‘A critical analysis of section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 - ‘The shoot to kill debate’ sought to investigate the rationale and necessity behind the call for yet another amendment of section 49, that purports to clarify the rules under which police are allowed to use their firearms. Bold statements emerged from South Africa’s leaders and several politicians, urging the police to ‘shoot to kill’, and may have the effect of threatening the country’s young and vulnerable constitutional democracy. The research comprised an historical overview of section 49, encompassing the use of force pre- and post- Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act 122 of 1998, followed by an overview of the current section 49. On the face of it, section 49 violates some constitutionally protected rights, among which are the right to life, to freedom and security, against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and to a fair trial, which includes the right to be presumed innocent. The ‘new’ section 49 however, withstood Constitutional muster as set out in Re: S v Walters&another. The research proceeded to contrast the current section 49, against the common law defence of private defence. A private individual invoking the defence of private defence is weighed against the law enforcement official invoking the defence under section 49. It is argued that the level of proof in the latter is higher as opposed to the former, resulting in the contention that the law enforcement officer is unfairly discriminated against. The reverse onus, whereby the onus is shifted onto the arrestor, is further canvassed. In an endeavour to interpret the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, the researcher considered international instruments such as the Canadian Constitution, where the use of force in effecting an arrest is regarded as legitimate, under certain conditions. In concluding the research it was established that the voiceferous calls, for the police to be able to ‘shoot to kill’, is both unnecessary and irresponsible. Section 49 has survived constitutional scrutiny. The use of force when effecting an arrest is sanctioned, provided that it is in line with the constitutional provisions where the sanctity of human life is respected and emphasized. The police do not need more powers to use deadly force because they already have all the powers that they need! There is a lack of knowledge and understanding by the leaders on the application and interpretation of section 49. Proper and effective training of police in Criminal Procedure and Criminal Law, specifically in the interpretation and understanding of section 49, with proper guidelines to limit the potentially excessive scope of section 49, is identified. The training should also include the mind set that ‘shooting to kill’, should not be taken lightly, should be limited and confined to what is reasonable and proportional in the circumstances and should only be exercised as a last resort A fully capacitated and well resourced police force will also empower and enable police officials. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2011. / Public Law / unrestricted

What happens when the journalist’s ethical obligation to protect the identity of an anonymous source of information clashes with the established legal principal that all relevant evidence needs to be placed before a court? It is common cause that the media is dependant on sources for information. If that were not the case, the media would merely relay obvious information on events already in the public domain. Some sources prefer to remain anonymous, be it for fear of retribution, fear for their own safety or that of their families or just plain shame. Whatever the case may be, the journalist remains under an ethical obligation not to disclose the identity of such a source of information. Although virtually all professional codes of ethics for journalists has some reference to journalists’ duty to protect the identity of their sources of information, at common law the South African journalist has no such privilege as is evinced by the judgment handed down by Hill J in S v Pogrund 1961 (3) SA 868 (TPD) who said that [s]uch principles … confer no privilege in law on any journalist. The most common justification given by supporters of a journalistic privilege is that sources would “dry up” should journalists be forced to disclose the identities of their sources of information. In the writer’s opinion, the question of a journalist’s right to protect the identity of an anonymous source of information or journalistic privilege falls squarely within the ambit of freedom of expression. Section 16 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa guarantees that everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes inter alia freedom of the press and other media and the freedom to receive or impart information or ideas. Any interference with the delicate relationship between journalist and source therefore will theoretically be a limitation on the rights guaranteed in section 16 of the Constitution. In recent times however since the inception of the new democratic dispensation South African courts have been more inclined to accept that journalists have, at least in principle, the right to protect their sources of information. This is unfortunately not enough as it is quite clear that the notion still exists to view the media as a primary source of evidence, rather than one of the cornerstones of democracy should a journalist be suspected of having information that could be relevant in a case before the court. This is clear from the recent Hefer Commission of Enquiry saga where a journalist was summonsed outright to testify as to her sources of information. South Africa is lagging behind other western legal systems where the journalist’s privilege is seen as a core element of press freedom. Protection for this principle has been formally introduced in foreign legislation. An amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act could be the answer, as could new legislation to protect the media from testifying regarding the identity of informants. Ultimately however, argument of the question before the Constitutional Court would be the ideal solution. / Dissertation (Magister Legum (Public Law))--University of Pretoria, 2007. / Public Law / unrestricted

“It has been said that the victim of a sexual assault is actually assaulted twice- once by the offender and once by the criminal justice system.”1 South Africa’s rape shield provision is contained in section 227 of the Criminal Procedure Act.2 The purpose of its enactment is to protect a complainant in a sexual offence matter from secondary victimisation during the trial as far as possible, by restricting the type of evidence that is admissible and the circumstances under which such evidence can be found to be admissible. This rationale has come under attack for its effect on the fair trial rights of the accused. There has been no challenge to the constitutionality of section 227 before a court yet. However, there are numerous rumblings of discontent at the consequences of a provision that restricts evidence that could be necessary to prevent a wrongful conviction. This paper seeks to consider the constitutional debates surrounding section 227 and to determine whether, to the extent that they may prove to be constitutionally problematic, the potential constitutional challenges are justifiable under a limitations analysis. It is impossible to engage with the constitutionality of section 227 without first discussing the rationale behind rape shield laws in general. The structure of the paper is therefore as follows: firstly, the history and purpose of rape shield laws will be investigated, and secondly, the history of section 227 under South African law will be discussed.

Text in Afrikaans / Infringement, by the executive, of the right to privacy of the individual is an everyday occurrence. Section 14 of the Constitution, Act 108 of 1996 protects the right to privacy. The Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 authorises the police service, to search for and seize articles, to enter premises, ascertain bodily features of accused and to employ traps and undercover operations. On the one hand the Criminal Procedure Act authorises the police to infringe the privacy of the individual but on the other hand it guarantees the privacy of the individual. The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act are qualified by the Constitution, specifically by section 36 and 35(5). The authorisation of a police officer should be obtained before a person could be arrested without a warrant, which should, in any event, be the last resort. The written permission of an officer must be obtained prior to the making of an application for a warrant to a magistrate. A police officer should be prohibited from issuing a search warrant, as the general perception of the public is that members of the police may not be sufficiently independent. The exercising of magistrates' discretion regarding the decision as to whether a search warrant should be issued or not should be extended. A search warrant should comply with strict requirements as to who may execute the warrant, when, how and when the warrant will become invalid. Search and seizure without a warrant should not be allowed at all, except in circumstances where there is an immediate threat or danger to a person, property or the public safety. In cases of urgency, it should be made possible to obtain the telephonic permission from a magistrate to search property. Where necessary to ascertain the bodily features of an accused through surgery, a compulsory application in terms of section 37(3) should be made to the court for authorisation, irrespective of whether the accused consents to the surgery or not. More importance should be attached to the rights of the individual and the powers of the executive should be limited. / Jurisprudence / LL.D

Text in Afrikaans / Infringement, by the executive, of the right to privacy of the individual is an everyday occurrence. Section 14 of the Constitution, Act 108 of 1996 protects the right to privacy. The Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 authorises the police service, to search for and seize articles, to enter premises, ascertain bodily features of accused and to employ traps and undercover operations. On the one hand the Criminal Procedure Act authorises the police to infringe the privacy of the individual but on the other hand it guarantees the privacy of the individual. The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act are qualified by the Constitution, specifically by section 36 and 35(5). The authorisation of a police officer should be obtained before a person could be arrested without a warrant, which should, in any event, be the last resort. The written permission of an officer must be obtained prior to the making of an application for a warrant to a magistrate. A police officer should be prohibited from issuing a search warrant, as the general perception of the public is that members of the police may not be sufficiently independent. The exercising of magistrates' discretion regarding the decision as to whether a search warrant should be issued or not should be extended. A search warrant should comply with strict requirements as to who may execute the warrant, when, how and when the warrant will become invalid. Search and seizure without a warrant should not be allowed at all, except in circumstances where there is an immediate threat or danger to a person, property or the public safety. In cases of urgency, it should be made possible to obtain the telephonic permission from a magistrate to search property. Where necessary to ascertain the bodily features of an accused through surgery, a compulsory application in terms of section 37(3) should be made to the court for authorisation, irrespective of whether the accused consents to the surgery or not. More importance should be attached to the rights of the individual and the powers of the executive should be limited. / Jurisprudence / LL.D

This dissertation deals with the constitutionality of the onus of proof in cases where mental illness is averred. Insanity refers to the legally defined state of mind and not to a specific psychological disorder. Mental illness is one of the factors recognised by South African law which negates criminal responsibility. The law recognises that persons suffering from insanity cannot be sanctioned in the same way as sane offenders. The law applicable in South Africa today with regards to the insanity defence is contained in the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, which replaced the M’Naghten rules and irresistible impulse test that appeared in South African Law nearly a century before. Section 78(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act stipulates that in order to not be responsible for an alleged crime the accused must have committed an act which constitutes an offence and must at the time of said commission have suffered from a mental illness or mental defect which rendered him incapable of (a) appreciating the wrongfulness of his actions; or (b) acting in accordance with an appreciation of the wrongfulness of his actions. Due to legislative amendments any party who raises mental illness as a defence is supposed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the accused was mentally ill at the time of the commission of the offence. This constitutes a departure from the normal rules of evidence which requires the state to prove the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The test for insanity is therefore a mixed one in which expert testimony is vital. Psychologists as well as psychiatrists play an important role in assisting the court, by way of expert testimony, to determine the mental state of offenders. Lawyers and mental health professionals often don’t see eye to eye as a result of the differences in interpretation and application of mental illness in the respective professions. The various difficulties faced by the defence, as a dependant of the professions, is explored. A comparative study of the laws relating to the insanity defence in English Law and in the United States of America is conducted. These findings are contrasted to the current South African legal position. The selected jurisdictions share a common thread in that the insanity defence in these countries all originated from the M’Naghten rules and was subsequently modified by each. In the English law system, a general insanity defence is non-existent today. The strict M’Naghten rules are still applied as the test for insanity and seldom evoked by accused persons. In the United States of America the test for insanity differs from state to state but all have returned to the stricter English approach despite a number of different tests being developed and applied during the years since the defence’s existence. The presumption of innocence, which means that the burden of establishing the elements of criminal liability lies with the prosecution and is a fundamental aspect of the South African criminal justice system. In all three of the legal systems the burden of proof has always been placed on the defence to prove its case on a balance of probabilities. Following the legislative amendments in South African law, in section 78 (1) (A) and (B), this position has now changed to he who alleges must prove. Whether it constitutes unfair discrimination on the mentally ill accused to burden him with this higher onus than in normal defences, and whether it will survive constitutional scrutiny, concludes the study. Copyright / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Public Law / unrestricted

The general principle in criminal law is that a person is liable when committing a criminal offence. This may include an offence a person has facilitated or procured. Vicarious liability, a principle borrowed from civil law, is an exception to the general rule in that it allows for a person to be held liable for the criminal acts of another. Legal persons have no physical existence and do not have hands and brains like natural persons. A legal person acts through its directors, employees, members or representatives. The corporation, being distinct and separate from its agents, is held liable for the acts or omissions of its representatives. This liability exists even though the corporate body never acted. International recognition of corporate criminal liability can be based on vicarious liability, identification or aggregation. All these forms of liability are derived from the human actus and mens rea. The identification theory provides for the liability of the corporate body, when someone who is identified with it, acted during the course of his employment when committing the offence. Those acts are treated as the acts of the corporate body. The identification theory is normally applied where mens rea is a requirement of the offence. The Aggregation theory provides for criminal liability of the corporation based on the conduct of a group of members of the company taken collectively. This theory is applied effectively where it is difficult to prove that a single person within the company is responsible for the commission of the offence. In South Africa corporate criminal liability developed from vicarious liability. It is regulated by section 332(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. This liability is based on the special relationship between the director or servant and the corporate body. Corporations act through its agents. The agent can be a director, servant or a third person instructed by either of them. In terms of section 332(1) it is possible that the corporate body can be held liable even where the agent acted beyond the scope of his employment. The latter can be argued is an extension of vicarious liability. Vicarious liability, can be argued, is too broad, because the intention of the agent is imputed to the corporate body, without the enquiry of fault by the corporate body. This offends the general principles of substantive criminal law. Generally, liability in criminal law accrues to someone who committed the offence with the required state of mind. The constitutionality of section 332(1) Act 51 of 1977 is questioned. The question is asked whether it is desirable to punish a legal person for the behaviour of its representatives or employees. Criminal law purports to control the behaviour of individuals to be in line with the interest and values of society. There is doubt whether the same goal can be achieved with the prosecution of corporate bodies. Prosecution of corporate bodies results in stigma to the corporation, which results in suffering a loss of reputation. Some authors argue that civil remedies can control the activities of corporate bodies more effectively. This argument, however, fails to address the issue that criminal law concerns the harm inflicted by human beings, hence the need to regulate human conduct. Corporate criminal liability attempts to address the harm inflicted by corporate bodies. It regulates pollution, health, safety and business. This liability is firmly established around the world but requires further development and modern refinement in South Africa. / Abstract

Magister Legum - LLM / Section 105A of the Criminal Procedure Act is unconstitutional with regard to its failure to extend benefits to an unrepresented accused. Unlike a represented accused, an unrepresented accused cannot benefit from section 105A. The only recourse available to him or her is to enter a plea of guilty under section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Act. This plea of guilty does not offer him the benefits under section 105A. This causes the section to operate unfairly against the unrepresented accused based on his/her failure to secure legal representation. This continued operation of section 105A infringes on the rights of an accused by not affording this protection to the accused. This is in terms of a right to equality before the law, freedom from discrimination and what constitutes a justifiable limitation under section 36 of the Constitution. South Africa has ratified or acceded to international and regional treaties which require, inter alia that the right to equality before the law is respected. This requires a model framework to be put in place to ensure that unrepresented accused can benefit from section 105A. An evaluation of the viability of adding the unrepresented accused to the protection under section 105A is done. This is informed by experiences from other jurisdictions, which aid the need for reform.

The State as the representative of the victims of crime is expected to protect those vulnarable group of people with due regard to the rights of the perpetrators’s of crime. It is imperative that the law of general application which is aimed at protecting victims of crime, be sufficiently effective to protect the victims. The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 is aimed at assisting the police to conduct pre-trial criminal procedure in order to bring perpetrators of crime to book. Sections 36A, 36B, 36C and 37 (both previous and as amended) of the Criminal Procedure Act including chapter 5A of the South African Police Act, 1995 are explored in this dissertation. This dissertation examines the areas in the Criminal Procedure Act that make it problematic for the police to conduct efficient and effective crime detection through the ascertainment of bodily features of the suspected or accused person. The law in three foreign jurisdictions relating to this topic are investigated and compared in order to make recommendations and suggest possible solutions. / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL.M.

The State as the representative of the victims of crime is expected to protect those vulnarable group of people with due regard to the rights of the perpetrators’s of crime. It is imperative that the law of general application which is aimed at protecting victims of crime, be sufficiently effective to protect the victims. The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 is aimed at assisting the police to conduct pre-trial criminal procedure in order to bring perpetrators of crime to book. Sections 36A, 36B, 36C and 37 (both previous and as amended) of the Criminal Procedure Act including chapter 5A of the South African Police Act, 1995 are explored in this dissertation. This dissertation examines the areas in the Criminal Procedure Act that make it problematic for the police to conduct efficient and effective crime detection through the ascertainment of bodily features of the suspected or accused person. The law in three foreign jurisdictions relating to this topic are investigated and compared in order to make recommendations and suggest possible solutions. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.M.