Diss.--Universiteit te Utrecht.

Diss.--Universiteit te Utrecht.

The dissertation examines recognition of new states, the practice historically employed to regulate membership in international society. The last fifteen years have witnessed novel or reinvigorated demands for statehood in many areas of the world. The claims of some, like those of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eritrea, Croatia, Moldova, Georgia or East Timor, achieved recognition; those of others, like Kosovo, Krajina, Bouganville, Abkhazia, Somaliland or Chechnya, did not. However, even as most of these claims gave rise to serious conflicts, the practice has elicited little systematic scholarly reflection. Drawing upon writings of international society theorists, the dissertation looks at the criteria that have guided recognition of new states. It charts the practice from the late eighteenth century until the present. Its central finding is that state recognition has always been tied to the idea of self-determination of peoples and not, as is conventionally assumed, only since the end of the First World War. State recognition can be said to have (1) emerged as a coherent practice in response to this idea and (2) evolved chiefly as a result of the continuous necessity to come to terms with the dilemmas presented by this idea. Two versions of the idea have guided the practice - selfdetermination as a natural and as a positive right. The former, dominant from the 1820s to the 1950s, took as the standard for acknowledgment the achievement of de facto statehood by a people desiring independence. The latter, prevalent since the 1950s, took as the basis of recognition a positive right to independence in international law. The development of self-determination as a positive right, however, has not led to a disappearance of claims of statehood that stand outside of its confines. Groups that feel unhappy within the states they belong to have continued to make demands for independence irrespective of the fact that they may not have an international right to it. The study concludes by expressing doubt that contemporary international society can find a sustainable basis for recognition of new states other than de facto statehood. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

The existing rights paradigm in Aboriginal law accepts Crown sovereignty claims grounded in ethnocentric conceptions of terra nullius and discovery, and views Aboriginal rights as arising out of prior occupation. The Supreme Court of Canada has shaken this paradigm by characterizing Crown sovereignty as merely de facto until reconciled with Aboriginal sovereignty and legitimated by a treaty, by developing the duty to consult, and by characterizing reconciliation as a process that is part of a generative constitutional order. The moves the Court toward a new paradigm rooted in the principle of the equality of peoples in which treaties provide a framework for sharing sovereignty. As part of the Canadian federation, Aboriginal sovereignty can strengthen Canadas territorial integrity and contribute to Canadas economic development.<p> In the past, courts allowed the act of state doctrine to shield Crown assertions of sovereignty from scrutiny. This doctrine protects Canadas territorial integrity, but does not shield the Crowns actions from legal and constitutional scrutiny. The fundamental constitutional principle of rule of law and the de facto doctrine will protect interests that relied on assumptions of Crown sovereignty that lacked constitutional legitimacy.<p> The transformation in the fundamental principles of Aboriginal law has parallels to Thomas Kuhns description of a paradigm shift in the natural sciences. The rights paradigm is in a crisis with moral and practical dimensions. It is incommensurable with the equality paradigm, and therefore the choice of paradigms will depend on normative criteria. Fundamental principles of the Canadian constitution, international standards of human rights and the perspectives of growing numbers of practitioners in the field that are of Aboriginal ancestry are all forces that will complete the shift to the equality paradigm.<p> An equality paradigm will result in the abandonment of some Aboriginal law doctrines, and the modification of others. Aboriginal title is inconsistent with an equality paradigm because it assumes the legitimacy of the Crowns claims to sovereignty, gives the Crown a superior title, and limits Aboriginal nations to a burden of only limited and subordinate rights. The fiduciary relationship rooted in the honour of the Crown will grow into a non-hierarchical relationship with reciprocal obligations.<p> Decisions of courts can play a supporting role, but only negotiations and treaties can build a genuine partnership, effective and equitable sharing of sovereignty and ultimately reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in Canada.

The existing rights paradigm in Aboriginal law accepts Crown sovereignty claims grounded in ethnocentric conceptions of terra nullius and discovery, and views Aboriginal rights as arising out of prior occupation. The Supreme Court of Canada has shaken this paradigm by characterizing Crown sovereignty as merely de facto until reconciled with Aboriginal sovereignty and legitimated by a treaty, by developing the duty to consult, and by characterizing reconciliation as a process that is part of a generative constitutional order. The moves the Court toward a new paradigm rooted in the principle of the equality of peoples in which treaties provide a framework for sharing sovereignty. As part of the Canadian federation, Aboriginal sovereignty can strengthen Canadas territorial integrity and contribute to Canadas economic development.<p> In the past, courts allowed the act of state doctrine to shield Crown assertions of sovereignty from scrutiny. This doctrine protects Canadas territorial integrity, but does not shield the Crowns actions from legal and constitutional scrutiny. The fundamental constitutional principle of rule of law and the de facto doctrine will protect interests that relied on assumptions of Crown sovereignty that lacked constitutional legitimacy.<p> The transformation in the fundamental principles of Aboriginal law has parallels to Thomas Kuhns description of a paradigm shift in the natural sciences. The rights paradigm is in a crisis with moral and practical dimensions. It is incommensurable with the equality paradigm, and therefore the choice of paradigms will depend on normative criteria. Fundamental principles of the Canadian constitution, international standards of human rights and the perspectives of growing numbers of practitioners in the field that are of Aboriginal ancestry are all forces that will complete the shift to the equality paradigm.<p> An equality paradigm will result in the abandonment of some Aboriginal law doctrines, and the modification of others. Aboriginal title is inconsistent with an equality paradigm because it assumes the legitimacy of the Crowns claims to sovereignty, gives the Crown a superior title, and limits Aboriginal nations to a burden of only limited and subordinate rights. The fiduciary relationship rooted in the honour of the Crown will grow into a non-hierarchical relationship with reciprocal obligations.<p> Decisions of courts can play a supporting role, but only negotiations and treaties can build a genuine partnership, effective and equitable sharing of sovereignty and ultimately reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in Canada.