Background and problem: Recent banking and financial crises has undoubtedly stressed the importance of a sound and well-functioning banking system. The banking industry is in critical need of strong governance stemming from their opaque and complex business along with the high social costs incurred in the event of bank failure. Previous research has shown that credit rating changes serve as a governance mechanism on the U.S. banking market, affecting real economic decision-making. However, no existing research has been conducted in an European context, rendering the objective of this thesis. Objective: The objective of this study is to examine the governance effects of credit rating changes on banks within the European banking market. Methodology: The objective of this thesis is achieved by using a novel and comprehensive data set comprising credit rating changes and financial accounting variables of 202 banks on the European banking market between the time period 1997-2011. A quantitative method is implemented to examine banks’ financial accounting variables in the event of credit rating changes. In order to measure the isolated effect from a credit rating change, the difference-in- differences econometric approach in combination with a Propensity Score Matching procedure will be conducted. Conclusions: The results from this research provide numerous evidence that credit rating changes have consistent governance effects on the European banking market. In the event of a credit rating downgrade, banks on the European banking market decrease in size and set aside more capital as reserves for non performing loans. In the event of a credit rating upgrade, banks increase in size and re-allocate assets, providing evidence that these banks have a more optimistic view of their financial conditions. The findings in this thesis are in line with previous research on the U.S. banking market, however, banks on the European banking market seems to have, on average, a more conservative attitude towards risk-taking in the event of a credit rating change.

I examine the effects of contemporaneous credit rating and watchlist announcements on the over-the-counter U.S. corporate bond market. I find significant negative daily abnormal returns (-2.91%) over a ten-day window associated with a downgrade announcement with negative watch. The effect is particularly strong over the two-day post-event window (-1.90%), while there is some weak evidence of market timing during the four days preceding a downgrade (-0.58%). Abnormal returns following upgrades with positive watch are weaker both in terms of statistical significance and magnitude. I also observe higher abnormal bond returns following downgrades with negative watch around rating-sensitive boundaries. These results suggest that bond abnormal returns could also be driven by regulation constraints, besides the information content of the ratings. Finally, a multivariate cross-sectional analysis on abnormal returns over the two-day window following downgrades shows that the negative watchlist state is a key determinant of bond market's response even when key control variables are included. / <p>Lic.-avh. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2014</p>

This paper utilizes a sample of firms over the years 2000–2009 to test the effects of credit rating changes, the financial crisis, interest rates, and other variables on short-term, long-term, and total debt levels on the balance sheet. Each independent variable was created using a one year lag in order to run the regressions. The values of these variables from the previous year are being analyzed to see if they can predict debt levels for the following year. The results of this paper suggest that levels of long-term and total debt are somewhat reliant on and are positively correlated with the federal funds rate. The results indicate that short-term debt levels are much harder to predict, but they appear to be negatively correlated with the financial crisis. Long-term debt levels were also affected by this variable, but were positively correlated with it. Z-score was a significant predictor of all types of debt, and was positively correlated with each. In an effort to acquire as many data points as possible for the regressions, strict data filtration techniques were used. This limited the sample to 177 firms. The overall insignificance of the results in this study suggest that further research on what drives debt levels on the balance sheet is necessary. This will generate a greater understanding of firm behavior both inside and outside of a financial crisis.

L'objectif de cette thèse est d'analyser le rôle des agences de notation sur le marché financier. Notre contribution consiste à mieux comprendre l'influence des annonces de notation sur les acteurs du marché français des actions (investisseurs et analystes financiers).La première question porte sur l'apport informatif délivré par les agences de notation et l'impact de leurs décisions. Afin de répondre à cette question, nous avons conduit une étude d'évènement à l'annonce de notation en distinguant les annonces par nature, type et catégorie.Cette recherche permet de prouver que les annonces de notation ont globalement un impact sur le marché des actions. L'impact dépend de la nature de l'annonce, des informations fournies dans les rapports de notation, des changements de note entre catégories et de ceux effectués dans la catégorie spéculative. Enfin, le niveau de la note dépend des caractéristiques financières et comptables de l'entreprise notée.La seconde question porte sur le rôle bénéfique des agences de notation sur les marchés. Afin de répondre à cette deuxième question, nous avons conduit une recherche qui consiste à analyser l'évolution de l'asymétrie d'information entre les investisseurs et de la liquidité autour des annonces de notation.Cette recherche prouve que les annonces positives (respectivement négatives) entraînent une diminution (respectivement augmentation) de l'asymétrie d'information sur le marché des actions. Les résultats prouvent également que les annonces positives et neutres, à l'inverse des annonces négatives, entraînent une réduction des fourchettes de prix et une amélioration des volumes de transactions. Ces deux effets concomitants traduisent une amélioration (respectivement détérioration) de la liquidité du marché lors des annonces positives et neutres (respectivement négatives).La troisième question porte sur l'utilité des annonces de notation pour les analystes lors de leurs prévisions. Afin de répondre à cette question, nous avons mené une recherche qui consiste à étudier l'évolution de la dispersion et de l'erreur des prévisions des analystes autour des annonces de notation.Les résultats mettent en évidence une relation inverse entre les caractéristiques des prévisions des analystes financiers et la nature de l'annonce de notation. Les annonces positives et neutres réduisent l'erreur et la dispersion des prévisions d'analystes.Ce travail de recherche permet d'attester de la réelle importance du contenu informationnel des annonces de notation pour le marché des actions et de la réelle contribution des annonces à l'amélioration de la communication financière sur le marché. / The main objective of this thesis is to analyze the role of rating agencies on the financial market. Our contribution consists in a better understanding of the impact of rating announcements on the agents on the French financial market (both investors and analysts).First we focus on the information content of announcements by rating agencies and the impact of theirs decisions in the market. To answer this question, we made an event study at the rating announcements, by identifying them by nature, type and category.This research highlights the fact that the rating announcements generally have an impact on the stock market. This impact depends on the nature of the announcement, the information provided in the reports as well as score changes between categories and within the speculative category. Moreover, the rating level depends on the firm financial and accounting characteristics.Second, we intend to understand the beneficial role of rating agencies on the financial markets. To answer this question, we analyzed the evolution of the information asymmetry and stock market liquidity around rating announcements.Our results show that positive announcements (respectively negative) lead to a decrease (respectively increase) of information asymmetry. We also found that positive and neutral announcements, unlike the negative ones, lead to a reduction of bid-ask spread and to an increase of transactions volumes. Both effects reflect higher (respectively lower) stock market liquidity when the announcements are positive or neutral (respectively negative).Finally, we focus on the study of the impact of rating announcements on analysts' forecasts. For this purpose, we studied the evolution of the analysts' forecasts dispersion and errors around rating announcements.Our results indicate an inverse relationship between the characteristics of financial analysts' forecasts and the nature of the rating announcement. Indeed, positive and neutral announcements reduce the error and the dispersion of analysts' forecasts.This research shows the informative content of rating announcements on the stock market and the real contribution of the announcements by improving financial communication.