L‘Afrique subsaharienne connait des crises et conflits qui menacent aussi la sécurité de l’Europe, des Etats-Unis et du reste du monde.Elle cherche à se sécuriser par elle-même et sollicite l’aide extérieure notamment celle européenne dont on s’interroge quant aux atouts, réalités et perspectives de paix avec l’UE. L’Union Européenne est un partenaire dont l’efficacité garantie par son approche globale et permise par ses instruments multiformes, ACP/CEE-UE et PESD/PSDC, est prouvée au Togo de 1993 à 2005 ; en RDC avec « Artemis » et EUFOR-RDCONGO ; au Darfour avec EUFOR Tchad-RCA ainsi qu’au large des côtes Somaliennes avec EUNAVFOR, mais dont le besoin de renforcement des atouts et d’atténuation des faiblesses conduit à promouvoir les concepts de complémentarité et d’appropriation dans la construction de l’Architecture Africaine de Paix et de Sécurité. Ce qui se fait à travers les opérations et surtout les missions civiles EUPOL et EUSEC en RDC, EUTM « Somalia », EUAVSEC au Soudan du sud, EUCAP Sahel Niger et EUCAP Nestor pour la formation des forces nationales de lutte respectivement contre le terrorisme islamiste et la piraterie maritime. Mais quelles inflexions et améliorations à apporter au Droit européen, panafricain et international, pour notamment des financements innovants et une meilleure coordination et mutualisation des ressources africaines avec des apports multiformes extérieurs suscités par l’attractivité subsaharienne du 21ème siècle ? Un nouveau vaste champ de réflexion. / Sub-Saharan Africa is faced with crises and conflicts that also pose a threat to the security of Europe, the United States and the world at large.Africa seeks to ensure its own security and calls on the aid of foreign partners including Europe. But questions arise concerning the strengths and realities of that partnership and the prospects for peace it offers.The European Union is indeed a partner whose effectiveness - guaranteed by the comprehensive approach embodied in its multifaceted ACP/EEC-EU and ESDP/CSDP instruments - was demonstrated in Togo from 1993 to 2005, in the DRC with "Artemis" and EUFOR RD CONGO, in Darfur with EUFOR Chad-CAR and off the coast of Somalia with EUNAVFOR. Yet the need to highlight its strengths and play down its weaknesses leads it to promote the concepts of complementarity and ownership in the construction of the African Peace and Security Architecture through operations and civilian missions, in particular EUSEC and EUPOL in the DRC, EUTM "Somalia", EUAVSEC in Southern Sudan and Niger Sahel EUCAP and EUCAP Nestor for the training of national forces in the fight against Islamist terrorism and maritime piracy.What adjustments and improvements to European, pan-African and international law are required, with a view, in particular, to more innovative forms of funding and better coordination, as well as a pooling of African resources and the various forms of assistance from foreign contributors attracted by the resources and the economic opportunities of sub-Saharan Africa in the 21st century? This opens up a whole new and wide-ranging debate.

There is little solid research that explores counterinsurgency practices against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), not only from the standpoint of what is being done, but, rather, what should be done based on past COIN successes. Notable works on counterinsurgency in Colombia include the research of Tom Marks, who focused on operational strategy and tactics; Kevin Self, who professes the importance of controlling territory in defeating the FARC, by addressing the social and institutional ills within Colombia itself; and Dennis Rempe, who notes US involvement in shaping Colombia's COIN strategy. Using a comparative case study model, this thesis provides an analysis of Colombia?s counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies and tactics through the lens of successful and unsuccessful COIN operations in Iraq, Algeria, Malaya, South Vietnam, Thailand, Algeria and El Salvador over the course of the 20th and early 21st centuries. After all, no matter how successful a COIN force is militarily, their accomplishments will ultimately be fruitless if the conditions which fuel insurgency remains present. This paper begins by providing the historical context for the conditions which shaped the Colombian social order, which led to the revolutionary movement. It then follows the growth of the FARC, examining that organization?s strengths and weaknesses. The FARC is contrasted by outlining recent COIN transformation efforts within the Colombian government, to include little acknowledged failures and successes, strengths and weaknesses. An important focus is placed on Colombian President Alvaro Uribe Velez? Democratic Security Policy as the model for Colombia?s current COIN efforts. After next examining various ongoing factors contributing to the Colombian insurgency?to include institutional failures, illicit funding and the problem of paramilitary groups?this thesis examines past COIN efforts by other governments. Finally, after applying lessons learned from thee past COIN efforts?cross-referencing historically successful and unsuccessful tactics with tactics used and not used by Bogota in its fight against the FARC?I provide recommendations to the government of Colombia (GOC) on how to improve its COIN efforts. Although it is important to look at this problem set from an external standpoint, we must still factor in internal factors that have limited Colombia?s ability to emerge victorious, such as allowing porous borders, airspace and coastlines; placing a priority on killing or capturing the enemy and not on engaging the population; and the primacy of military direction of counterinsurgency; disregard of basic human rights; an insufficient judiciary structure; failure to halt financial support mechanisms; and the lack of an outlet for political inclusion . From this vantage point, we will be able to see that these elements?when properly implemented?have proven successful over time and may enhance GOC success and ultimately result in victory over the insurgency that has plagued their country for 40+ years