham JP, unlike his predecessor, was not only a scholar with a towering intellect but a man endowed with outstanding leadership qualities. He was thus ideally suited to bring about a change for the better in the status of the Natal Court. He did this by taking a dynamic lead and presided over and delivered a high proportion of the courts' judgments. He also set his brethren an excellent example by the high standard he set for himself and his court and which they emulated. This thesis thus also covers the careers of these puisne and acting puisne judges and their contribution towards the better administration of justice in Natal. In 1930 there existed in Natal a disinct system of dual practice with a de facto Bar. This system had been a vexed question in the minds of Natal lawyers for two decades but when Feetham JP was confronted with it he immediately addressed the controversial issue and brought about the necessary reforms to divide the legal profession and bring Natal into line with the rest of South Africa. This reform raised the quality of pleading and manner in which the law was presented. It also provided the Natal Bench with able personnel for the future from within Natal. Accordingly this thesis also assesses the careers of the main legal practitioners of that period and their contribution towards the development of the administration of justice in Natal. In less than ten years Feetham JP thus transformed the Natal Provincial Division from being weak and ineffectual to a position where it became a division respected for its Bench, judgments and legal profession. During the course of time history has confirmed the overall significance of Richard Feetham's Judge Presidency. / Thesis (LL.M.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1988.

Globally, the justice system has set up courts to respond to complaints of a criminal and civil nature. Courts also respond to complaints which require swift relief by way of shortened procedures, in the form of motion proceedings. In all these complaints, courts have to respond in a manner that leaves litigants with a feeling of satisfaction that justice has been done. To the end of ensuring that there is legal certainty, justice systems in all jurisdictions have established a hierarchy of courts, with lower courts being bound by the decisions of higher courts in their jurisdiction. There has been no problem in the application of this principle called stare decisis, or judicial precedent, in disputes of law. However, in disputes of constitutional interpretation, courts have demonstrated a marked shift from observing the rule of judicial precedent. The disregard for this rule manifests itself particularly in the adjudication of cases surrounded by controversy. It is argued herein that constitutional interpretation is no different from legal interpretation, in that the rule of judicial precedent which characterises court decisions in legal disputes, should characterise court decisions in constitutional interpretation disputes. The Constitutional Court of South Africa itself, though it is the highest arbiter in constitutional matters, is bound by its own previous decisions, unless its previous decisions have become manifestly wrong. Three constitutional rights are analysed. The right to life in its three manifestations, namely, the right to life of the unborn child, the right to life of the convicted criminal not to be hanged, and the right of the terminally ill to continue living by receiving medical care at state expense. The other two rights are the right to privacy, and the right to culture. The right to privacy is the right that has been claimed in political controversies. In isolated instances, specifically mentioned herein, the Constitutional Assembly and the drafters of the Constitution have also contributed to the resultant inconsistency in constitutional interpretation. This is especially so with regard to the right to practise one‘s culture. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / LL.D.

Globally, the justice system has set up courts to respond to complaints of a criminal and civil nature. Courts also respond to complaints which require swift relief by way of shortened procedures, in the form of motion proceedings. In all these complaints, courts have to respond in a manner that leaves litigants with a feeling of satisfaction that justice has been done. To the end of ensuring that there is legal certainty, justice systems in all jurisdictions have established a hierarchy of courts, with lower courts being bound by the decisions of higher courts in their jurisdiction. There has been no problem in the application of this principle called stare decisis, or judicial precedent, in disputes of law. However, in disputes of constitutional interpretation, courts have demonstrated a marked shift from observing the rule of judicial precedent. The disregard for this rule manifests itself particularly in the adjudication of cases surrounded by controversy. It is argued herein that constitutional interpretation is no different from legal interpretation, in that the rule of judicial precedent which characterises court decisions in legal disputes, should characterise court decisions in constitutional interpretation disputes. The Constitutional Court of South Africa itself, though it is the highest arbiter in constitutional matters, is bound by its own previous decisions, unless its previous decisions have become manifestly wrong. Three constitutional rights are analysed. The right to life in its three manifestations, namely, the right to life of the unborn child, the right to life of the convicted criminal not to be hanged, and the right of the terminally ill to continue living by receiving medical care at state expense. The other two rights are the right to privacy, and the right to culture. The right to privacy is the right that has been claimed in political controversies. In isolated instances, specifically mentioned herein, the Constitutional Assembly and the drafters of the Constitution have also contributed to the resultant inconsistency in constitutional interpretation. This is especially so with regard to the right to practise one‘s culture. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.