Tests of the static trade-off theory that posits that firms move towards the optimum capital structure necessitate a joint hypothesis test - whether firms adjust toward target leverage, and whether the proxy used for target leverage is the true target leverage. Prior studies use the time-series mean leverage for each firm, the industry median leverage, an estimated cross-sectional leverage, and a tobit estimated leverage using the factors suggested by the static trade-off theory as proxies for the target leverage. In this dissertation, I examine whether these proxies are equivalent and test the consistency of the proxies with the theorized behavior of the true target leverage. My results indicate that the four proxies we examine have significantly different distributions and this holds across most industries. Further, the industry median leverage is the proxy which best exhibits behavior consistent with the true target leverage. Firm value is higher for firms closer to the industry median and lower for firms away from the industry median. A robustness check using Kmeans cluster analysis confirms the superiority of the industry median leverage over the other proxies of target leverage. This study complements the previous studies on the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory. The main purpose of this study is to investigate three issues that are not considered in the previous studies. The adequacy of the specification and the assumptions of the models used in testing the trade-off and the pecking order theory. The second issue examined in this study is the validity to putting the pecking order and the trade-off theories in a horse race. The final issue examined in this study is the factors driving firms to issue (repurchase) debt or equity or combination of both and simultaneously the factors affecting the size of issue (repurchase)

Thesis advisor: Thomas J. Chemmanur / Thesis advisor: Arthur Lewbel / The dissertation aims to investigate the role of asymmetric information in capital structure, investment, compensation of mortgage servicers, and bond and equity returns. Specifically, I evaluate the impact of credit ratings on debt issuance and investment of private and public firms, as well as the effect of asymmetric information on compensation of loan servicers in the mortgage backed securities market. Further, I study the relationship between ratings issued by investor and issuer-paid credit rating agencies and equity analyst recommendations. Finally, I evaluate the effect of the aforementioned signals on bond and equity returns as well as firm leverage and investment decisions. Chapter one in the dissertation is the first study to empirically evaluate the effect of credit ratings on capital structure and investment for private U.S. firms, relative to equivalent public firms. I find that private firms constrain debt issuance and investment by 4.5 and 6.5 percentage points more than public firms, respectively, when their credit ratings are on upgrade or downgrade thresholds. Consistent with these results, private firms that become public through an IPO constrain debt issuance by 10 percentage points before going public, if their ratings are on an upgrade or downgrade boundary. The second chapter studies the impact of asymmetric information between mortgage sellers and servicers on mortgage servicer compensation. We proxy for asymmetric information using the decision to retain mortgage servicing rights, which creates a principal-agent problem between sellers and servicers. Using loan-level data on Fannie Mae-insured, full documentation mortgages, we first find that loans in which sellers retain servicing rights default and foreclose at a significantly lower rate, and lose less in foreclosure than those in which they are not retained. Since it is more costly to service non-performing loans, these ex-post differences in default rates should be reflected in servicer compensation. However, using Fannie Mae MBS pool-level data, we find no difference in servicing fees for pools in which servicing rights are retained relative to pools in which they are not retained. In order to identify the impact of seller/servicer affiliation on servicing fees, we exploit a post-crisis regulatory change which altered the incentive to retain servicing rights for small sellers of MBS relative to large sellers. Finally, in the third chapter, we evaluate the information flows to the stock and bond markets of issuer versus investor-paid rating agencies and equity analysts. Equity analysts' forecasts and ratings assigned by issuer-paid credit rating agencies such as Standard and Poor's (S&P) and by investor-paid rating agencies such as Egan and Jones (EJR) all involve information production about the same underlying set of firms, even though equity analysts focus on cash flows to equity and bond ratings focus on cash flows to bonds. Further, the two types of credit rating agencies differ in their incentives to produce and report accurate information signals. Given this setting, we empirically analyze the timeliness and accuracy of the information signals provided by each of the above three types of financial intermediary to their investor clienteles and the information flows between these intermediaries. We find that the information signals produced by EJR are the most timely (on average), and seem to anticipate the information signals produced by equity analysts as well as by S&P. We find that changes in leverage are associated with lower EJR ratings but higher equity analyst recommendations; further, credit rating changes by EJR have the largest impact on firms' investment levels. We also document an "investor attention" effect (in the sense of Merton, 1987) among stock and bond market investors in the sense that changes in equity analyst recommendations have a higher impact than either EJR or S&P ratings changes on the excess returns on firm equity, while EJR rating changes have a higher impact on bond yield spreads than either S&P ratings changes or changes in equity analyst recommendations. Finally, we analyze differences in bond ratings assigned to a given firm by EJR and S&P, and find that these differences are positively related to the standard proxies for disagreement among stock market investors.

The dissertation consists of two essays. In the first essay we study the efficiency of banks during the period of (2000-2017) that witnessed a fierce financial crisis in the light of the regulatory acts enacted in response to the crisis (Basel III 2010). We investigate the combined impact of compliance with Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, common equity Tier 1, and leverage requirements on bank operating efficiency. We measure operational efficiency of 68 insured, U.S. federally and state-chartered, commercial banks, with consolidated assets of $15 billion or more, over a sampling period of 18 years. We seek to identify whether different dimensions of bank regulation are efficient in stabilizing US financial system by improving efficiency of large commercial banks; whether they impede bank efficiency by limiting its risk-taking endeavors and tightening its capital usage; or whether no impact on efficiency exists altogether. We build an empirical model measuring the impact of capital and leverage regulation and credit risk on banks’ operational efficiency. Empirical findings show a positive and statistically significant impact of capital adequacy on operating efficiency of large U.S. commercial banks, with common equity Tier 1 having more power in determining efficiency. Leverage requirements and net charge-offs are also found to be significant determinants that promote bank operating efficiency. In the second essay we investigate determinants for government’s choice of sovereign Sukuk over conventional bonds. Using a sample of 143 sovereign Sukuk and 602 sovereign conventional bonds issued in 16 OIC countries during (2000-2015), we analyze factors affecting the government's choice of employing sovereign Sukuk structure as substitute to sovereign bonds instruments. Results suggest that countries having developed financial markets, higher credit quality, and strong economic and financial prospects are more likely to issue sovereign Sukuk rather than sovereign bonds, mainly as a strategy to diversify and develop their current debt markets by introducing newly-developed debt tools. However, countries with weaker economic and financial indicators are more likely to opt for the classic sovereign bonds. We conclude that government’s choice of sovereign debt is mainly determined by a country’s financial characteristics, macroeconomic indicators and certain specific events.

Cette thèse est composée de 3 essais. Le 1er essai traite de la problématique du risque de pertes extrêmes dans le secteur bancaire dans un contexte du problème d'agence entre les actionnaires et les top managers des banques. Pour pouvoir inciter les banques à ne pas prendre le risque de pertes extrêmes, il est proposé d'appliquer la régulation des fonds propres sous forme d'une politique de recapitalisations obligatoires, dont les paramètres sont choisis pour inciter les actionnaires à rémunérer leurs managers de la manière à les détourner des stratégies au risque de pertes extrêmes.Le 2ème essai développe le design de la supervision bancaire qui vise à éliminer le problème d'aléa moral au sein d'une banque, tout en assurant un coût minimum de supervisions. Les banques, dont la situation financière commence à se dégrader, doivent être soumises à des audits aléatoires. Les banques, dont la valeur de l'actif s'est dégradée considérablement, doivent être mises sous tutelle pour un redressement financier. Les auditeurs externes peuvent être impliqués dans le processus de supervision, mais ne doivent pas complètement remplacer les régulateurs. Le 3ème essai étudie comment la capacité d'emprunt de l'entreprise non-financière affecte sa politique d'investissement en présence des coûts d'émission de la dette. Il est montré que les entreprises, dont la capacité d'emprunt est moyenne, ont intérêt à réaliser un investissement plus important par rapport aux entreprises dont la capacité d'emprunt est relativement faible/forte. Cela est entièrement dû à l'effet des coûts fixes d'émission de la dette, qui émerge dans le contexte dynamique d'investissement. / This dissertation consists of 3 self-contained theoretical essays.Essay 1 brings into focus the problem of "manufacturing" tail risk in the banking sector. This work shows that, in order to prevent banks from engaging in tail risk, bank capital regulation should account for the internal agency problem between bank shareholders and bank top managers. It is proposed to design bank capital requirements in the form of incentive-based recapitalization mechanism which would induce bank shareholders to shape executive compensation in such a way as to prevent top managers from engaging in tail-risk.Essay 2 deals with the problem of moral hazard in bank asset management. It proposes the concept of incentive-based bank supervision aimed at preventing moral hazard at a minimum cost to the regulator. It is shown that the intensity of supervision efforts should be gradually adjusted to the bank's financial health: banks in the mild form of distress should be subject to random audits, whereas deeply distressed banks should be placed under temporary regulatory control. To prevent double moral hazard, external auditors involved in supervision should be offered the optimal incentive contract.Essay 3 examines the impact of credit rationing (debt capacity) on corporate investment in the setting with costly debt financing. It is shown that, when credit constraints are binding, the firms with intermediate levels of debt capacity will establish larger investment projects than the firms with relatively low or high debt capacity. This non-monotonicity of investment on debt capacity arises due to the effect of the lump-sum debt issuance costs in the dynamic context of investment.