Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / This thesis discusses risk in Department of Defense (DoD) weapon systems acquisition. It uses the Marine Corps' Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) as a case study in risk management strategy and techniques. The AAAV will provide the Marine Corps with a fast deploying, over-the-horizon, waterborne insertion capability. The AAAV's improvements over the currently fielded Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) will provide Marines with a highly survivable and lethal weapon system ashore. Risk is the possibility of damage, inj ury or loss. The severity of a risk is determined by a combination of both the probability of an unfavorable event occurring and the severity of the event's occurrence. Risks are present in virtually all DoD developmental programs. Programs suffer from risks in technical challenges, unstable system requirements, missing schedule milestones, unpredictable funding and cost overruns. The DoD currently uses techniques to mitigate risks inherent in advanced system development. This thesis analyzes the AAAV's Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) acquisition phase risk management strategy. The thesis concludes by drawing from the lessons learned in the AAAV program during PDRR and analyzing the application of the lessons learned during the AAAV's cu rrent acquisition phase, System Development and Demonstration (SDD) / Captain, United States Marine Corps

During the 2000 presidential race, then Texas Governor George W. Bush advocated transforming and reforming how the Department of Defense (DoD) acquires new weapon systems. He promised a "revolution" that would "skip a generation of technology," in order to "move on to futuristic weapons without necessarily buying all those in development." This thesis examines President Bush's proposal and analyzes the potential impact on DoD and the defense industry. Ultimately the research revealed that there are ways to improve the acquisition process and protect the defense industry. The primary conclusion of the research is that it is feasible to skip current weapon systems in development, in order to begin research and development of the next-generation weapon systems. However, DoD will be impacted through higher operations and sustainment (O & S) costs to sustain existing weapon systems if weapon systems currently in development are skipped. The acquisition professionals that participated in this study believe these O & S costs could increase up to 10% per year for anywhere from five to 20 years depending on the type of system. This thesis makes additional recommendations and areas of further research. / Captain, United States Marine Corps