Networks of maliciously compromised computers, known as botnets, consisting of thousands of hosts have emerged as a serious threat to Internet security in recent years. These compromised systems, under the control of an operator are used to steal data, distribute malware and spam, launch phishing attacks and in Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks. The operators of these botnets use Command and Control (C2) servers to communicate with the members of the botnet and send commands. The communications channels between the C2 nodes and endpoints have employed numerous detection avoidance mechanisms to prevent the shutdown of the C2 servers. Two prevalent detection avoidance techniques used by current botnets are algorithmically generated domain names and DNS Fast-Flux. The use of these mechanisms can however be observed and used to create distinct signatures that in turn can be used to detect DNS domains being used for C2 operation. This report details research conducted into the implementation of three classes of classification techniques that exploit these signatures in order to accurately detect botnet traffic. The techniques described make use of the traffic from DNS query responses created when members of a botnet try to contact the C2 servers. Traffic observation and categorisation is passive from the perspective of the communicating nodes. The first set of classifiers explored employ frequency analysis to detect the algorithmically generated domain names used by botnets. These were found to have a high degree of accuracy with a low false positive rate. The characteristics of Fast-Flux domains are used in the second set of classifiers. It is shown that using these characteristics Fast-Flux domains can be accurately identified and differentiated from legitimate domains (such as Content Distribution Networks exhibit similar behaviour). The final set of classifiers use spatial autocorrelation to detect Fast-Flux domains based on the geographic distribution of the botnet C2 servers to which the detected domains resolve. It is shown that botnet C2 servers can be detected solely based on their geographic location. This technique is shown to clearly distinguish between malicious and legitimate domains. The implemented classifiers are lightweight and use existing network traffic to detect botnets and thus do not require major architectural changes to the network. The performance impact of implementing classification of DNS traffic is examined and it is shown that the performance impact is at an acceptable level.