This dissertation investigates the impacts of constraints on optimal government policy. The first two chapters provide a general introduction and review of the literature. Chapters three and four analyze education spending and institutional structure in an economy with informational asymmetries and employment matching frictions. The fifth investigates the impact of politics on government decisions over taxation and spending programs more generally. Chapter three analyzes the situation where governments can target education funds to specific observable groups (referred to as low and high productivity neighbourhoods/regions). The results suggest that it may be optimal to employ educational transfers, rather than cash transfers amongst individuals, to achieve social welfare objectives. This is becasue the former can reduce distortions created by the tax system. However, the value of educational spending in mitigating these information frictions may not be that large, and may in fact exacerbate such distortions. This suggests that an optimal education policy may be more regressive when there is a distortionary tax system in place. Further, we showt that even if ``equalizing opportunities'' is deemed optimal in the static problem, it may not be a reasonable policy goal when we extend the analysis to include dynamics. Chapter four is joint work with Afrasiab Mirza. We analyze an economy where heterogeneous individuals are uncertain about their endowments. The education system trades off the desire to capitalize on talent through specific skills training with the need to provide individuals with opportunities to learn about their career preferences through a broader education. The results consider the implications of various educational institutions for the income distribution and consequently welfare. Chapter five analyzes the dynamics of public spending, taxation and debt in a political agency model. Choices are made by short-lived politicians who can be only partially controlled through the electoral process. The main focus is to consider the impacts of binding limits on the public budget. The value of imposing this additional friction depends both on the extent to which politicians' goals deviate from their constituencies and how effectively the electoral process disciplines them when they misbehave. The results also suggest that the value of such a restriction depends on the fiscal position at the time in which it is imposed. / Thesis (Ph.D, Economics) -- Queen's University, 2009-11-25 20:25:29.12

Como a sustentabilidade da dívida é afetada por elevados e crescentes níveis de endividamento no Brasil? Esta dissertação introduz uma estrutura teórica e empírica para a estimação de limites endógenos para a dívida bruta do setor público, utilizando um modelo com credores neutros ao risco que avaliam a probabilidade de calote do governo em função do próprio nível de endividamento e da taxa de juros e um governo soberano que segue uma função de reação do superávit ao nível da dívida com propriedade de fadiga fiscal e choques exógenos. Nos dados de 2002 a 2018, as estimativas de limites para o endividamento bruto estão entre 130,8%, no cenário mais provável, até 151,4% do PIB, sob condições mais favoráveis. As taxas de juros estariam entre 22% e 38% a.a., garantindo a sustentabilidade fiscal do governo para os próximos anos, com ressalvas que 1) este é um máximo para a dívida, nada é discutido sobre um nível ótimo de endividamento; e 2) que a trajetória crescente da dívida em anos recentes requer uma atenção especial por parte das autoridades fiscais que desejarem se comprometer com sua sustentabilidade, ainda que ela se situe abaixo de seu máximo. / How the sustainability of public debt changes when rising indebtedness arises? This dissertation introduces the theoretical and empirical framework to estimate endogenous limits to the debt levels, that is, a model with risk-neutral lenders that account for the default probability as a function of indebtedness itself (thus the endogeneity) and the interest rates; and the fiscal authority, which follows a fiscal reaction function with the fiscal fatigue property and exogenous shocks. The estimates for the debt limits in the Brazilian economy stays around 130.8% and 151.4% of GDP, with real interest rates of 38% per year in the first case, using monthly data from 2002 to 2018. This ensures the fiscal sustainability for the next year, but it is worth noting that 1) this is the limit for debt levels; nothing is discussed about the optimal level for the economy as a whole; and 2) the path of rising indebtedness in the recent years needs to be strongly reviewed by whoever wishes to commit to fiscal sustainability in the next government.

Como a sustentabilidade da dívida é afetada por elevados e crescentes níveis de endividamento no Brasil? Esta dissertação introduz uma estrutura teórica e empírica para a estimação de limites endógenos para a dívida bruta do setor público, utilizando um modelo com credores neutros ao risco que avaliam a probabilidade de calote do governo em função do próprio nível de endividamento e da taxa de juros e um governo soberano que segue uma função de reação do superávit ao nível da dívida com propriedade de fadiga fiscal e choques exógenos. Nos dados de 2002 a 2018, as estimativas de limites para o endividamento bruto estão entre 130,8%, no cenário mais provável, até 151,4% do PIB, sob condições mais favoráveis. As taxas de juros estariam entre 22% e 38% a.a., garantindo a sustentabilidade fiscal do governo para os próximos anos, com ressalvas que 1) este é um máximo para a dívida, nada é discutido sobre um nível ótimo de endividamento; e 2) que a trajetória crescente da dívida em anos recentes requer uma atenção especial por parte das autoridades fiscais que desejarem se comprometer com sua sustentabilidade, ainda que ela se situe abaixo de seu máximo. / How the sustainability of public debt changes when rising indebtedness arises? This dissertation introduces the theoretical and empirical framework to estimate endogenous limits to the debt levels, that is, a model with risk-neutral lenders that account for the default probability as a function of indebtedness itself (thus the endogeneity) and the interest rates; and the fiscal authority, which follows a fiscal reaction function with the fiscal fatigue property and exogenous shocks. The estimates for the debt limits in the Brazilian economy stays around 130.8% and 151.4% of GDP, with real interest rates of 38% per year in the first case, using monthly data from 2002 to 2018. This ensures the fiscal sustainability for the next year, but it is worth noting that 1) this is the limit for debt levels; nothing is discussed about the optimal level for the economy as a whole; and 2) the path of rising indebtedness in the recent years needs to be strongly reviewed by whoever wishes to commit to fiscal sustainability in the next government.