This dissertation utilized cross-national and cross-sectional micro-data, internationally comparable macro-data, and hierarchical methodology to model variability in status attainment by religious factors, gender traditionalism, and contextual features of the fifty-seven countries included in the sample. The broad research goals were to ascertain gender differences in attainment outcomes, and to extend the scope of existing knowledge on the religion-attainment intersections, the bulk of which is based upon single-country and single-religion data. Cross-national findings validate that individuals' attainment outcomes are greatly shaped by contextual circumstances in terms of human development levels, public outlays on education, urbanization trends, and gross domestic product per capita. The random factors substantially reduce the fixed effects. Attainment variations exist within each religious group and religiosity level. This work illuminates the efficacy of adding `contexts' among the principal predictors in all research endeavors on attainment outcomes, stratification trends, social class mobility, and gender disparities with the purposes to discern individual-and country-level effects. In so doing, this dissertation in Sociology provides multidisciplinary analysis that may have implications for comparable research in Public Policy, Economics, and Gender Studies.

Since 1997, the retail industry of South Korea has suffered a decline in sales due to the nation's financial crisis. Because of the increase of price consciousness, discount stores have become the stores most attractive to South Korean consumers. The purpose of this study was to (a) compare the differences between South Korean and the U.S. consumers in demographics, shopping orientation, perception of the importance of store and product attributes, and store evaluation, satisfaction and patronage in discount stores and (b) examine the relationships among the six variables. In addition, South Korean consumers' preferences toward the strategies used in the U.S. discount stores were examined to determine whether these strategies could be adapted to South Korean discount stores. The proposed model suggests that consumers' shopping orientation affects their perception of the importance of store and product attributes. Consumers' perception of the importance of attributes affects how they evaluate a store. Consumers' evaluation of the store then influences their satisfaction with the store. If consumers are satisfied with the store, they choose to patronize the store. A total of 234 participants recruited at Wal-Mart were included in this study, 117 from South Korea and 117 from the U.S. Results showed that there were significant differences between the two countries in participants' occupation, marital status, age, education, the perception of the importance of attributes in discount stores, and store evaluation and satisfaction. When the relationships between variables were examined, results showed that the proposed model is partially supported. When South Korean participants' preferences toward the strategies used in the U.S. were examined, they showed high preferences toward some strategies. The implication of the results were discussed. / Master of Science

As regras eleitorais podem afetar o nível de proteção comercial em países democráticos? Estudos recentes indicam que, no que diz respeito ao protecionismo comercial, as instituições eleitorais importam. No entanto, diante de uma análise mais detalhada da literatura, é possível perceber que não há uma teoria prevalecente e que os resultados apresentados são ainda contraditórios. Nesta tese, objetiva-se resolver esse problema teórico e empírico que envolve representação política e protecionismo comercial testando pressupostos da literatura e apresentando explicações alternativas. A primeira parte do estudo aborda problema específico que, indiretamente, serviu de incentivo para a segunda etapa. A questão que se busca responder pode ser resumida na seguinte indagação: o tamanho do distrito eleitoral é um bom preditor para as preferências em matéria de política comercial do legislador? A pergunta trata, diretamente, da Constituency Size Assumption, um pressuposto que é amplamente aceito pela literatura de Economia Política Internacional (EPI). De acordo com essa abordagem, quanto maior o distrito, maior a probabilidade de o legislador se mostrar favorável ao livre-comércio, uma vez que ele estaria insulado em relação a grupos de interesses. Em distritos menores, no entanto, legisladores poderiam ser tornar, mais facilmente, reféns de interesses particularistas, fato que resultaria em posições protecionistas. Nesta parte, foi proposto o estudo dos casos brasileiros e chileno, levando em consideração as votações nominais de deputados e senadores. Corroborando os achados da literatura, também não foram encontradas evidências para validar a teoria diante da análise de votos nominais entre os anos de 1995 e 2010, para o Brasil, e entre 1996 e 2006, para o Chile. Na segunda parte, apresenta-se o modelo Stigler-Peltzman (S-P) de regulação, tal qual formalizado por Chang et al. em Electoral Systems and the Balance of Consumer-Producer Power, como uma possível solução para se entender a relação entre os incentivos gerados pelos sistemas eleitorais e os níveis de proteção comercial em democracias. Após adaptar o modelo para a área de política comercial, este foi testado empiricamente em 37 democracias entre os anos de 1995 e 2008, quando se estimou o efeito do nível de responsividade dos sistemas eleitorais - desproporcionalidade eleitoral - sobre o nível de proteção tarifária. Os achados indicam que quanto maior a taxa de proporcionalidade entre cadeiras e votos obtidos gerada pelos sistemas eleitorais, maior o nível de proteção que os governantes eleitos irão oferecer aos grupos de interesses, especialmente em democracias não-presidencialistas. / Do electoral rules affect the level of trade protection in democratic countries? Recent studies indicate that, when it comes to trade protection, electoral systems do matter; however, a thorough analysis of the literature unveils the fact that competing theories and mixed findings still prevail. In this dissertation, I intend to solve the empirical and theoretical puzzle involving political representation and trade policy by offering and testing an alternative explanation. In the first part, I investigate a more specific problem, which, indirectly, was an incentive to develop the second part. The question I attempt to answer is: Does the electoral district size affect legislator\'s preference in trade policy? The question is related to the Constituency Size Assumption, which is widely accepted in the International Political Economy (IPE) literature. Accordingly, the larger the constituency, the more prone the legislator will be to free trade, given that he will be insulated from special interests. Smaller constituencies, however, would lead to concern for particularistic interests, which would result in a protectionist position. Until recently, few studies have proposed empirical analyses of this relationship, and those who have accomplished the feat of presenting findings that cast doubt on the validity of this assumption, have been restricted to the US Congress. In this section, I test the constituency size theory in Brazil and Chile, contrasting vote preference with the trade policy of Representatives and Senators. I found no evidence of the theory\'s validity. The empirical analysis is based on rollcall votes from 1995 to 2010 (Brazil) and from 1996 to 2006 (Chile), in which we compared trade-related bills voted in both Houses. In the second part of this work, I present as an answer to the puzzle the Stigler-Peltzman (S-P) analysis of regulation, formalized by Chang et al. in Electoral Systems and the Balance of Consumer-Producer Power. Adapting their model, I evaluate the effect of electoral institutions on the level of trade protection. More specifically, I analyze 37 democracies from 1995 to 2008 and estimate the effect of electoral systems\' level of responsiveness - electoral disproportionality - on trade protection. The findings indicate that the higher the rate of proportionality created by electoral institutions, the greater the level of protection that politicians will provide for special interest groups, especially in non-presidential democracies.

As regras eleitorais podem afetar o nível de proteção comercial em países democráticos? Estudos recentes indicam que, no que diz respeito ao protecionismo comercial, as instituições eleitorais importam. No entanto, diante de uma análise mais detalhada da literatura, é possível perceber que não há uma teoria prevalecente e que os resultados apresentados são ainda contraditórios. Nesta tese, objetiva-se resolver esse problema teórico e empírico que envolve representação política e protecionismo comercial testando pressupostos da literatura e apresentando explicações alternativas. A primeira parte do estudo aborda problema específico que, indiretamente, serviu de incentivo para a segunda etapa. A questão que se busca responder pode ser resumida na seguinte indagação: o tamanho do distrito eleitoral é um bom preditor para as preferências em matéria de política comercial do legislador? A pergunta trata, diretamente, da Constituency Size Assumption, um pressuposto que é amplamente aceito pela literatura de Economia Política Internacional (EPI). De acordo com essa abordagem, quanto maior o distrito, maior a probabilidade de o legislador se mostrar favorável ao livre-comércio, uma vez que ele estaria insulado em relação a grupos de interesses. Em distritos menores, no entanto, legisladores poderiam ser tornar, mais facilmente, reféns de interesses particularistas, fato que resultaria em posições protecionistas. Nesta parte, foi proposto o estudo dos casos brasileiros e chileno, levando em consideração as votações nominais de deputados e senadores. Corroborando os achados da literatura, também não foram encontradas evidências para validar a teoria diante da análise de votos nominais entre os anos de 1995 e 2010, para o Brasil, e entre 1996 e 2006, para o Chile. Na segunda parte, apresenta-se o modelo Stigler-Peltzman (S-P) de regulação, tal qual formalizado por Chang et al. em Electoral Systems and the Balance of Consumer-Producer Power, como uma possível solução para se entender a relação entre os incentivos gerados pelos sistemas eleitorais e os níveis de proteção comercial em democracias. Após adaptar o modelo para a área de política comercial, este foi testado empiricamente em 37 democracias entre os anos de 1995 e 2008, quando se estimou o efeito do nível de responsividade dos sistemas eleitorais - desproporcionalidade eleitoral - sobre o nível de proteção tarifária. Os achados indicam que quanto maior a taxa de proporcionalidade entre cadeiras e votos obtidos gerada pelos sistemas eleitorais, maior o nível de proteção que os governantes eleitos irão oferecer aos grupos de interesses, especialmente em democracias não-presidencialistas. / Do electoral rules affect the level of trade protection in democratic countries? Recent studies indicate that, when it comes to trade protection, electoral systems do matter; however, a thorough analysis of the literature unveils the fact that competing theories and mixed findings still prevail. In this dissertation, I intend to solve the empirical and theoretical puzzle involving political representation and trade policy by offering and testing an alternative explanation. In the first part, I investigate a more specific problem, which, indirectly, was an incentive to develop the second part. The question I attempt to answer is: Does the electoral district size affect legislator\'s preference in trade policy? The question is related to the Constituency Size Assumption, which is widely accepted in the International Political Economy (IPE) literature. Accordingly, the larger the constituency, the more prone the legislator will be to free trade, given that he will be insulated from special interests. Smaller constituencies, however, would lead to concern for particularistic interests, which would result in a protectionist position. Until recently, few studies have proposed empirical analyses of this relationship, and those who have accomplished the feat of presenting findings that cast doubt on the validity of this assumption, have been restricted to the US Congress. In this section, I test the constituency size theory in Brazil and Chile, contrasting vote preference with the trade policy of Representatives and Senators. I found no evidence of the theory\'s validity. The empirical analysis is based on rollcall votes from 1995 to 2010 (Brazil) and from 1996 to 2006 (Chile), in which we compared trade-related bills voted in both Houses. In the second part of this work, I present as an answer to the puzzle the Stigler-Peltzman (S-P) analysis of regulation, formalized by Chang et al. in Electoral Systems and the Balance of Consumer-Producer Power. Adapting their model, I evaluate the effect of electoral institutions on the level of trade protection. More specifically, I analyze 37 democracies from 1995 to 2008 and estimate the effect of electoral systems\' level of responsiveness - electoral disproportionality - on trade protection. The findings indicate that the higher the rate of proportionality created by electoral institutions, the greater the level of protection that politicians will provide for special interest groups, especially in non-presidential democracies.