The existing body of knowledge attributes to informal land transactions in sub-Saharan African cities observed problems in city neighbourhoods. However, the dearth of empirically insightful studies of how this eventuates continues to leave a vacuum in terms of practical solutions. But it is commonly held that bureaucratic intervention offers a way out. Substantial resources, often backed by donor agencies, are therefore being spent in revamping bureaux and governmental bodies in a bid to solving the problems. This thesis sets as its central aim to identify and establish the costs to agents of the real causes of the problems. It also aims to assess the economic impact of formal policy measures on agents and recommends feasible approaches to market regulations. To address the objectives insights from property rights, transactions costs and public choice economics are brought to bear. Based on a survey of market participants of sampled informal neighbourhoods in Accra, the capital city of Ghana, it employs regression and discriminant analyses to analyse the data generated. In the process helpful insights are gained. It has been possible to put some figures to the extent of costs that lead agents to operate in ways that eventually translate into the problems commonly witnessed. The study finds that actual costs to market participants of government activities are too high to be of any benefit. These costs mainly derive from rent-seeking behaviour which extensive bureaucratic intervention of transactions in urban residential lands bring about. On the basis of the results of the regression analysis, arguments implying inefficiency of informal land markets, specifically relating to the arbitrary nature of prices, are refuted. The futility of the use of compulsory purchase powers to create residential neighbourhoods also emerges from the results of the discriminant analysis. Similarly, efficiency' enhancing bureaucratic interventions in the informal market lead to the diversion of real resources into wasteful rent-seeking expenditures. The sum of these wasteful diversions of resources explains a great deal of the haphazard developments that have come to characterise many neighbourhoods of cities in Sub-Saharan Africa. Market led regulation emerges as the needed focus of future land policy and management strategy. But to work the study calls for the removal of unwarranted market interventions extant at the present moment and the reorganisation of bureaux to be responsible in ways that would induce them to operate efficiently.

This thesis addresses three questions: What are proxy wars? How are proxy wars waged? Why are proxy wars waged? Each research question addresses a gap, a flaw or a deficiency in the current knowledge of proxy wars. Accordingly, each question is matched with a research aim. The first aim is to establish a conceptual and definitional baseline for proxy wars as a point of inquiry. The second seeks to restrict the empirical domain of proxy wars in an effort to enhance our ability to recognise proxy wars in the contemporary security environment. Lastly, the third objective is an analysis of the normative and causal dynamics underpinning party interaction in proxy wars. Taken together, the three research questions form the focus of my research, namely to understand and explain proxy wars as a self-standing form of political violence. I apply my research questions to Africa on a timeline beginning with 1945 leading up to 2011. I build a qualitative dataset, the Proxy War Dataset, which maps the spread of the phenomena across time, space (regions, countries), and conflict indicators (incompatibility). I use it as a descriptive tool to understand proxy wars, as well as a theory-informing source of data. In answering the causality problem, I put forward a theory of distributional violence focused on strategic interaction which yields four distinct logics of distribution of violence in proxy wars: pre-emptive, managerial, retaliative, and cooperative. I probe the theory with a series of four case studies focused on proxy wars in Ethiopia, the country most affected by the phenomena under observation throughout the 1945-2011 timeline.

What happened to Afrikaner nationalism? Did the end of apartheid spell the end of the nationalism with which it had become synonymous? Was the decade that lay between South Africa's first universal suffrage elections of 1994 and the collapse of the Afrikaners' National Party in 2004 the final chapter in the history of Afrikaner nationalism? If so - and that is the question posed in this thesis - how is one to interpret the Afrikaner campaign that gained momentum during that very same decade in defence of Afrikaans - the language that gave the word apartheid to human history? Contra the lay and scholarly consensus, I argue that Afrikaner nationalism has outlived apartheid. What we are witnessing today, if only in certain elite circles, is not the end of Afrikaner nationalism but its revival. To substantiate this claim, chapter 3 of the thesis develops a definitional and theoretical framework from which I argue in chapters 4 and 5, by means of a diachronical comparison, that the latest movement represents a continuation of the Afrikaner nationalist past. First, however, the scene has to be set. Chapters 1 and 2 provide the political and ideological background without which no analysis would be possible of Afrikaner nationalism's consecutive language and cultural movements. It needs to be stressed, though, that while language and cultural activism has the central attention in this study, it also considers the relationship between cultural and political nationalism - both as concepts and as actual movements - and questions the notion of a dichotomy. In seeking a historical explanation for the contemporary Afrikaner movement, I revisit what Kellas regards as the problem that studies of nationalism have classically addressed, namely the relationship between politics, economics and culture "which in any particular case brought about the transition from ethnicity to nationalism"? (1991:35). Focusing on the Afrikaner case, my thesis explores the role of language in these dynamics - something that has not been done in a systematic manner.

By the end of the Seventeenth century, when the Dutch settlement at the Cape was already firmly established, and the foundation had thus been laid for the present political dominance of the white man in the country, Africa south of the Kunene Okavango and Zambesi Rivers was inhabited by a considerate. number of different native peoples On the basis of racial, linguistic and cultural distinction, these can all be classified into four main stocks, commonly known as the Bushmen, the Hottentots, the Bergdama and the Bantu respectively. The Bushmen are a short, brownish-yellow people, with certain peculiar and racial characteristics, they all speak languages of a uniform, well-defined and easily recognizable type, phonetically remarkable especially for the great prevalence of click consonant; and they practice neither agriculture nor pastoralism, but live in small separate commutative which lead a nomadic hunting and collecting existence.

The joyous advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994 brought real promise of an improvement in the life chances for millions of marginalised South Africans. There was reason for many citizens to have great faith in the new order after decades of sustained struggle. Effective state intervention and the spatial reorganisation of society seemed a realistic prospect in a country blessed with abundant natural resources and an established industrial base. The power of the state to affect change at the grassroots level was however soon compromised by the substitution of the populist Reconstruction and Development Programme with the neoliberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) by mid 1996. South Africa was now part of the international community and the new government's gaze was directed away from its popular support base. The radical and risky policy shift was influenced by demands of an international investor community and by the dictates of international donor organisations. Announcement of the policy shift was a low profile affair and few citizens had any real comprehension of the impact the shift would have on the capacity of the new ANC government to deliver on its electoral promises. Change in the macro economic policy reverberated within the lower tiers of government and in local authorities. Urban development policy was repeatedly rewritten; first in response to the dictates of the socialist RDP in 1994, and again in response to a neo-liberal GEAR in 1996. In 2000 the fragmented urban management system of appointed officials was replaced by an elected metropolitan government system. This initiated a third, profound shift in the policy context as each metropolitan government sought to formulate its own, context-specific policies. The most recent shift is significant since it has resulted in massive organisational upheaval and restructuring. However, it has opened new laboratories, which generates new opportunities for more responsive and accountable policy-making and planning. These new opportunities emerge against a backdrop in which the comedy of policy shifts that have occurred during the past nine years have resulted in little action and a growing crisis on the ground. Despite the policy shifts, corridor development has remained a constant feature of post apartheid urban development frameworks. Initially it made sense as a mechanism to physically integrate fragmented cities. It fitted a populist agenda, had political currency and was an easy sell. After the adoption of neo-liberal strategies it would receive another label; that of an accessible armature for private investment. Importantly, the latest policy shift in 2000 offered an opportunity to consider the city in a holistic and integrated fashion. This represents the belated death of the Apartheid City, which was characterised by fragmented, sub-regional councils linked to racially defined urban enclaves. New metropolitan governments arguably have greater capacity to facilitate and co-ordinate action in the extended corridor zone than has ever been possible. Effective implementation of a regional capital web of minimal public investment now becomes a distinct possibility. The recent adoption of a metropolitan government system and the associated strategic urban management approach offers an opportunity for reflection and for the construction of an informed vision of the role of urban design in corridor development. Whilst the corridor concept has survived, its purpose has become confused. While not discarding the corridor idea, many proposals that originated during the early post apartheid years are being questioned by new metropolitan governments. The new crisis is largely the result of the private sector having shown reluctance to invest in marginal zones of the city. Since corridors were originally conceived as devices which aim to link marginal zones to the core of opportunity, their capacity to facilitate change is limited by the sustained lack of market interest. While the market remains reluctant to invest in the areas of greatest need in corridors, requirements for improved mobility and access amongst the urban poor have escalated dramatically as millions of migrants from the rural hinterland and the African sub-continent flock to the urban peripheries. Migrants squat on the verges of highways or crowd into the backyards of apartheid-era townships. They are effectively constructing their own informal corridors along lines of access. This dynamic adds to the emerging crisis associated with an uninterested private sector. This thesis responds to the crisis from an urban design perspective. It evaluates the actions of urban designers in the corridor context during the past decade, and tests the perceptions of ordinary citizens who are affected by corridor development. While doing this it questions the predominance of generic approaches to corridor development and draws on insights gained from international fieldwork in Malaysia, Australia and Peru. Finally, it presents a strategic approach that indicates ways in which urban design may realise its potential to become an enabling discipline in the participatory development of the post apartheid integration corridor.

No description available.

A conceptual framework, 'accountable bureaucratic capacity' is utilised to investigate the ability of local government to institutionalise collaborative urban upgrading measures in partnership with civil society organisations. The main argument is that the latter cannot contribute to sustainable development, democratisation or to protect citizens' rights in low-income neighbourhood without accountable representation from their side, a reciprocal and active representation from the citizens concerned, and an accountable public sector. The capacity of urban governance and the extent to which participatory initiatives can exploit the potential within existing structures and systems are examined. This examination allows an evaluation of how far a participatory project rated as 'good-practice' can enhance citizens' awareness of opportunities, political participation and local government performance, while building collaborative and institutionalised planning capacity. The research concludes that the sustainability of urban upgrading depends on the form of citizens' participation and the management styles of cities. Successful participation during an upgrading project may have 'transformative' potential to encourage citizens' political participation. If the citizens are not active, even though they reject the government's development agenda, or have to depend on 'informal' networks to provide their needs, they may be characterised as 'free-riders', who withdraw from urban governance and its collaborative decision-making processes. Legal recognition of squatter settlements is the first step required to institutionalise upgrading policies, particularly for indigenous or customary groups trying to survive in a world characterised by increasing interdependence and escalating threats to local ties. However, although this recognition strengthens a group's ability to negotiate and interact with non-group members, it may also have detrimental effects if it is not supported by additional legislation. Local government needs institutional reform and a strategic capacity-building programme to forge partnerships and the joint responsibility of the public and private sectors, as well as of civil society.

We study three topics on corruption that are of particular relevance to sub-Saharan Africa. Firstly, we address the question of why corruption is such an endemic problem in sub-Saharan Africa. Is it policy driven or "destiny"? We analyse indices of perceived corruption and test several theories regarding the causes of corruption. We find strong support for two arguments: Countries with a British heritage are perceived to be less corrupt, while those with a common law system are perceived to be more corrupt. We find weaker support for four further arguments: Countries with good quality institutions and a greater proportion of women in the labour force are perceived as less corrupt. Countries with greater natural resource abundance and with greater trade openness are perceived to be more corrupt. Secondly, we look at the supply side of bribery. Within the public procurement process, we study how a firm's uncertainty regarding the official's corruptibility and rival firms' costs influences the magnitude of the bribe it offers. Due to the illegal nature of bribery, we also explicitly consider different punishment mechanisms for corrupt firms. We find that secrecy leads to lower bribe levels, and that bribery can be completely deterred by either appropriate fixed fines or by firms being fined punitive damages. Thirdly, we investigate whether more corrupt governments receive less aid. We develop a theoretical framework that treats corruption as a tax on aid. Although we are unable to empirically test this model, we use it to motivate our empirical analysis of aid receipts using data on sub-Saharan Africa. We find a negative correlation between a country's perceived level of corruption and its aid receipts. However, we find no causal effect of perceived corruption on aid receipts. We revisit the results of an influential paper in the literature and find that their result of no evidence that countries perceived as more corrupt receive less aid is not robust to a sample of sub-Saharan African countries, although we find no evidence of a causal effect. We find no evidence that the impact of perceived corruption on aid receipts differs across sectors.

This thesis seeks to assess the relevance of existing theories about the origins of nationalism and investigate more specifically the claim that nationalism is rooted in ethnicity. It does so by examining the cases of Eritrea and Somaliland, which proclaimed their independence in May 1991 after seceding from the states to which they were formerly united. Having explained in the introduction why International Relations needs to take a closer look at the causes of nationalism, the second chapter proceeds to review some of the main theories about the origins of nationalism. It retraces the history of the primordialist-modernist debate, discusses the main contentions of the ethnonationalist approach and presents some of the factors singled-out by recent scholarship as propitious for the emergence of nationalism. Given that most of the theories about the origins of nationalism presented in chapter two centre on Europe, chapter three surveys the literature on the rise of nationalism in Africa i_n order to determine whether any additional factors need to be considered before analysing Eritrea and Somaliland. Chapter three also includes a discussion of the anthropological literature on ethnicity in Africa and questions the ethnonationalist claim that ethnic groups are pre-modern. Using as a framework the factors identified previously, chapter four offers a historical account of the emergence of nationalism in Eritrea. Chapter five does the same for the case of Somaliland. As the analysis provided in chapters four and five illustrate, the claim that nationalism and secession have ethnic roots is not empirically substantiated by the cases of Eritrea and Somaliland. The thesis concludes by discussing the practical implications of these fmdings with regard to the right of secession and proposals for boundary adjustment in Africa. It also highlights the ways International Relations may contribute to our understanding of the causes of nationalism.

This thesis contributes originally to pentecostal historiography through bringing a pre-eminent figure in early British Pentecostalism into the limelight showing how Pentecostalism in Belgian Congo was pioneered by him alongside local agency. Together they furthered its development in the southeastern Katanga and Kasai provinces. Central to W.F.P. Burton’s contradictory and complex personality was a passionate desire to see the emancipation of humankind from the spiritual powers of darkness believing only Spirit-empowered local agency would enduringly prove effective. This thesis unevenly portrays Burton’s Congolese years by parsing biographical landmarks alongside his persistent attempts to co-labour with local agency. Burton’s ambitions might have been circumscribed by his birth into a notable family. Burton though, lived with a faith which believed for Spirit intervention in church communities converting lives, bringing physical healing and transforming regions. In the maelstrom following Congolese Independence, Burton’s belief in his own brand of indigenisation made him an outlier even among Pentecostals. This thesis argues such pentecostal faith engendered an idealism which frustratingly conflicted with those not sharing it in the way he understood and pursued it. It thus serves Pentecostals (holding a similar faith) and historians by clarifying his ideals and revealing the reasons for his frustrations.