Thesis (Ph. D.)--Cornell University, 1994. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 171-178).

The main objective of monetary policy is to protect the value of the currency, and in so doing, achieve the objectives of maximum economic growth, development, and the creation of employment opportunities. As from 1985, under the advice of the De Kock Commission, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), implemented the classical cash reserve system of monetary control. Under this system, the SARB was willing to refinance the money market shortage fully, automatically, and on certain predetermined terms, conditions and costs. However, since the new political dispensation in 1994, South Africa’s financial markets have become more globalized, liberalised, and integrated. Thus, the classical cash reserve system had lost its usefulness, and was no longer effective. As from March 1998, the SARB implemented the new repurchase system of monetary control. In implementing the repurchase system of monetary control, South Africa was adopting a more eclectic approach. This system is aimed at making monetary policy more effective and more flexible in a financial environment filled with complexities. This study finds that the repurchase system has thus far been successful in meeting its objectives. Interest rates are more flexible and sensitive to developments in the domestic and external environment, the signalling mechanism of the SARB has proved to be successful, accommodation and interest rates are closely related and the interbank market has become more developed. Therefore, the repurchase system appears to be more efficient than the previous system of monetary control in South Africa.

by Cheung Sai On, Andrew. / Thesis (MBA)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1986 / Bibliography: leaves 72-73

Frances Cheung. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 65-69). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.iii / Table of Contents --- p.iv / List of Tables --- p.vi / List of Appendices --- p.vii / Chapter Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter 2. --- Two-Sector Endogenous Growth Model with International Borrowing --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1 --- Introduction --- p.5 / Chapter 2.2 --- Basic Model --- p.8 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Existence of the Balanced Growth Path --- p.12 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- "Determination of Steady State Values (u*,k*c*,θ*1)" --- p.13 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- Stability --- p.15 / Chapter 2.3 --- Model with Fixed Asset in Goods Production --- p.16 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Existence of the Balanoed Growth Path --- p.20 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- "Determination of Steady States Values (u*, k*, c*, θ*2)" --- p.22 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- Stability --- p.25 / Chapter 2.3.4 --- Comparative Statics --- p.27 / Chapter 2.3.5 --- Transitional Dynamics --- p.30 / Chapter 2.3.6 --- Numerical Examples --- p.31 / Chapter 2.4 --- Conlusion --- p.33 / Chapter Chapter 3. --- Modification to Benhabib-Farmer Model --- p.34 / Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.34 / Chapter 3.2 --- The Model --- p.37 / Chapter 3.3 --- Steady States --- p.43 / Chapter 3.4 --- Condition for Indeterminacy --- p.45 / Chapter 3.4.1 --- A Necessary Condition --- p.45 / Chapter 3.4.2 --- Necessary and Sufficient Condition --- p.46 / Chapter 3.5 --- Numerical Examples --- p.47 / Chapter 3.6 --- Conclusion --- p.49 / Appendices --- p.54 / References --- p.65

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 208-223). / Microfiche. / xiv, 223 leaves, bound ill. 29 cm

Thesis (Ph. D.)--West Virginia University, 2009. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 97 p. : ill. (some col.). Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 91-97).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Nebraska, 1988. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 87-94).

Investiga a existência de racionamento de crédito aos empreendimentos informais da economia brasileira. A dissertação adapta um modelo de escolha ocupacional desenvolvido em Evans e Jovanovic (1989) para a decisão de investimento da firma condicional a sua restrição orçamentária. Um dos resultados desse modelo é que as firmas restritas ao crédito são mais dependentes da sua riqueza inicial para realizar investimentos. Tal resultado motiva a nossa estratégia empírica que utiliza a relação entre riqueza e investimento para identificar se há ou não restrição de crédito para os empreendimentos informais urbanos. Para mitigar o problema de endogeneidade entre riqueza e investimento, foram considerados apenas os empreendimentos jovens, ou seja, aqueles com menos de cinco anos de existência, dado que essas firmas ainda não acumularam riqueza suficiente para gerar uma causalidade reversa. Utilizando dados da pesquisa Informal Urbana (Ecinf), para o ano de 2003, realizada pelo o IBGE, encontramos evidências de que a riqueza tem um impacto significativo sobre diferentes decisões de investimentos, com efeitos marginais entre 0,001 a 0,034. Além disso, os resultados indicam que os empreendimentos caracterizados por trabalhadores por conta-própria enfrentam maior restrição de crédito quando comparados aos empregadores, corroborando resultados comumente encontrados na literatura. / Dissertação (Mestrado em Economia) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, 2010. / Bibliografia: p. 77-80.

The problem of credit rationing/borrowing constraint has recently received considerable attention. Individuals who are denied any credit by a financial institution, or who find it difficult to borrow against future incomes, are said to be credit rationed or borrowing constrained in the credit markets. This dissertation tries to identify the circumstances under which individuals may be rationed (or not), and analyses the actions undertaken to overcome future constraints. Chapter 2 analyses the problem of credit rationing as it arises in equilibrium, when borrowers differ with respect to their demands for loans. It is shown that if the principal can costlessly observe the agent’s type, then (i) the agents who meet the collateral requirements are not rationed in the sense of Stiglitz-Weiss (1981), (ii) the agents who do not meet the collateral requirements are rationed in the sense of Jaffee-Russell (1976). We further show that if the principal cannot distinguish between different agents, then the previous rationing results still hold in the second best contract which is pooling : agents of different types pick the same contract. Chapter 3 analyses the problem of credit rationing as it emerges in a dynamic setting, when a renegotiation of the original contract may be undertaken. It is conjectured that (i) the principal uses the information revealed about an agent’s type at the time of first repayment, to design future contracts, (ii) the agents who show consistently honest behavior are never rationed, (iii) the agents who showed dishonest behavior impose a negative externality on the agents who were honest; they are rationed in later periods. Finally, in chapter 3, we analyse the role of an exogenously imposed borrowing constraint prompting the individuals to change their life-cycle decisions. This chapter provides an explicit link between human and non-human wealth by making income endogenous through investment in human capital. The chapter also discusses the econometric aspects of the problem: the possible empirical work that can be undertaken in the future using a micro data set. / Ph. D.

by Li Hin Keung, Frankie [and] Cheuk Chun Wai, Simon. / Bibliography : leaves 84-85 / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1984