2024 / This dissertation investigates the scientific practices involved in biodiversity conservation at the intersection of the philosophy of measurement, the philosophy of data, and the literature on values in science. With a focus on the epistemology, methods,and ontology of measuring biodiversity within the context of conservation science, it aims to develop a socially relevant and socially engaged philosophy of science. Chapter 1 challenges ”Biodiversity Skepticism,” which dismisses the usefulness of the concept of biodiversity due to the proliferation of heterogeneous, non covariant measurements. Instead, drawing from Norman M. Bradburn, Nancy L. Cartwright, and Jonathan Fuller’s model of the measurement process, I argue for understanding the pluralistic nature of conceptualizing complex measurands. In Chapter 2, I address the need for a proper justification of the claim that we are in a biodiversity crisis by analyzing the conceptual and data incommensurability between contemporary biodiversity and paleodiversity. Building on Carlos Santana’s ideas, I propose solutions for obtaining robust inferences about the status of environmental crises. Chapter 3 challenges the slogan implicitly endorsed in evidence-based conservation that ”the bigger the data, the bigger the evidence,” highlighting the complexity of turning data into evidence through an examination of the IUCN’s redlisting process. I contend that evidence relies on a complex infrastructure made of data communities and evidential standards, and undermine the facile equating of data with evidence. In Chapter 4, I counter the contention that performance metrics in conservation are value-neutral, using the philosophical framework of ”critical metrology.” This section exposes the fallacy of measurements’ inherent value neutrality and addresses the contribution of conservation science to ”scientific colonialism.” I also propose potential solutions for fostering an ethical and epistemically stronger conservation agenda. Chapter 5 concludes by going back to the measurement theory used to account for biodiversity measurement, and shows how this context reveals the ways in which Bradburn, Cartwright, and Fuller’s theory of measurement needs to be amended. It also sketches an adequacy-for-purpose view to evaluate measurements and elaborates on some implications of this view in relation to measurement validation and the irremediable value-ladeness of measurements. This dissertation offers novel philosophical insights into the theoretical and practical complexities of measuring biodiversity that is valuable to biodiversity scientists, offering a space for building actionable knowledge at the intersection of philosophy and conservation science. / 2027-02-07T00:00:00Z