This thesis critically examines the career and significance of America’s first Secretary of Defence James V. Forrestal from a post-Cold War perspective. Within traditional Cold War scholarship, Forrestal’s legacy is problematic. The nature of his role as a defence administrator, combined with his suicide in 1949, has led scholars to underestimate his significance and relegate his legacy to the occasional biography. The few studies that examine his contribution utilise conventional analytical approaches that fail to fully assess his policymaking impact. The end of the Cold War, however, has brought additional insight into the policy concerns that dominated the conflict, new analytical approaches to its scholarship and fresh material on which to base a re-assessment. As this thesis demonstrates, the employment of new methodologies to study Forrestal’s impact is long overdue. By drawing on theories specifically related to leadership and decision-making behaviour, this thesis brings a deeper, fuller understanding of Forrestal’s policy-making impact as a Cold War official through an examination of his professional conduct. Despite Forrestal’s many successes, political controversies surrounding his defence career overshadowed his many achievements. This thesis argues that such controversies were the result of Forrestal’s dedication as a public official, his policy-making and management styles, and the structure of his authority as defence secretary. They were not, as some have argued, the result of his ineffectiveness as a policy-maker, “hawkish” attitudes or declining mental health. His collapse, furthermore, was not the natural conclusion of any paranoid delusions or obsessive nature, but rather a result of Forrestal’s dedication to his work at the expense of his own health. This thesis undertakes a content analysis of Forrestal’s writings and an examination of his policy-making approach, concentrating on the evolution and execution of his policy advice and initiatives, as well as the structure of his authority as secretary of defence. It begins with a biographical overview of his life and public service career, as well as an assessment of existing Cold War scholarship and its general tendency to underestimate Forrestal’s significance. The components of his legacy are then analysed thematically, with chapters devoted to his foreign policy influence, his role in the unification controversy and his administrative efforts as defence secretary. Throughout, Forrestal’s career and significance is reassessed both in the application of new theoretical and methodological insights, and the analysis of recently declassified and reorganised documents, particularly the complete and unexpurgated version of Forrestal’s official diaries.

There is an increasing gap between the progress of technological systems and the successful exploitation of these systems through cyber-attack. Whilst the mechanism and scope of cyberspace is progressing with each passing day, risk factors and the ability to process the required amount of data from cyberspace efficiently are proving to be major obstacles to achieving desired outcomes from cyber operations. This, coupled with the dramatic increase in the numbers of cyber attackers, who are constantly producing new ways of attacking and paralysing cyber systems for political or financial gain, is a critical issue for countries that have linked their major infrastructures with Internet applications. The defensive methods currently applied to counter these evolving attacks are no longer sufficient, due to their preventive and reactive nature. This research has developed a new Active Situational Awareness theoretical model for Active Defence that aims to enhance the agility and quality of cyber situational awareness in organisations in order to counter cyber attacks. Situational Awareness (SA) is a crucial component in every organisation. It helps in the assessment of an immediate situation in relation to the environment. Current SA models adopt a reactive attitude, which responds to events and works in passive manner to any progressing enemy cyber attack. This creates a defensive mind-set and consequently influences the operator to process and utilise knowledge only within the concept of attack prevention. Thus, one can assume that operators will only gather certain knowledge after the occurrence of an attack, instead of actively searching for new intelligence to create new knowledge about the cyber attack before it takes place. This research study introduces a new approach that incorporates an Active Defence posture; namely, a ‘winning attitude’ that conforms to the military stratagems of Sun Tzu, where operators always engage attackers directly in order to create new knowledge in an agile manner by deploying active intelligence-gathering techniques to inform active defence postures in cyberspace. This also allows the system being protected to remain one step ahead of the attackers to ultimately defeat them and thwart any costly attacks. To back these statements, this study issued a survey to 200 cyber defence and security experts in order to collect data on their opinions concerning the current state of Active SA. Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) was then employed to analyse the data gathered from the survey. The results of the analysis revealed significant importance of Active Offensive Intelligence gathering in enhancing Cyber SA. The SEM showed there is a significant impact on SA Agility and Quality from Active Intelligence gathering activities. Further to this, the SEM results informed the design of the serious gaming environments utilised in this research to verify the SEM causality model. Also, the SEM informed the design of a SA assessment metric, where a behavioural anchor rating scale was used along with ground truth to measure participant SA performance. The results of this experiment revealed that there was 2 times better enhancement in cyber Situational awareness among those who did utilise active measures compared with participants who did not which mean almost double and this shows the importance of offensive intelligence gathering in enhancing cyber SA and speed up defender decision making and OODA loop. This research provided for the first time a novel theory for active cyber SA that is aligned with military doctrine. Also, a novel assessment framework and approaches for evaluating and quantifying cyber SA performance was developed in this research study. Finally, a serious gaming environment was developed for this research and used to evaluate the active SA theory which has an impact on training, techniques and practice Deception utilisation by Active groups revealed the importance of having deception capabilities as part of active tools that help operators to understand attackers’ intent and motive, and give operators more time to control the impact of cyber attacks. However, incorrect utilisation of deception capabilities during the experiment led operators to lose control over cyber attacks. Active defence is required for future cyber security. However, this trend towards the militarisation of cyberspace demands new or updated laws and regulations at an international level. Active intelligence methods define the principal capability at the core of the new active situational awareness model order in to deliver enhanced agility and quality in cyber SA.

The defence by the defence counsel during the trial Abstract The aim of the thesis is not only to analyze both the position of the defence counsel and the accused in criminal proceedings, including their rights and obligations arising from this position, but in particular to define the limits in which both the accused and the defence counsel can exercise the right of defence. The content of the thesis is divided into an introduction, six chapters and a conclusion. The introduction summarizes the aims to be achieved in the thesis. It emphasizes the importance of the right to a fair trial, which includes the right of defence and which is an integral part of the rule of law concept. The first part deals with a brief historical excursion into the history of the position of the defence counsel and the accused in criminal proceedings, with particular emphasis on the legislation applicable in the territory of the present Czech Republic. In the second chapter, the rights and obligations of the accused are analyzed, especially but not only in the trial. Emphasis is placed on defining the limits of the accused's right of defence and the reasons why such restrictions exist in the legal system. The third and fourth chapters are then devoted to the defence counsel, his rights and obligations arising from his position in...

This thesis is a study of what is said to be at issue in the nuclear weapons debate and constitutes the beginning of an attempt to understand its nature and significance . The technique adopted has been to offer an initial presentation of rival rationales in order to introduce the main concepts and show something of the force of these developed, positions (Vol I pp 7-30) . The two rationales are then related point by point , to give the analytical framework used in the subsequent interviews (pp 31-9) . Each pair of points is expanded and commented upon , and detailed references are given to the books and articles from which the analysis was drawn (pp 40-214) . The next section relates all of this briefly to the main party platforms in Britain , as of June 1987 (pp Zt 1- zt ) Volume II is made up of complete sets of responses to the framework of questions generated in the earlier chapters . The advantages of this method are i that in each case the rationale is laid out verbatim 9 so that premises are explicitly stated and the dependence of subsequent upon prior arguments is clearly seen . This in itself is very rarely done which is why so many proposed policies are so often , and so widely misunderstood . that , because all those consulted have responded to the same set of questions , their alternative sets of answers can be compared with one another point by point . This is the crucial and unique advantage of the approach adopted here . It ensures that what is at issue can be precisely pinpointed. The results as recorded here are in themselves striking and illuminating More important still they open the door to detailed future investigation of a kind which can be done in no other way.

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From a logical point of view, it is obvious that a large military build-up must have occurred in the Soviet Union during some period preceding World War II. The purpose of this dissertation is to analyse the military objectives of the Soviet leadership, to examine how such objectives were formulated in public statements and internal decisions, to determine whether they were supplemented or competed with industrialisation, and to see to what extent they were accomplished. This study formulates a new analytical approach to Soviet rearmament as a process. The purpose in this regard is limited to establishing a framework for further empirical studies. This analytical model will be tested on a few selected branches, rather than to give an exhaustive description of the whole Soviet defence industry. Given the archival access, the primary purpose is to determine exactly what kind of plans were designed by the military. Such an approach raises several questions: Was there a specific pattern of planning in the defence sector? Did the defence industry apply methods that differed from economic planning in general? Did the combination of military goals with those of the industrialisation in general form a specific Soviet model of planning? In other words, will the new knowledge concerning the military targets in planning change, or even require revisions of our views on the planning system as such? To elaborate on this analytical approach, the scope of the study has been limited in time and space; to the years 1926-1937, to the defence industry in a narrow sense and to the highest decision-making circles in the Party, State, military and planning organisations. The central actor in this study is Mikhail Tukhachevskii, acting as Chief of Staff at the time when this study commences, and as a Deputy Defence Commissar and Chief of Armaments in the mid-1930s. Tukhachevskii’s flamboyant career during the Russian Civil War and the Soviet-Polish war in 1920 had already made him a famous personality in the mid-1920s. The implications of Tukhachevskii’s elaboration of new warfare doctrine for the industrialisation of the Soviet Russia are taken up. The two basic questions for this study are: Which were his strivings with regard to the new weapon producers? What was the result of his involvement in industrial management and mobilisation. The study covers the development of Soviet defence industry planning from 1926 to 1937. The starting-point of 1926 was chosen because it was then that defence matters, for the first time since the Russian Civil War, were again high on the political agenda. The choice of 1937 as the final year of this study is motivated by both historical factors and the available sources. By then, a clear pattern of defence planning system had emerged. Several reforms designed to synchronise the military and planning organs had been implemented. In other words, a fixed structure for defence industrial planning had taken shape. Thereafter, in the "Geat Terror" of 1936-38, a whole generation of cadres from the Party, state and industrial authorities was wiped out, while the Red Army literally was beheaded. A subsequent study would be required to analyse whether or not the organisation was sufficiently solid to make it possible for the newly-promoted successors to continue the preparations of the country for war. This study is limited in space so as to highlight the specific decisions and plans for the defence industry. When it had become accepted that a future armed conflict would require the resources of the whole economy, and that a new kind of warfare – including long-range aviation and chemical weapons – would inflict damage far behind the front-lines, war preparations came to include most sectors of the economy, the administration, and the educational and transport systems. When the Soviet leaders foresaw a total war, their war-preparedness naturally came to include most sectors of society. The scope of this study is limited, however, to the drafting of and implementations of plans for the armaments manufacturers and, to a certain extent, also for the principle suppliers to the defence industry. The dissertation is cronologically divided into three parts: Part I: Contours of the future war, threat assessments and their implications. Part II: The role of the defence in the first five-year plan – Some reconsiderations. Part III: The military and the defense industry in the second five year-plan, 1933-1937. Each part is structured basically in the following manner. The first chapter in each part deals with military threat perception, its doctrines and its main proposals for the transformation of the armed forces. The organisational network that linked the military, the planners and the high political decision-making bodies forms the following element of each part. In these chapters the author scrutinises both the formal processing of various plans and defence issues through the highest military, planning and Party organs, on the one hand, and the personal in-fighting that went on among outstanding military leaders, on the other hand. These two elements provide the background for the war plans. The war plans are analysed not in their operational, but in their material dimension. The material requirements of the military, expressed in the long-term mobilisation requests and the annual military armaments order were the centrepiece of the investment and production plans of the defence industry and its suppliers. Thereafter, the author analyses the military components in the first, respectively the second, Five-year plans and evaluate the military results of each of these plans. The results deal both with actual armaments productiom during these years, and so far as the indirect estimations allow, with the eventual mobilisation preparedness of the industry. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 1996