The diffusion of episodes of terrorism and political violence around the world has heightened the need for states to design effective counterterrorist measures. Orthodox studies on terrorism hold that the frequency and intensity of terrorist attacks determine the levels of assertiveness maintained by counterterrorist measures. This research builds on this assumption by developing the link between terrorism and counterterrorism policy through two unit-level variables. Besides the frequency and intensity of terrorist attacks, this study examines the political orientation of states’ elites, and states’ integration in multilateral security frameworks. The research tests for these factors by studying counterterrorist authoritarian regimes, and questions the notion that their political orientation makes state terrorism a measure of choice. In empirical terms, this study investigates the making of China’s counterterrorism policy in Xinjiang from 1996 to 2017. The period is analysed by comparing three within-cases, bookended by pre identified critical junctures. China’s counterterrorist measures in Xinjiang have experienced a revival since President Xi came into power in 2013, and the country has been quick to adopt a counterterrorism policy that has come to resemble state terrorism. Yet, no substantial variation in the opposition to the country’s elite nor exceptionally violent terrorist attacks have been recorded in the region. This study relies upon qualitative data, such as political discourse and documents, news media and scholarly writings, and aggregated data is examined to complement the qualitative sources. Methodologically, this thesis supplements process tracing with qualitative content analysis. The evidence provides support for a theory of ‘multi-causal counterterrorism’, according to which counterterrorism policy depends on the combination of systemic and domestic factors. Other than the incidence of terrorist attacks, states choose their counterterrorism policy in the context of ever-changing power relationships at the international and domestic levels. It is concluded that these power relationships impose constraints on states’ decision-making abilities.

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The 9/11 attacks changed how western societies, and with them the world, view terrorism. To respond to these events, western democracies allied to fight for their values against what they saw as their sworn enemies. It is in this fight that the research takes place and assesses if western democracies did lose sight of their primary objective, which was to spread democracy and its principles across the world. This study will assess how democracies deconstruct themselves through the methods they employ to win this War on terror. More precisely, this study will analyze the USA and France’s approaches and their consequences on them as representatives of western democracies. The research finds itself in a new approach that focuses on a historical, social, and linguistic aspect of the decisions made by these States as it aims to assess the self-deconstruction of democracies in their fight against terrorism. The research question that will lead this thesis is formulated as such: ‘How are the methods used by western Democracies in their fight against Islamic terrorism causing their deconstruction?’ and will be using a textual analysis approach to the topic by analyzing speeches and legal documents that have played a crucial role in the current shape of these democracies. The expected results are to understand if democratic values have been victims of the ‘War on terror’ and if democracies have started a transformation process from a focus on liberties to a priority on security.

Depuis les attaques du 11 septembre 2001 contre New York et Washington, D.C. le terme de « terrorisme » a pris une place prépondérante dans le discours politique américain. Profondément péjoratif et s’accompagnant indéfectiblement d’une forte condamnation morale, il a été utilisé afin d’expliquer et justifier le recours à la force armée dans de multiples régions de monde et l’imposition de limites aux libertés civiles des citoyens américains, et ce malgré l’absence de définition claire de ce concept au niveau américain comme au niveau international. Le discours américain sur le terrorisme fit son apparition sur la scène politique durant la dernière décennie de la Guerre froide, l’Union Soviétique et ses alliés « totalitaires » étant décrits par Ronald Reagan comme recourant au « terroriste international » afin d’assouvir leurs velléités hégémoniques et de mener une véritable guerre contre l’ensemble du monde civilisé, d’abord en Amérique centrale puis, de plus en plus souvent, au Moyen-Orient. Le président américain, s’exprimant dans un contexte d’énonciation protégé, n’eut jamais à proposer de définition explicite de ce terme. Les débats devant le Congrès, l’Assemblée Générale et le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies révèlent eux par contre que ce concept était à l’époque fortement contesté au sein du pouvoir américain tout comme au niveau international, et que les représentants du gouvernement américain défendirent non pas un mais de multiples discours très différents les uns des autres et adaptés aux contextes d’énonciation propre à chacun de ces forums. Grâce à cette compartimentation rendue possible par l’absence d’une définition claire et acceptée par tous du « terrorisme », mais aussi au rôle joué par les experts et les médias, le discours américain put ainsi s’imposer malgré ses contradictions flagrantes, et après l’interlude des années 1990, faire son retour triomphant après le 11 septembre 2001. / Since the attacks of September 11, 2001 against New York and Washington, D.C., the term of « terrorism » took a dominating place in the American political speech. Deeply pejorative and always accompanied by a strong moral judgment, it has been used to explain and justify the use of force in several regions around the world and curbs on the civil liberties of American citizens, all in spite of the absence of a clear definition of this concept at the American as well as at the international level. The American discourse on terrorism made its appearance on the political scene during the last decade of the Cold war, the Soviet Union and its « totalitarian » allies being described by Ronald Reagan as resorting to « international terrorism » in order to fulfill their hegemonic goals and as waging a war against the whole civilized world, initially in Central America and then, more and more often, in the Middle East.The American president, expressing himself in a protected context, never had to put forth an explicit definition of the term. However, the debates in Congress, at the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations reveal that this concept was strongly disputed at the time both within the American government and at the international level, and that the representatives of the American government defended not one but multiple and very different discourses, each adapted to its specific context of enunciation. Through this process of compartmentalization, made possible by the absence of a clear and widely-accepted definition of « terrorism » but also by the role played by experts and the media, the American discourse was able to impose itself on the political scene in spite of its internal contradictions and, after the interlude of the 1990s, to complete its triumphant comeback after September 11, 2001.

Depuis les attaques du 11 septembre 2001 contre New York et Washington, D.C. le terme de " terrorisme " a pris une place prépondérante dans le discours politique américain. Profondément péjoratif et s'accompagnant indéfectiblement d'une forte condamnation morale, il a été utilisé afin d'expliquer et justifier le recours à la force armée dans de multiples régions de monde et l'imposition de limites aux libertés civiles des citoyens américains, et ce malgré l'absence de définition claire de ce concept au niveau américain comme au niveau international. Le discours américain sur le terrorisme fit son apparition sur la scène politique durant la dernière décennie de la Guerre froide, l'Union Soviétique et ses alliés " totalitaires " étant décrits par Ronald Reagan comme recourant au " terroriste international " afin d'assouvir leurs velléités hégémoniques et de mener une véritable guerre contre l'ensemble du monde civilisé, d'abord en Amérique centrale puis, de plus en plus souvent, au Moyen-Orient. Le président américain, s'exprimant dans un contexte d'énonciation protégé, n'eut jamais à proposer de définition explicite de ce terme. Les débats devant le Congrès, l'Assemblée Générale et le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies révèlent eux par contre que ce concept était à l'époque fortement contesté au sein du pouvoir américain tout comme au niveau international, et que les représentants du gouvernement américain défendirent non pas un mais de multiples discours très différents les uns des autres et adaptés aux contextes d'énonciation propre à chacun de ces forums. Grâce à cette compartimentation rendue possible par l'absence d'une définition claire et acceptée par tous du " terrorisme ", mais aussi au rôle joué par les experts et les médias, le discours américain put ainsi s'imposer malgré ses contradictions flagrantes, et après l'interlude des années 1990, faire son retour triomphant après le 11 septembre 2001.

The terrorist label became recently so widely used. It strongly influenced the language of media, politicians and society. The security discourse is seemingly dominated by the counter-terrorism policy. Both the national and international legal systems introduced laws to avert the terrorist actions. Ironically, no universal definition of terrorism has been found yet so the use of the terrorist label depends mainly on own interpretation. The thesis aims to critically analyse the terrorist label and to determine if it prevents the conflict between so called terrorists and the rest of the society from peaceful resolution. The first chapter introduces theoretical and methodological framework of the research. It is followed by the analysis of the EU's designation of Hezbollah's military wing as a terrorist organization in the second chapter. A special attention is paid to the Israeli diplomatic pressure on the EU to blacklist Hezbollah which was selected as an appropriate example of the terrorist labelling.