There have been few attempts to empirically delineate and assess the importance of "external" or "international" factors in the study of comparative politics and political development. The purpose of this thesis is to examine an "international-national linkage" which has been the subject of Considerable speculation butressed with anecdotal evidence. The linkage is between the short term instability of export proceeds of underdeveloped countries and the amount of political violence with in these countries. The independent variables are export instability, export losses, export instability impact, and the impact of export losses. In the first section of the thesis, the external nature of export instability is discussed. Export instability is not always induced externally. The evidence linking export in stability to domestic economic disturbances and economic disturbances to political violence is presented and discussed in the next section. Domestic economic disturbance is an unmeasured intervening variable in this study. There are many methods of computing the instability of export proceeds. Percentage deviations from annual trend values are used in this thesis, with the trend values computed using five year moving averages. The data sources and various measures of political violence available are assessed in terms of validity and reliability. A composite index of "the total magnitude of civil strife," developed by Gurr and Ruttenberg, is used to measure the amount of political violence. The results of across-sectional correlation analysis for a sample of forty-seven underdeveloped countries indicate zero relationships between the four independent variables and political violence. A lack of covariation within the total sample may obscure significant correlations of opposite sign within specified subsamples. Accordingly, the sample is subdivided into three relatively homogeneous socio-economic regions and four political system types. The extent and direction of the relationships does vary according to region and type of political system. The variation is not large. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

A discussion and analysis is offered of Gunnar Myrdal's contributions to the theory of political development. Attention is focused on his conception of the role of the state as an agent of development. The paper is divided into two parts. Part I is concerned with the development of the state in the advanced welfare democracies of the West. We find that this development both affects and is affected by the emergence of an organized institutional infrastructure. We discuss the political development of the West --the development of a strong, capable, and effective state --in terms of the liberal interlude, the organization of markets, the spread of equality and the emergence of the "welfare state" as an "organizational state." We find that Myrdal seriously underestimates the critical requisites for an effective yet democratic "organizational state." Part II discusses Myrdal's application of his model of development to the underdeveloped world. Here we find that Myrdal is ideologically compatible with those elites who stipulate that the state must be the main agent of development. Yet through a discussion of the "modernization ideals" of socialism, political democracy and state planning as well as the exigencies of corruption and personal insecurity we do not find an organized institutional infrastructure underpinning the strong, capable, and effective state. Rather we find the "soft-state." For what we characterize as rational political reasons the "soft-state" is marked by low citizen obedience and few obligations placed on the citizens by the political leaders. We argue that this is intimately related to the low degree of equality between individuals and groups. In fact, since so many receive so little from the outputs of state activity, the state is unable to enforce a network of citizen obligations. We find that the "soft-state" is characterized by two things: ambivalence among the elites; and, stability of the system. Yet this stability is a stability of stagnation not development .On the basis of Myrdal's discussion of the agricultural sector we suggest that the only way the "soft-state" will be hardened into a more capable state is through a selective retrenchment of state activities. It would appear that the underdeveloped world would profit from a liberal interlude of reduced state activities. Moreover, by giving encouragement to those groups in society who are less bound by convention and who do not have a vested interest in the status quo, (e.g. the progressive agriculturalists), it may be possible to secure political development, that is, the development of an organized institutional infrastructure, making for a strong, capable, and effective state. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

This study explores the prospects for the emergence of democratic regimes in developing countries in general and in Muslim countries in particular. This question has both intellectual and policy relevance for the 1990s and beyond. The optimistic view about the future of democracy has been challenged by Samuel Huntington who sees the status of democracy in the world in 1984 as not very different from what it was about ten years earlier. Huntington further claims that among the Islamic countries, "particularly those in the Middles East, the prospects for democratic development seem low." Huntington attributes this to the recent Islamic revivalism, particularly Shi'ah fundamentalism, and the poverty of many of the Muslim countries. This study will test and reject the thesis that Islam is directly responsible for the absence of democracy in the Muslim countries. A model to measure the society-state power index is proposed, with a control for Islam, to observe whether Islam plays a neutral role in the process of democratization or it is a force hindering the inauguration of democracy in Muslim countries. Support for a structural explanation of democratization is found. The failure by the developing countries to inaugurate democracy is due to the uneven distribution of socioeconomic and political power resources. The cultural explanations, e.g. the role of religion, are thus rejected. A total of 87 countries are included in a cross national regression analysis, consisting of 31 Muslim countries, 17 newly inaugurated democracies, and 39 other developing countries. The period under investigation covers 1970 through 1988. This study also has implications for the U.S. and other developed Western countries that are concerned with the persistence of authoritarianism in the developing countries. Some policy proposals are offered as to help establish democracy in developing countries.

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This research seeks to identify the factors that account for the variation in development levels across nations by focusing on the institutional components of development, especially the effects of financial market development on economic and political development. I argue that financial market institutions are critical to economic and political development, and provide a partial explanation for the variation in development observed across nations. Financial market development affects political development indirectly through greater economic efficiency and growth and directly by reducing poverty, increasing economic equality, strengthening the middle class and increasing political participation. Increased financial market development also produces more efficient institutions and eliminates certain perverse incentives in government that result in corruption. The action mechanisms rest largely on the idea that increasing access to financial services allows the lower and middle- income segments of society to smooth their income and invest in high return activities that can lift people out of poverty. These improvements distribute both economic and intellectual resources throughout society and provide greater opportunities for political entrepreneurship from all societal groups. This, along with greater ability to participate either through monetary means or greater time, increases political participation and democratic development. Using a variety of econometric techniques to analyze data on 190 countries over 28 years (1975-2003), I show that financial market development has a significant effect in several areas of development. Specifically, I find that financial market development reduces poverty and income inequality and reduces the level of corruption. Increasing financial market development also increases political competition and civil rights protection in addition to increasing the effectiveness of government and regulatory levels. Ultimately, I assert that while financial market factors have not been previously targeted as sources for development, they may provide an effective policy tool for fostering equitable development in a variety of economic and political situations. I further argue that the state must have a greater role in development than the prevailing neoliberal paradigm prescribes, and must actively seek to develop institutions that support financial market development.